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Introduction
In recent years, both in Poland and across Europe, the problem of internatio-
nal migration has been transformed from an issue which merely concerned
a narrow group of analysts and officials into an area of interest for broad
social circles and an important element of state policy. The significance of
migration as a topic of public discourse has increased considerably. This has
resulted from the emergence of migration challenges which are different
from those that had hitherto existed, and which require new studies to be
conducted and changes to be introduced in government policies. On a global
scale, the total number of migrants has increased (according to the UN Popu-
lation Division, currently there are approximately 200 million migrants world-
wide – in 1980 this number was half that size), the participation of women
in migration processes has increased, and the economic imigration has be-
come a constant element of national labour markets. In addition, the process
by which migrants concentrate in several of the world’s most developed
regions, is constantly ongoing. In Europe, migration has become a key topic of
the public discourse in light of the ever more apparent difficulties with inte-
grating migrants, and as well as the deepening demographic crisis.
Within the framework of the European Union a trend towards a progressing
internationalisation of the migration issues has been observed, which re-
quires current national concepts of migration policy to be changed. To date,
Poland has not developed a coherent concept of its migration policy. However,
mass labour migration, the demographic crisis, and increasing gaps in the
labour market demands that this problem be dealt with urgently.
The area of Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus is characterised by its
own migration specifics. Due to the two waves of enlargement of the Euro-
pean Union, that area more and more strongly participates in an immigra-
tion exchange with EU states. In this situation, the European Union will pro-
bably pay closer attention to migration flows on the territory of the former
USSR. This publication should be treated as an analysis aimed at recognising
and systematising the main migration trends in the states of the EU’s east-
ern neighbourhood. This study contains analyses of both the general trends
and the migration situations in the individual countries of this area.
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This study covers the migration challenges in Eastern European countries
(Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova) and the Southern Caucasus (Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Armenia), that is, in those countries of the former Soviet Union, which
border or will border in the foreseeable future with the territory of the Euro-
pean Union and are recipients of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which are not included in the study, are EU
member states, whereas the Central Asian states do not participate in the
ENP. However, due to numerous legal and factual interdependencies existing
within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the dis-
cussed problem will (when justified) be presented within the perspective of
the entire region.
Considering the difficulties with defining the phenomenon of international
migration, the most general definition of this term has been assumed in this
publication. ‘International migration’ will be deemed to refer to every reloca-
tion of a person outside the borders of his own country of residence, except
for tourist or official trips. From the perspective of a given country, migrants
are either immigrants or emigrants, i.e. persons staying in or leaving the
country. Migrants will also be classified into permanent and temporary cate-
gories. The specifics of the migration situation in the post-Soviet region makes
it impossible to apply the typology of ‘temporary migrants’ recommended
by the UN, namely dividing the migrants into long-term (more than 12 months)
and short-term. This is because (apart from legal migration for settlement
purposes) irregular temporary departures, i.e. those whose duration cannot
be specified, are most typical for this area. Similar difficulties are posed by
the use of the refugee terminology adopted by the UNHCR. Reasons for this
include the fact that in the first period of their independent existence, many
countries assumed entirely different legal solutions, such as registering re-
fugees as forced migrants.
The statistical data presented in the publication should be treated with some
caution. Its imperfect reliability results both from the ineffectiveness of the
migration registration systems in the countries of the area discussed, as well
as their methodological failings. As registration systems were developed du-
ring the Soviet period for the purposes of strictly regimenting the relocations
of persons, they cannot embrace the temporary migrations which are specific
to the present era. The statistics usually cover emigrants who officially liqui-
dated their households and departed permanently. Furthermore, the hetero-
M i g r a t i o n  c h a l l e n g e s
In
tr
o
d
u
c
ti
o
n
6
geneity of the applied definitions of migration and the methods of data col-
lection also constitutes an important problem. This makes comparison of the
received data difficult. It remains an open question as to whether the metho-
dology applied in other regions of the world is able to recognise all the types
of migration flows in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. Yet another
problem is caused by the insufficiently developed data collection infrastruc-
ture (especially in the region’s poorer countries). Difficulties with delineat-
ing all the types of migration flows cause that authorities of the discussed
countries sometimes complete the data provided to them by the registration
offices the so-called VRD (Visas and Registration Divisions) with the border
crossing statistics. Also, the results of national censuses are treated as an im-
portant source which fills the gaps in current statistics. Nonetheless, the data
quoted unquestionably permit certain trends to be perceived, including the
structure and evolution of migration flows.
This publication was developed on the basis of the analysis of available sta-
tistical materials, government documents, studies from analytical centres and
international organisations, newspapers and magazines from the countries
concerned. Also, expert visits to individual countries in the region discussed
have played an important role in our preparation of this material. The study
is composed of three parts:
I. The first discusses the conditions of the migration processes on the terri-
tory of Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus, including the border,
socio-economic and demographic conditions;
II. The second presents the general characteristics of the migration processes
specific to the EU’s eastern neighbourhood;
III. The third describes the characteristics of the migration trends, and the
migration policy of the individual countries in the region.
The publication presents the conclusions and opinions of its authors.
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Theses
General theses
1. The genesis of modern migration movements on the territory of Eastern
Europe and the Southern Caucasus should be sought in the common histori-
cal heritage of this region and the mass relocations of population which took
place in the twentieth century. After the fall of the Soviet Union, external mi-
gration mainly constituted a function of the political and ethnic crises which
emerged in connection with the process of the newly established countries de-
fining their state identity. From the mid-1990s, these processes took on a more
economic nature, and have started to counterbalance the results of socio-
economic problems in the regionís poorer countries, and to supply workers
for the developing labour markets in wealthier countries.
2. The relatively high porosity of state borders, together with the border cross-
ing regimes in force, are important factors affecting the shape of migratory
traffic in the area discussed. Neither demarcation nor even delimitation was
conducted in many areas. The situation is especially complex in the Southern
Caucasus and Moldova, with self-appointed quasi-states controlling some
border areas. Despite the trend among the individual states in the region to
tighten up regulations on the movement of people, there is still a rather libe-
ral border regime in force. A no-visa movement is common, except between
Russia & Georgia and Armenia & Azerbaijan.
3. After the collapse of the USSR, all the countries of the area discussed expe-
rienced a considerable decrease in income and living standards of the popu-
lations. The economic growth recorded in recent years cannot reverse the in-
clination within these societies to labour migration, as there has been no simul-
taneous development of labour markets or increase in salaries. The visible
differentiation in the pace of economic development allows us to divide the
discussed countries into two groups: those which generate average income
(Russia, Belarus, Ukraine) and those which generate low income (Moldova,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia). Even though labour migration also occurs in
the countries of the first group (especially in Ukraine), these countries are
not yet so dependent on remittances sent by emigrants.
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4. The process of the collapse of the USSR coincided with the growing symp-
toms of a deep demographic crisis. This particularly touched the northern
and western areas of the former empire. Since the beginning of the 1990s,
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus have recorded a deepening negative population
growth rate. Also, a considerable decrease in population was recorded in the
Southern Caucasus. However, this mainly resulted from escalating migration
caused by a down reaching economic crisis and armed conflicts. Trends indi-
cate that the demographic situation of individual countries in the area will
continue to deteriorate. Forecasts for Russia and Ukraine do not preclude
population numbers decreasing by over 30% until the mid-twenty-first cen-
tury. Only external migration can ease the negative results of these process-
es. The significance of the Central Asian countries, which still have consider-
able population growth rates, and whose development level is lower than
that of the remaining states of the former USSR, is growing considerably.
5. Migration patterns in the Eastern European and the Southern Caucasian
countries display similar intensity and trends of development. These process-
es were at their fastest immediately after the collapse of the USSR. Currently
they show a gradual trend towards stabilisation. In simple terms, migration
movements in this area can be divided into ethnic and labour migration. Cur-
rently, labour migration is the dominant trend (to a great extent illegal). In
some countries, especially in Russia, the significance of repatriation is grow-
ing. Most migration flows in the post-Soviet region take place within that
area (except for the Baltic states). Yet another common feature of migration
movements consists in its predominantly legally undocumented nature.
6. Migration processes have also become a distinctive feature of the region
discussed. To put it simple, the countries in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood
can be divided into two groups: immigration states (Russia, and to a lesser ex-
tent Belarus) and emigration states (Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, and to a less-
er extent Ukraine and Azerbaijan). The threat of illegal transit migration is
very different – from Ukraine, which lies on the main route of illegal migra-
tion from Southern Asia into Europe, to Armenia, which is located on the pe-
riphery of the transit migration routes. Four countries (the Caucasian states
and Moldova) have experienced armed conflicts on their territories as well as
mass exoduses of their populations. A consequence of these conflicts has been
the presence of a large number of refugees and internally displaced persons
(IDPs).
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7. A new phenomenon which the successor states encountered after the USSR’s
collapse, is irregular transit migration from Asia (South-East Asia and the
Middle East), Africa and countries of the Commonwealth of Independent
States, to Western European countries. The illegal nature of this process
makes it difficult to estimate its real scale and dynamics, or to evaluate the
scale of the threats connected with this phenomenon. However, it is unques-
tionable that this is an extensive burden on the barely developed migration
management systems of CIS countries.
8. The migration policies of the individual Eastern European and Southern
Caucasian countries are at different stages of development. However, migra-
tion systems in all the countries discussed feature several common proper-
ties, such as selectiveness, gaps in legislation and institutional back-up, re-
pressiveness, and high levels of international cooperation. These migration
policies are also influenced by the typical problems of countries undergoing
transformation: institutional weakness, excessive red tape, corruption, and
organisational chaos. It was only several years ago that the problem of eco-
nomic migration was first dealt with, which was too late.
Country theses
RUSSIA
The Russian-language diaspora is the most numerous on the territory of the
Commonwealth of Independent States, and living standards in the Russian
Federation are higher than in most neighbouring countries, which generate
a continually positive migration balance for Russia. At the beginning of the
1990s, migration compensated for most of the population losses resulting
from the negative population growth rate in Russia. Currently, however, this
proportion has decreased considerably.
Whereas in the initial period, ethnic migration was most important among
the migration flows, it is currently economic migration (to a considerable ex-
tent illegal) which is now predominant. Russia is the largest labour market,
which absorbs the excess workforce from neighbouring countries. Russians
as a rule do not emigrate in search of work. The significance of the Russian Fe-
deration as a route for illegal migration seems to be decreasing as the logistic
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costs of smuggling constantly rise, with a simultaneous increase in the degree
of risk.
Russia has succeeded in developing a foundation of the migration manage-
ment system. However, its effectiveness has been reduced by constant reor-
ganisations, a lack of coherent assumptions of the state’s migration policy,
the excessive repressiveness of state structures, and corruption. Russian policy,
as much in the field of migration as in others, bears an imprint of its impe-
rialistic traditions, which affects the sphere of international contacts particu-
larly strongly. The European Union and CIS countries are Russia’s most im-
portant partners in this area. In its contacts with the EU, Moscow has em-
phasised the security issues and freedom to travel, whereas the CIS area is
more frequently treated as a reservoir of cheap labour and re-emigrants who
can ease the negative effects of the demographic crisis.
UKRAINE
The socio-economic crisis which Ukraine experienced in the 1990s resulted
in a vast emigration of its population, both permanent and temporary. Only
in 2005, for the first time in years, did the migration balance of Ukraine reach
a positive value. According to official data, in the period from 1991 to 2004
over 2.5 million inhabitants left Ukraine, and around 2.2 million entered.
There are also several million labour migrants outside the country. Their
main target countries are the Russian Federation, Poland, Italy and Portugal.
Through Ukraine goes intensive transit migration. The main channel of immi-
grants transfer through the Eurasian area cuts through the Russian-Ukrai-
nian border, and then proceeds through Ukrainian territory towards its west-
ern borders.
The migration management system in Ukraine has not been fully developed.
For several years, state administrative reform, which would include the cur-
rent structures responsible for migration issues, has been announced. Ukraine
adopted basic documents in the area of migration and refugees, and has de-
veloped general assumptions for its migration policy. However, this policy
suffers from a temporary nature and the lack of afterthought. Its main objec-
tive is not to allow the country to be transformed into a centre for illegal
migration, and to civilise the labour migration of its citizens. The aims of Ukrai-
ne’s external policy in the area of migration consist of enabling free move-
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ment of its citizens abroad and creating opportunities for them to work
there, as well as obtaining financial assistance and advice from the interna-
tional community to combat illegal migration.
BELARUS
Currently, legal migration movements in Belarus are not distinguished by any
great intensity, and do not have any significant influence on the country’s
economic and demographic situation. Belarus has recorded a positive migra-
tion balance, which is gradually decreasing. Irregular labour emigration may
apply to several thousand Belarusian citizens, who work mainly in Russia and
Poland. Belarus poses a certain challenge to the EU as a possible transit country
for illegal migrants. On the other hand, the Belarusian authorities are inclin-
ed to exaggerate the threat of illegal migration and use this phenomenon as
a leading propaganda slogan in their dialogue with Western countries.
The migration policy management system is in the hands of the force struc-
tures. Security issues are its top priority. Fragmentary migrantsí integration
programmes have been implemented, mainly by international and non-go-
vernmental organisations. The migration management system is becoming
increasingly subordinate to the control of society. In the past two years, the
Belarusian authorities have adopted a series of provisions that hinder the exit
of citizens and entrance of foreigners. These instruments enable the authori-
ties to control the flow of people with respect to the political activity of mi-
grants. The policy of the Belarusian authorities has led to a significant limi-
tation of this countryís activity on the international arena. In such a situation,
Minsk appears in some way to be fated to develop its cooperation within the
framework of the CIS.
MOLDOVA
Since the moment the USSR collapsed, Moldova has had a negative migration
balance. It is the country of origin of many labour emigrants, even though it
is out of the way of the main transit routes in the CIS region. That situation
may change due to the recent EU’s expansion, which included Rumania and
Bulgaria. The scale of labour emigration is one of the most important social
and economic problems in Moldova. It is estimated that there are around
600,000 Moldavians working outside the country, mostly illegally.
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In Moldova, there are both wide-ranging governmental structures to deal with
migration issues and basic concept documents dedicated to these problems.
However, there are not enough efficient implementation mechanisms, includ-
ing in the area of registering migration flows and combating illegal migra-
tion. The authorities aim to take over control of labour migration by signing
agreements with other countries which would legalise the residence and em-
ployment of Moldavians abroad. Meanwhile, the assistance of the European
Union has given Moldova the opportunity to order its migration management
system and to improve control over its borders. Additionally, relationships
with Russia remain a key issue. It is the most important labour market for Mol-
davian economic emigrants, and its influence on the situation in Transnistria
is hard to overestimate.
AZERBAIJAN
Azerbaijan is a country with intensive, yet diminishing, migration flows.
The most extensive migration took place at the turn of the 1990s, when as
a result of a conflict with Armenia, nearly the entire Armenian population
(except for this in Nagorno-Karabakh) fled the country, and mass flow of Azeri
refugees arrived from Armenia and Karabakh. Currently, labour emigration
is the main trend. Russia remains the main target destination for this type
of movement. Azerbaijan is gradually becoming both a transit and destina-
tion country for immigrants and refugees from the East and South Asia. Also,
the presence of the large number of internally displaced people (IDPs) who
are refugees from the Karabakh conflict, should be noted here.
The authorities have been trying to create a comprehensive migration mana-
gement system. Despite a certain progress, including the initiation of combat
with illegal migration and attempts to take over control of migration flows,
it seems in fact that Azerbaijan’s system cannot deal with the increased mi-
gratory pressure, for instance the one caused by worsening of the security
situation in the Middle East.
GEORGIA
Georgia is an emigration country. The main wave of migration movements
occurred in the 1990s. Currently migration flows have stabilised. However,
labour migration from this country is still in progress. The main destination
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country is Russia although, because of the visa requirement for this country,
Turkey and Western European countries are becoming increasingly popular
destinations for migrants. There is a large group of internal refugees from
South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia.
Compared to its neighbours, Georgia has a poorly-developed migration po-
licy which, together with serious deficiencies in the area of border protec-
tion, makes the control over the flow of people difficult. However, the aim
of thoroughly restructuring the migration management system may in the
longer term help in developing of a modern migration strategy. The main
direction of the international cooperation which Georgia has been conduct-
ing in the area of migration is the European one. At the same time, improv-
ing relations with Russia is a very important aim of Georgian policy from the
point of view of social needs.
ARMENIA
The fundamental demographic trend in independent Armenia is the mass emi-
gration of its inhabitants. Russia remains the main target country. The Arme-
nian-Azerbaijani antagonism has resulted in a mass exodus of Azeri inhabi-
tants and an inflow of Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan.
Armenia has a relatively well-developed migration policy with a legal and in-
stitutional basis. However, some of the principles of this policy have not been
enforced, which results from both financial difficulties and the ineffective-
ness of the administration. In the area of migration, Armenia is conducting
an active external policy. It cooperates closely with Russia, which allows the
Armenian citizens to enjoy relatively good legal and social protection on the
territory of the Russian Federation.
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P A R T  I
C O N D I T I O N S
1. Border issues
The problem of border control poses a particular challenge to the countries
of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. It is connected to the fact that most
borders in this area have only had this status for the past 15 years. This par-
ticularly applies to the poorer countries in the region, or those with borders
that are particularly difficult to protect for geographic reasons. Also, cultural
and ethnic factors play an important role – border lines often separate natio-
nal groups or cultural and economic centres, which results in intensive fron-
tier traffic.
The problems connected with borders’ protection also have a political back-
ground. After the collapse of the USSR, the newly-formed governments, which
were preoccupied with strengthening their statehoods, did not attach impor-
tance to securing their borders. The attitude of Russia was also of prime im-
portance. For the first few years after becoming independent it enforced the
concept of protecting the external borders of CIS instead of its own state bor-
ders. It is not possible to bring order to the situation on the borders without
regulating their legal position. Meanwhile, unresolved border disputes are still
in progress among the CIS countries; delimitation has not been conducted
on many sections. Particularly complicated situations are found in the South-
ern Caucasus and in Moldova, where polities that have not been recognised
by the international community, yet which are de facto independent, control
certain sections of the state border. The issue of signing of border agreements
is sometimes used as an instrument in current political games.
The problem of the comprehensive protection of borders of individual coun-
tries in the area became a real political priority relatively recently. It is only
in the past couple of years that the state authorities, which were internally
strengthened yet at the same time concerned with the increasing threats posed
by illegal migration, smuggling and terrorism, have undertaken efforts to im-
prove the situation on their borders. Also, certain external factors have in-
fluenced this evolution, especially changes in Russia’s border policy and its
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willingness to conclude treaties with the European Union on the mutual libe-
ralisation of movement of people.
1.1. Legal status
Usually the ‘old’ borders, i.e. the former external borders of the Soviet em-
pire, have a settled legal status. This includes the borders of Ukraine, Belarus
and Moldova with their western neighbours, i.e. Poland, Hungary, Slovakia
and Romania. Also, the northern and western section of the former external
borders of the Russian part of the empire have had a settled status for years1,
even though the Russian-Norwegian conflict on dividing the Barents Sea shelf
has remained unresolved for some time. There is no territorial dispute between
Russia and Finland, although a few Finnish circles of thought have raised the
issue of reclaiming the lands lost in the course of World War II. The situation
of the eastern Russian borders is somewhat different; the border disputes in
this region were ‘frozen’ during the USSR period, and difficulty in resolving
them fell upon the new Russian authorities. The conflict with China is the
oldest; in the mid-nineteenth century, the Russian empire forced the weaken-
ed Chinese empire to relinquish lands that had traditionally been owned by
the Chinese state. This dispute was resolved in 1991, through a Russian-Chi-
nese treaty on the state border. However, the status of several islands on the
Argun river and on the meeting-point of the Amur and Ussuri rivers was
only defined in October 2004. The Japanese claims in relation to the South-
ern Kuril Islands resulted in both countries still being unable to sign a peace
treaty to end World War II. The ‘old’ borders of the Caucasian states (with
Turkey and Iran) have been formally defined.
After the collapse of the USSR, the successor states took over the territorial
status quo and accepted the former administrative borders which divided the
individual Soviet republics. However, the adoption of the general inviolability
of borders was another matter, as was defining these borders on the ground,
considering that the previous borders between the Union’s republics had not
been treated too strictly. Also, former territorial antagonisms, suppressed dur-
ing the Soviet period, were reawakened. It should be remembered that many
borders inside the Soviet empire were of an artificial nature, which failed to
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1 However the Polish – Russian dispute on sailing principles on the Vistula Lagoon and the Ukra-
inian – Romanian dispute concerning the delimitation of maritime boundary are still in progress.
consider historical, ethnic, economic and transport conditions. Also the finan-
cial factor came into play; demarcation is a costly and time-consuming pro-
cess. In addition, concluding agreements on delimitation happens to be delay-
ed for political reasons.
Russia, as the largest country in the CIS, located at the very centre of the
region, plays the main role in the process of regulating the legal situation of the
region’s borders. It often initiates certain processes in border policy, which
are then taken up by other countries. Russia’s position regarding the legal
regulation of its borders seems to be ambivalent. On one hand, Moscow aims
to achieve strict control over its territory; on the other hand, for political
reasons, it does not seem to be interested in legally setting out borders with
the countries of the former USSR. Such a situation is apparent in the case of
Belarus, which forms a common state with Russia. The Russian authorities
have delayed signing a border agreement with Kazakhstan, which is dense-
ly inhabited by ethnic Russians, for quite some time. The delimitation treaty
between these two countries was recently signed, in January 2005. The Russian
and Ukrainian agreement on the delimitation of the state border was signed
in January 2003, although it only referred to the land border, whose demar-
cation has not yet been initiated. It is not very likely that the division of the
Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait will be resolved in the immediate future.
The positions of both parties are divergent; Russia wants these waters to have
the status of ‘common internal waters’ of both countries, whereas Ukraine
is in favour of separating them. A specific situation takes place at the border
of Russia and the Baltic States. The sole border, which enjoys a regulated
legal status, is the Russian-Lithuanian one.
Following the example of Russia, Belarus obstructs the completion of the
process of regulating its border with Ukraine, treating the ratification of a bor-
der agreement as an argument of pressure in its financial dispute with Kiev.
Meanwhile, the demarcation process of the border between Belarus and the
Baltic states is currently in its final stage. The Moldavian and Ukrainian bor-
der has not been completely defined, as a considerable part of it is under the
control of Transnistrian separatists.
The border situation is particularly complicated in the Southern Caucasus,
where there have existed territorial disputes unresolved for many years. Geor-
gia does not have control over two sections of its border with Russia, which
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are under the control of separatist regimes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Meanwhile Nagorno-Karabakh, which is formally a part of Azerbaijan, as well
as a part of the Azerbaijani territories which previously had not belonged to
that autonomous region, are under the control of Armenian separatists. This
implies that Baku not only does not control an extensive part of its border
with Armenia, but also a fragment of its border with Iran. The legal status of
the Caspian Sea remains unsettled. In addition, the borderline separating the
Russian Northern Caucasus from Azerbaijan and Georgia has not yet been en-
tirely demarcated.
1.2. The border protection system
In all states of the region, the authorities’ aim is to exercise real control over
the flow of people and goods across the borders. For many years since the
collapse of the USSR, the borders between the republics have to a great extent
remained unprotected. This was caused by both political reasons and finan-
cial difficulties. However, an increase in cross-border threats, Russia’s tighten-
ing-up of its regulations for border crossing as well as the decreasing attrac-
tiveness of the integration model proposed by Moscow, have all resulted in
the CIS states initiating a process of state border formation, understood as
an attribute of state autonomy, and as a barrier against external threats. The
process of developing the border protection system in the individual states
of the region and on individual sections of their borders, is at different stages
of development. The best protection systems are on those former external bor-
ders of the USSR where former Soviet infrastructure has been used as their
core.
In the past three years, an increase in efficiency of the border protection sys-
tem can be observed in Russia. In contrast to the 1990s, when Kremlin treat-
ed the protection of the entire state border (except for the Chechen section)
as a secondary issue, the authorities currently wish to control the border more
efficiently. The special focus is put on these parts of the border where Russia’s
economic interests may be infringed, and where threats to its security may
emerge from. This policy is weakened by a certain ambivalence in the conduct
of the Russian authorities, which simultaneously see in it an instrument for
maintaining its influence on the post-Soviet area. The process of improving
border protection has been of a relatively selective nature. For example, Russia
does not seem interested in strengthening its borders with Ukraine and Bela-
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rus. For some time, a similar attitude on Moscow’s part made it practically
impossible to protect the border with Kazakhstan. However, the growing threat
of drug smuggling and illegal migration has forced Russia to start develop-
ing infrastructure along this border. Also, the process of changing the charac-
ter of the border protection system from a linear to an operational system,
as well as the full professionalisation of border divisions is underway.
Since July 2003, the Russian Border Service has been part of the Federal Secu-
rity Service (FSB). This dependency has to a great extent determined the direc-
tion of the border service reform and the nature of its operations. The process
of reforming the territorial structure of the border service, aimed at adapting
it to the administrative structure of the country, is in progress. The first ele-
ment of this reform was to establish new border regions, taking into conside-
ration the division of the country into federal regions. Another stage consists
in appointing lower-level territorial management units. An important element
of restructuring the Border Service was the appointment in May 2005 of a coast
guard.
The Russian border service inherited from the Soviet Union its dual nature,
of a policing and military entity. The police division consisted of units respon-
sible for border control, management and other administrative issues, where-
as the border was protected by typical military units, which often participat-
ed in armed conflicts on CIS territory. Changing the border service into a more
operational body was a declared objective of the authorities for many years.
The process was actually accelerated once the border service was incorpo-
rated into the FSB. The reformed service has been granted new rights in the
area of conducting operational, investigative and intelligence activities. Mobile
special forces are being established. An important element of the reform is in-
troducing fully professional border service units. According to official announ-
cements, this process should finish by the end of 2008.
According to the federal programme entitled ‘The State Border of the Russian
Federation (2003–2010)’, the process of equipping the border with appro-
priate infrastructure is in progress. It is worth noticing that after the col-
lapse of the USSR, around 13,000 kilometres of border remained completely
unprotected. The hugest resources are designated for equipping the border
in the region of the Northern Caucasus. Expenditure of around 15 billion roub-
les is anticipated for this objective until the end of 2007. Also, the process of
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developing the infrastructure on the border with Kazakhstan is underway;
around 400 new border facilities should be established by the end of 20102.
Border systems of other CIS countries are undergoing similar reform. The
Ukrainian State Committee for State Border Protection introduced a territo-
rial structure reform several years before Russia. As a result, five regional mana-
gement divisions were established. In 2003, the Committee was transformed
into the Ukrainian State Border Service (USBS), a formation of a policing cha-
racter, and with special status. The Ukrainian government is planning to turn
the USBS into an entirely professional service by 2008. Even though since the
collapse of the USSR, Ukraine has constructed a considerable number of new
watchtowers and has distributed the border divisions alongside the entire
state border, its protection system still differs considerably from the standards
in force in the European Union. The greatest smuggling of goods and people
takes place across the undemarcated border with Russia. In May 2006, the
Ukrainian authorities informed about the construction of a 400-kilometre
ditch alongside the border with Russia in the Luhansk Oblast.
The border protection system in Belarus is based on maintaining border
troops of military type. The old border infrastructure operates on the Polish-
Belarusian border. With assistance from Russia, Belarus is developing a bor-
der protection system on its borders with Lithuania and Latvia. The border
with Ukraine is protected only by mobile divisions, and the border with Russia
remains unprotected.
1.3. The border regime and visa policy
Factors such as cross-border ethnic, cultural and economic interdependences,
intensity of labour migration and frontier trade, and a lack of social awareness
of a border, all mean that maintaining the openness of borders is of key signi-
ficance for the societies of the countries discussed. A liberal border crossing
system between the CIS countries was introduced in 1992, pursuant to the
so-called Bishkek Treaty. According to this document, citizens from CIS coun-
tries could move in mutual border traffic without visas. Moreover, it was com-
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2 See the interview with the Head of FSB N. Patrushev: Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 26 May 2006; and
interview with General V. Denisov, Head of the Border Protection Management of the Border
Service Organisational Department: Gazeta, 10–12 March 2006.
mon practice to use the so-called internal passports3 and a several other do-
cuments to cross borders. This situation was conductive to the development
of illegal migration and cross-border crime, and failed to generate the antici-
pated integration effects. Therefore in 2000, Russia decided to withdraw from
the Bishkek Treaty4. The termination of this agreement was also motivated by
Russia’s decision to introduce visas for Georgian citizens in connection with
its deteriorating political relations with that country.
The withdrawal of the largest state called into question the necessity of the
further operation of the Bishkek treaty. Individual states in the area started
to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements on no-visa requirements. The
main multilateral agreement of this type is the agreement of 2000, which was
concluded between the countries of the Eurasian Economic Community, i.e.
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,
which joined the organisation in 2006. In practice, the no-visa regime is still
in force in relations between the Eastern European countries and the Caucasus;
the aforementioned visa requirement between Russia and Georgia is an excep-
tion to this policy. Belarus was announcing introduction of the same measures
towards Tbilisi. Moreover, due to the bad relations between Armenia and Azer-
baijan, there is practically no movement of people between these countries.
Another step towards tightening the border crossing regulations in the CIS
area was the introduction of provisions limiting the number of documents
entitling a person to enter the territory of a given country. In principle, this
trend is leading to the recognition of a foreign passport as the only such legi-
timate document. However, in relations between countries which cooperate
closely, the former principles for movement of persons are still in force. The
introduction of the so-called migration cards, which foreigners fill in when
entering the country, also constituted a mechanism aiming at increasing the
efficiency of control over the movement of persons. These cards have been
introduced by Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. Some wealthier countries in the
region also plan the introduction of biometric documents5, and the develop-
ment of a biometrical database for people crossing the border.
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3 Equivalent of ID cards.
4 After previous withdrawal of Turkmenistan and suspension of treaty by Uzbekistan.
5 Until December 2006 Russia issued 2,5 thousand biometric passports in few test regions 
of the country.
In general, there is a visa regime (in some cases one-sided) between the East-
ern European & Caucasian countries and the countries of the European Union.
The countries, which want to facilitate travel abroad for their citizens in the
face of the oncoming expansion of the Schengen area by the new EU mem-
ber states, are seeking to liberalise their visa relations with the EU, and total
abolition of the visa requirement in the long-term. The first such agreement
facilitating mutual visa traffic was concluded between the European Union
and Russia in May 2006. Negotiations with respect to signing an analogous
agreement are in progress with Ukraine (the agreement was paraphed in
October 2006 during the EU–Ukraine Helsinki Summit). Moldova is also aim-
ing for liberalisation6. Those states which have declared Euro-Atlantic inte-
gration as an objective of their foreign policy have unilaterally abolished their
visa requirement for EU and US citizens, among others. Such decisions have
been taken by Georgia and Moldova. Ukraine did not require visas from citi-
zens of western countries in the period between May and September 2005,
and then extended this concession permanently.
In the situation where a border regime becomes stricter, one method for limit-
ing the difficulties connected with crossing the border may be to expand the
border crossings’ infrastructure and optimise the regulations for custom clear-
ance. Nevertheless, the border infrastructure in the CIS countries remains
outdated and insufficiently developed, and the rules for crossing the border
are unclear and facilitate abuses of power. Different executive bodies, which
double up their duties, are empowered to control the border crossings. There
are also private enterprises operating on the border, selling insurance, among
other activities. These places have different statuses, and some of them are
owned by private owners. Many crossings are far away from the border.
A good method for shortening the border crossing time is to introduce joint
border clearances; such clearances function on certain Polish-Ukrainian bor-
der crossings. There are also so-called consultation points on this border,
which facilitate rapid exchange of information about the frontier situation.
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6 For more information see country analyses.
2. The socio-economic situation
The difficult socio-economic situation in Eastern European and Southern
Caucasian countries is the reason of most migration movements. After the
collapse of the USSR, all the countries in the region discussed underwent
a considerable decrease in incomes and living standards, connected with the
breaking of all the previous economic ties and the structural mismatching of
the new economies to the requirements of the free market. Other reasons in-
cluded malfunctioning economic policies. The economic growth recorded in
recent years cannot reverse the inclination within these societies to economic
migration, as there has been no simultaneous development of labour mar-
kets or any increase of salaries. Moreover, these countries differ in the level of
their national incomes and labour demand. They also border on the wealthy
EU, which encourages their citizens to look for employment in European
Union countries. On the other hand, it should be remembered that the decision
to leave the country is not taken by migrants on the basis of a strict analy-
sis of economic conditions, but depends on many subjective factors.
The visible differentiation in the pace of economic development allows us to
divide the countries of Eastern Europe and Caucasus into two groups: those
which generate average income (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine)7 and those which
generate low income (Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia)8. Even though
economic migration also occurs in the countries of the first group (especially
in Ukraine), these countries are not yet dependent on remittances sent by
emigrants. In connection with the considerable increase in prices of energy
resources recorded in recent years, a group of countries exporting petroleum
and gas (mainly Russia, but also Azerbaijan) can also be distinguished. These
countries are recording a fast economic increase, which drives internal de-
mand and stimulates the development of labour markets (for example, the
mining, transport and construction sectors).
2.1. National income and economic increase
According to expert evaluations, in comparison with the final period of the
Soviet empire, the average drop of the gross domestic product (GDP) in post-
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7 Kazakhstan, which is not a subject of this report, should be also included into the list 
of these states.
8 Such typology is used by the World Bank (WB).
Soviet countries in the mid-1990s amounted to 50%9. This rapid drop in GDP
resulted in serious social distortions. Even in the wealthiest Russia, the GDP
has only surpassed that of 1990 as recently as January 2007. The GDP was prin-
cipally falling until the period 1995–1996, to stabilise for a while until the fi-
nancial crisis in Russia in 1998, which also affected the economies of other
countries in the CIS region. In subsequent years, GDP gradually increased,
reaching a particularly high growth in the period 2003–2004, which was caus-
ed by an increase in world prices for energy resources and metals (Table 1).
In 2004, growth in GDP amounted to 7.2% in Russia, and 12.1% in Ukraine.
The strengthening of national currencies, pressure from inflation and errors
made by the authorities of individual countries, accompanying this pheno-
menon resulted in a smaller increase in 2005 and 200610 (this does not refer to
the Caucasian countries).
As can be seen from the table, Russia remains the wealthiest country in the
region, taking the GDP indicator per person into consideration. It is closely
followed by Belarus and Ukraine. The economic growth in Belarus is more
stable, but one-sided and results from close economic relations with Russia,
among other factors. In Ukraine the growth rate tends to be more erratic,
although the country has a greater developmental potential. Azerbaijan
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Country
Russia
Ukraine
Belarus
Moldova
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Armenia
2000
7,205
4,114
4,809
1,515
2,550
2,229
1,983
Paƒstwo
2003
9,182
5,666
6,104
1,977
3,401
2,970
3,524
2005
11,041
7,156
7,710
2,374
4,600
3,615
4,269
2004
7.2
12.1
11.4
7.3
10.2
6.2
8.4
2005
6.4
2.6
9.2
7.0
24.3
7.7
11.7
GDP per capita in PPP* (US$) Real GDP increase (%)
Table 1. Gross domestic product (GDP) in the Eastern European and Southern Caucasian countries
Based on IMF World Economic Outlook Database 2006
* Purchasing Power Parity
9 However these estimates should be treated with certain caution, as the statistical data in
the USSR time were prepared according to a different methodology.
10 The specific economic situation exists in Ukraine, where in 2005 there was a minimal eco-
nomic growth of 2.6% and in 2006 a considerably larger one i.e. 7%.
seems to have the best economic perspectives in the Caucasus, as long as it
uses the profits from its export of petroleum rationally. For years, Moldova
has been the poorest country in the region. The differences in GDP and the
dynamics of the growth of this indicator directly translate into the migra-
tion trends among the societies of the countries discussed. The wealthiest
countries have a considerably lower emigration level, and the recent cycle of
economic growth had a great influence on the general reduction of migra-
tion pressure throughout the entire Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus.
2.2. Labour markets
In the USSR period, official employment indicators were very high, which re-
sulted, among other factors, from the obligation of principle of full employ-
ment as well as the low labour effectiveness. Simultaneously the salaries and
incomes of the population remained at a relatively low, rather homogenous
level. Formal unemployment was practically nonexistent. Salaries did not ful-
fil the function of payment for work, as happened in Western countries; they
were merely one of many forms of social benefits. The structure of the labour
market corresponded with the centrally-planned economic model, focusing
on the development of heavy industry and close production links within the
framework of the USSR. It was thus no surprise that after gaining indepen-
dence, the labour markets of the Eastern European and Caucasian countries
decreased, and the existing employment structure became unfit for the new
conditions. The entire structure required changes; in the 1990s, the level of em-
ployment in industry dropped by several times in comparison with the So-
viet period. Agriculture was developed in the poorer countries of the region.
As emphasised by A.A. Moskovskaya, agriculture became a ‘buffer against un-
employment’ in the CIS countries; cultivation of plots of land became one of the
most important sources of income for these societies11. Additionally, a gradual
increase in the significance of the service sector was observed.
Unemployment (Table 2) also appeared, although still very much hidden, as
the governments of the countries discussed maintained the illusion of total
employment. This was not however backed up by appropriate salaries, consi-
dering the high rates of inflation and jumps in price. This trend was particu-
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11 A. A. Moskovskaya, Zashchita zanyatosty y dohodov naselenya v ‘pyeryehodnyj pyeriod’:
problemy stran SNG.
M i g r a t i o n  c h a l l e n g e s
P
a
r
t 
I.
 C
o
n
d
it
io
n
s
26
larly seen in countries where free market reforms were fragmentary. Thus,
unlike in the Central European countries, the economic crisis was not accom-
panied by mass unemployment but by low payments. This phenomenon
brought forth unofficial unemployment, manifested by employees working
for only a symbolic amount of hours, or taking mandatory leaves of absence.
Moreover, in almost all these countries, an increase in the percentage of the
professionally inactive population was recorded (also among those of work-
ing age). On the other hand, in the CIS region there is a very well developed
shadow employment. According to estimates it includes around 30–40% of
the total working-age population12.
All countries of the CIS experienced a considerable decrease in real salaries
after the collapse of the USSR. Despite the increase in pay observed from the
end of 1990s, it has as yet still failed to reach the level from before 1991. More-
over, these salaries are often set at a lower level than the social minimum,
especially in the poorer region’s countries. Another feature, which has been
characteristic of the Central European countries as well, is differentiation of
pay. Research conducted by the WB shows that this differentiation in CIS states
reached a very high level, typical of developing countries (in Russia this ratio
amounts to 1 to 11)14. Extensive differences are also present among the indi-
12 O. Pavlova, O. Rohozynsky, ‘Labour Markets in CIS Countries’, Warsaw 2005, page 10.
13 This data, obtained from workforce evaluation, usually presents a higher number of unem-
ployed persons than officially registered.
14 World Bank, Enhancing Job Opportunities: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union,
2005, pages 91–92.
Country
Russia
Ukraine
Belarus
Moldova
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Armenia
Paƒstwo
2003
8.9
3.6
3.1
1.2
1.4
...
9.8
Table 2. Unemployment rates in the Eastern European and Caucasian countries in selected years
throughout the 1997–2003 period
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Department of Statistics13
1997
11.2
2.8
2.8
1.7
1.3
8.0
11.0
Paƒstwo
1999
12.2
4.3
2.0
2.1
1.2
5.6
11.5
Paƒstwo
2001
8.7
3.7
2.3
1.7
1.3
5.5
9.8
Unemployment rate (in %)
vidual countries in the region; in 2005, the average nominal monthly salary
in Russia amounted to US$302, and in Georgia to US$50 (Table 3).
The importance of employment as a means for earning a living has been de-
valued by the existence of a high level of hidden unemployment, combined
with low pay, which does not constitute a considerable financial stimulant for
most social groups in the countries discussed. It has also considerably increas-
ed the attractiveness of the economic migration model. On the other hand,
governments’ susceptibility to artificially maintain high employment levels
increases the passivity of a significant part of the population, which receives
its salaries regardless of their personal involvement. Such a situation poses
a threat of jumps in unemployment (and in consequence, an increase in eco-
nomic emigration) in case of an economic crisis, and an inability to further
subsidise a pay system that does not fit market requirements. On the other
hand, passing radical neo-liberal reforms without the assurance of proper
social protection can lead to an increase in the number of people leaving the
country for economic reasons.
2.3. Poverty
One of the most important results of the economic transformation in the
countries of Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus has been a decrease in the
living standards of many social groups, an increase in the number of people
living in poverty, and a reduction of access to social benefits. In the second half
of the 1990s, in most CIS countries over half of society on average remained
below the minimum living conditions. In recent years, the poverty indicators
in the Eastern European and Caucasian countries have improved; according
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Country
Russia
Ukraine
Belarus
Moldova
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Armenia
Table 3. Average monthly pay in 2005 (in US$)
Source: Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS
Average salary
302
220
214
100
140
50
115
to calculations by the WB, between 5 and 20% of the population lives in ab-
solute poverty in the wealthier countries of the region, and more than 40%
in the poorer countries15.
As Table 4 shows, the countries with an average income (Russia, Belarus, Ukrai-
ne) have relatively low levels of population living in conditions of absolute
poverty (US$2 per day) and high indicators of population living on around US$4
per day. Even though the latter group is not extremely poor, it could easily
become poor in the case of economic instability16. Meanwhile countries such
as Armenia, Georgia and Moldova have a large percentage of extremely poor
people. The situation in Azerbaijan is atypical; a relatively small number of
people live in absolute poverty, although almost 70% of the population is poor.
It should be remembered that the data indicated does not include incomes
obtained in the shadow economy, which ease the effects of official poverty.
Analysis of the poverty structure is one of the factors, which help to define
those social groups who are most likely to emigrate. As in other countries in
the world, professionally inactive persons, retired people, families with many
children or incomplete families, the families of the disabled or people who
are only formally employed, are those who are particularly threatened by
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Country
Russia
Ukraine
Belarus
Moldova
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Armenia
2002
8.7
3.2
2.3
55.7
5.2
49.3
54.7
Paƒstwo
2003
1.4
43.4
4.2
51.6
50.4
Percentage of population living 
in absolute poverty (US$2 per day
according to PPP, 2000)
2002
41.0
31.0 
21.0 
90.0
74.0
45.0*
91.0
Paƒstwo
2003
22.0
85.0
70.0
46.0*
93.0
Percentage of population living 
in poverty (US$4 per day according 
to PPP, 2000)
Table 4. Poverty levels in the Eastern European and Caucasian countries in the years 2002–2003 (in %)
Based on I. Sinitsina, Byednost y socyalnaya politika v stranach SNG, Warsaw 2006
* The data referring to the number of people living off around US$4 per day seems incredible, 
as this is smaller than the estimates for people living in extreme poverty (for around US$2)
15 World Bank, Growth, Poverty and Inequality: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union,
2005, page 2.
16 World Bank, Growth, Poverty..., op. cit., page 1.
poverty. In the countries discussed more often than in another places, work-
ing people, mainly those employed in non-restructured branches of the eco-
nomy and in agriculture, are also faced with poverty. Also, people with higher
education are poorer than in other regions. A specific and particularly pover-
ty-sensitive group is refugees and internally displaced persons17.
3. Demographic trends in the CIS area
The process of the collapse of the USSR coincided with growing symptoms
of a deep demographic crisis. This particularly touched the northern and west-
ern areas of the former empire, which are mainly inhabited by populations of
Slavic origin. Since the beginning of the 1990s, all the countries of this region
have recorded deepening negative population growth rates. In Central Asia
and in the Southern Caucasus, demographic trends are of a different nature,
which results from the greater religious and cultural distinctness of these
areas from the centre of the former empire. Central Asia, dominated by Mos-
lem populations, was the most economically backward region of the USSR.
For these reasons, whereas in the western part of the former USSR we observe
demographic processes of a nature similar to those specific to the post-indus-
trial Western world, in Central Asia these processes resemble those occur-
ring in developing countries.
According to forecasts, the most populated countries of the CIS (Russia and
Ukraine) may lose one-third of their populations by the mid-twenty-first cen-
tury. Russian politicians believe that such a turn of events could threaten not
only the state’s power ambitions, but also its very security. With a popula-
tion inadequate for an extensive territory that is rich in natural resources,
Russia will become a ‘morsel’ for aggressive neighbours. In the nearer term, the
decrease in population numbers, and therefore the workforce, may (according
to politicians) stop economic development and strengthen the state’s depen-
dence on raw materials. Ukrainian discussions of this topic mainly empha-
sise the social outcomes of depopulation.
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17 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are persons who were forced or obligated to leave their
place of residence, especially as a result of armed conflict, infringement of human rights or
disasters and did not cross legally recognized state borders; definition used by the UNHCR.
The demographic crisis which the southern and westerns areas of the former
USSR are undergoing is of a system- and civilization-based nature. In compa-
rison with Western Europe, the negative consequences of the crisis are being
magnified through the excessive consumption of high-proof alcohols, low
levels of personal culture and insufficient health care. The development mo-
del which predominates in any given country is difficult to adjust quickly.
Therefore, an active and consistent migration policy seems to be the most
effective method of easing the negative effects of depopulation.
For states faced with the demographic crisis, the territory of the former USSR
is natural ground for competition for the migrants which are desired. The sen-
timents maintained towards former fellow countrymen, numerous family
and social contacts, easy communication, knowledge of the Russian language
and certain cultural patterns make it easier for people raised in this area to
integrate with the societies of other CIS countries. At the beginning of the
1990s, the migration wave was an impulsive phenomenon, connected with
returning to the countries of origin and escaping from areas of conflict. The
Southern Caucasus was a specific migration basin. However, the migration
potential of this region seems to have been exhausted. The importance of the
Central Asian states, which still demonstrate considerable population growth
rates and development levels lower than those of other states of the former
USSR, increases.
3.1. Number of population
Mikhail Tulsky, the author of the above table, attempted to use different sour-
ces, in order to verify the official data regarding population numbers, wishing
to avoid duplication and distortion. It can be particularly clearly seen from
the example of countries such as Turkmenistan and Russia that the numbers
cited in the table differ considerably from those given by the official statistical
authorities. According to the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (RFSSS),
the population numbers in this country as of 1 January 2006 amounted to 142.7
million people, which is more than 3 million more than indicated by Tulsky.
However, he claims that the data from the national census from 2002, taken
by the RFSSS as base amounts, were distorted in some entities of the Fede-
ration (for instance in Moscow and Chechnya), and moreover they do not in-
clude people with unregulated legal status in the calculations. His number of
the permanent CIS population seems to be close to reality. According to data
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from the Interstate Statistical Committee of CIS, this number is much higher,
and amounts to around 279 million people18.
The population number of the CIS area is gradually decreasing. As far back as
in 1993, it was inhabited by over 282.6 million people; in 2006 it was almost
274.9 million, thus 7.7 million people less. Currently the rate of decrease is not
great, as population shortages in some countries are being compensated for
by an increase in this number in other countries, particularly in Central Asia.
In comparison with 1992, the current number of the Ukrainian population
has decreased by over 5 million people (almost 10%), and by over 8.7 million
people (around 6%) in Russia, whereas in the same period the population of
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Country
Azerbaijan 
(including
Nagorno-
Karabakh)
Armenia
Belarus
Georgia
Abkhazia
South Ossetia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Transnistria
Russia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Ukraine
Entire CIS
Table 5. Permanent population in CIS countries in the years 1989–2006 (in thousands of people, 
as of 1 January of a given year)
Source: Demoskop Weekly No. 237/8 (6–18.03.2006) and data from a national census conducted 
in the USSR in 1989. The so-called quasi-states are marked by italics in the table
1989
7,021
3,305
10,152
5,409
16,464
4,258
4,335
147,022
5,903
3,523
19,810
51,452
278,654
1992
7,324.0
3,694.0
10,198.0
4,865.2
521.0
81.2
16,451.7
4,502.0
3,643.0
714.0
148,325.6
5,505.6
3,970.0
21,106.3
51,802.0
282,658.6
2002
8,141.4
3,212.9
9,950.9
4,371.5
213.5
50.0
14,851.1
4,946.5
3,413.1
578.0
142,782.2
6,375.5
4,889.0
25,115.8
48,221.1
277,112.5
2004
8,265.7
3,212.2
9,849.1
4,315.2
214.4
49,4
14,951.2
5,037.3
3,392.7
562.0
141,071.4
6,640.0
4,965.0
25,707.4
47,442.1
275,675.1
2005
8,347.3
3,215.8
9,800.1
4,289.1
214.6
49.2
15,074.8
5,092.8
3,386.0
554.0
140,317.8
6,780.4
5,008.0
26,021.3
47,100.5
275,251.7
2006
8,436.5
3,219.4
9,750.2
4,264.0
215.0
49.0
15,217.7
5,138.6
3,374.0
546.0
139,582.3
6,913.0
5,051.0
26,328.0
46,749.2
274,833.9
18 www.cisstat.com/rus/060204.htm
Turkmenistan has increased by over 1 million people (around 25%), Uzbeki-
stan by 5.2 million (around 25%) and Tajikistan by 1.4 million people (around
26%). These processes have caused the proportionate participation of Russia
and Ukraine in the population of the CIS area to decrease. It should be antici-
pated that over the next few years the population of Russia will constitute
less than half of the total population of the CIS. There are still differences in
population density among individual countries in the region; in Moldova, for
example, there are 111 people per square kilometre, in Kazakhstan only 5 peo-
ple, and in Russia 8.
3.2. Natural growth
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Country
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Belarus
Georgia
Moldova
Russia
Ukraine
Table 6. General fertility rate in selected countries in the CIS area (number of births per 1000 per-
sons) in the period 1950–2003
Source: www.demoscope.ru/weekly/spp/sng_cbr.php
1950
40.60
33.70
25.50
24.40
38.90
26.90
22.90
1960
42.60
40.10
24.45
24.70
29.30
23.20
20.50
1970
29.20
22.10
16.24
19.20
19.40
14.60
15.20
1980
25.20
22.70
16.01
17.70
19.80
15.90
14.80
1990
27.24
24.00
13.98
17.10
17.70
13.40
12.70
2000
14.80
9.00
9.40
11.00
10.20
8.70
7.80
2001
13.60
9.10
9.20
10.80
10.04
9.08
9.31
2002
13.50
10.00
8.94
10.70
9.85
9.73
8.00
2003
15.80
11.10
9.20
11.20
10.10
10.10
8.20
Country
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Belarus
Georgia
Moldova
Russia
Ukraine
Table 7. General mortality rate in selected countries in the CIS area (number of deaths per 1000
persons), in the period 1950–2003
Source: www.demoscope.ru/weekly/spp/sng_cbr.php
1950
11.10
12.00
8.00
14.40
11.30
10.10
8.50
1960
6.70
6.80
6.60
6.50
6.42
7.39
6.90
1970
6.70
5.10
7.63
7.30
7.39
8.68
8.80
1980
7.00
5.50
9.90
8.60
10.09
11.02
11.35
1990
6.00
6.20
10.75
9.00
9.72
11.20
12.13
2000
5.90
6.30
13.48
10.70
11.33
15.33
15.39
2001
5.60
6.80
14.07
10.50
11.04
15.62
16.43
2002
5.70
8.00
17.78
10.70
11.55
16.25
14.00
2003
8.80
7.00
14.50
11.10
11.50
15.30
16.30
In the 1960s, the fertility rate exceeded the mortality rate by almost three-
fold in all the countries in the region. In Azerbaijan and Armenia, the differen-
ce was nearly sevenfold. It is interesting to note that in this period, the diffe-
rence in number of deaths per 1000 inhabitants between individual USSR
republics were minimal. However, the process of differentiation gradually
started to take effect. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the num-
ber of deaths per 1000 inhabitants in Azerbaijan and Armenia was nearly twice
lower than that in Russia or Ukraine. Throughout the past half century, the
general mortality coefficient in the Southern Caucasian countries has only
slightly increased (mainly in Georgia), although in the countries with a majo-
rity Slavic population it was doubled. In Ukraine, as early as the beginning of
the 1990s, the number of deaths and births was almost equal. In 2000,
throughout the entire region, apart from the Southern Caucasus, the mortality
rate has exceeded the analogous fertility rate. In Ukraine, where the situa-
tion has been most difficult, this difference was twofold.
An increase in the mortality rate is the key to explaining the phenomenon
of negative population growth rate in such countries as Russia, Ukraine and
Belarus, as the pace of the decrease in the fertility rate has been comparable
in all the countries of the region. It should be anticipated that negative popu-
lation growth rate trends will stabilise for a longer period, and will gradually
include all countries, except most probably Azerbaijan.
The population in Russia and Ukraine constitutes nearly 90% of the popula-
tion of the area discussed; therefore, the demographic processes taking place
in both countries should be studied in greater detail, as they will have a do-
minant impact on the entire region.
For the first time in its modern history, in 1992 Russia came into contact with
the problem of a negative population growth rate. Since this turning point,
the number of deaths has permanently exceeded the number of births by over
700,000 cases per year. According to specialist evaluations, this trend will
continue until at least midway through the twenty-first century. Whereas in
the initial period, the negative growth rate was considerably compensated
for by a positive migration balance, in the latter period, this compensation
did not exceed 10% per year. The negative growth rate was accompanied by
a shortening of an average life expectancy, which implies that Russia is expe-
riencing a specific civilization regression.
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Ukraine had encountered the phenomenon of a negative population growth
rate in 1991, even before Russia. In 1996, this exceeded 300,000 people per
year, and it has not dropped below that level ever since. Ukraine’s demogra-
phic situation was even more complicated by the fact that for a long time it
had had a negative migration balance, which in the period 1994–2001 had
exceeded 100,000 people per year on average. The correlation of these two co-
efficients makes the Ukraine’s population fall particularly fast. Only in 2005
did Ukraine register a positive migration balance (4,600 persons). The demo-
graphic forecasts for Ukraine also anticipate the maintenance of this nega-
tive rate of population growth, at least until the mid-twenty-first century,
even though the rate of decrease should slow down.
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Year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Number of births 
(in thousands)
1795
1588
1379
1408
1364
1305
1260
1283
1215
1267
1312
1397
1477
1508
1460
Number of deaths 
(in thousands)
1691
1807
2129
2301
2204
2082
2016
1989
2144
2225
2255
2332
2366
2298
2303
Difference
(in thousands)
104
-219
-750
-893
-840
-777
-765
-706
-929
-958
-943
-935
-889
-790
-843
Life expectancy
69.01
67.89
65.14
63.98
64.64
65.89
66.64
67.02
65.93
65.27
65.30
64.80
64.90
Table 8. Population growth rate and life expectancy in Russia, 1991–2005
Source: L. Rybakovsky, Demographycheskoye budushcheye Rossii y migracyonnye protsessy. Socis,
3/2005; Russian Federal State Statistics Service
3.3. Age structure
As shown in Table 10, the societies of the CIS countries are aging, even though
the pace and nature of these respective processes are different. Between
1989 and 2005, the percentage of children aged under 14 dropped in all coun-
tries. The most significant drops were recorded in Russia, Moldova and Ar-
menia, and amounted to 8 percentage points. The smallest drops were record-
ed in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 4 and 5 percentage points respectively.
In Ukraine and Russia, children under 14 currently constitute only 15% of the
population, whereas in Tajikistan they constitute up to 38% of the population.
In the Slavic countries and Armenia, the number of seniors (65+) has signifi-
cantly increased. In Ukraine they already outnumber the category of children
under 14, and soon the situation will be similar in Russia and in Belarus. The
percentage share of the oldest citizens in the Ukrainian population is four
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Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Number of births
(in thousands)
657.2
630.8
596.8
557.5
521.5
492.9
467.2
442.6
419.2
389.2
385.1
376.4
390.7
408.6
427.3
426.1
Number of deaths
(in thousands)
629.6
669.9
697.1
741.7
764.6
792.6
776.7
754.2
719.9
739.2
758.1
745.9
754.9
765.4
761.3
782.0
Difference
(in thousands)
27.6
-39.1
-100.3
-184.2
-243.1
-299.7
-309.5
-311.6
-300.7
-350.0
-373.0
-369.5
-364.2
-356.8
-334.0
-355.9
Lifetime 
expectancy
69.30
68.67
67.98
67.22
66.93
67.36
68.08
68.32
67.91
68.33
68.32
68.24
68.22
Table 9. Population growth rate and life expectancy in Ukraine, 1990–2005
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine
(www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2005/ds/nas_rik/nas_u/2002.html)
times higher than in Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. In consequence, at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century the average age of the statistical Ukrainian
was 39 years, of his Russian counterpart 38 years, and of the Tajik and Turk-
men it was only 23. In the future, these indicators will determine the dyna-
mics of the demographic processes on the territory of the CIS, among other
changes in population proportions which will be to the advantage of the Cen-
tral Asian countries. Nevertheless, even in this region the population growth
rate should start weakening eventually.
3.4. Nationality structure
The USSR was a melting-pot of over 100 nations. Fifteen of them had their own
republics, which formed a federation. The state’s authorities, however, con-
ducted a policy which refused to take the ethnic differentiations of these terri-
tories into consideration. Entire nations were deported; masses of workers and
specialists were transferred from one place to another, consciously aiming to-
wards a unification of the state’s ethnic structure. The term ‘Soviet nation’ was
even devised; in this way a nation was established on a basis of an ideology,
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Country
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Russia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
1989
33
30
23
25
32
38
28
23
43
41
22
41
Paƒstwo
2005
25
22
16
19
25
31
20
15
38
37
15
36
Age group 0–14 years
1989
63
64
67
66
62
58
64
67
53
56
67
55
Paƒstwo
2005
68
68
70
68
68
63
70
71
58
59
69
60
Age group 15–64 years
1989
5
5
10
9
6
5
8
10
4
4
12
4
Paƒstwo
2005
7
11
15
13
8
6
10
14
4
4
16
4
Age group 65+
Table 10. Age structure of societies of the CIS countries (in %)
Source: Demoskop Weekly, nr 235/6, 20.02–05.03.2006; 
http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2006/0235/barom01.php
instead of an ethnic origin. As a result of this policy, the percentage share of
native population gradually decreased in most republics. According to the
1989 census, in Kazakhstan the Kazakhs constituted merely 39.7% of the re-
public’s population, which was the lowest indicator for the entire USSR. Ar-
menia was the most ethnically homogenous republic, with Armenians con-
stituting 93.3% of the population.
After the collapse of the USSR, the authorities of the newly independent states
radically changed the principles of their nationalistic policy, intending to
strengthen the positions of the titular nations. The process of spontaneous re-
patriation and the reunification of families was commenced. In several regions,
particularly in the Caucasus and Moldova, armed conflicts took place, which
then resulted in waves of migration. It was easiest to leave such areas of in-
coming population. An increase in xenophobic attitudes took place. There were
cases of discrimination against the so-called aliens (including their access to
managerial positions). They were often informed that they were only guests
and not always welcome ones.
The latest censuses registered considerable changes in the nationality struc-
tures of the CIS countries. In all these states except for Russia, the share of
the native population increased in the national structure. According to data
from 2001, the percentage of Armenians in Armenia amounted to 98%. In Ka-
zakhstan, the percentage of Kazakhs in 1999 had already reached 53%. Even
in Ukraine, with its dramatically shrinking population, the percentage of Ukrai-
nians increased from 72.7 to 77.8% between 1989 and 2001. This was caused
by the mass migration of Russians as well as assimilation processes notice-
able among this minority. Similar processes are also found in Belarus.
Russia was the only country in the CIS, where in both absolute numbers and
percentage terms, the proportion of titular population has decreased. This
has been an on-going trend for at least half of the previous century. Accord-
ing to a1959 census, Russians constituted 83.3% of the population of the
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, in 1979 82.6%, in 1989 81.5%,
and in 2002 79.8% of the population of the Russian Federation. The mass in-
flux of Russians migrating from the CIS region was not able to reverse this
trend, only to slow it. The cause of the decrease was that ethnic Russians, in
contrast to some native nations of the Russian Federation (including Che-
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chens and nations of Dagestan), featured a negative population growth rate,
as did representatives of the incoming nations.
It seems that the trend of the percentage share of Russians in the population
of the Russian Federation to decrease will be of a permanent nature. In con-
sequence, this could significantly influence the assumptions of the migra-
tion policy of the Moscow government. It must take into consideration the
increase in xenophobic trends, which have their origin in the shrinking sta-
tus of possession of the Russian ethnos, among other factors. In such situa-
tions, opening up to culturally different immigrants may meet with intense
social resistance and lead to the worsening of internal conflicts.
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P A R T  I I
G E N E R A L  T R E N D S
Migration patterns in the Eastern European and the Southern Caucasian
countries show similar intensity and development trends. These processes
were most rapid immediately after the collapse of the USSR. Currently, they
show tendency towards gradual stabilisation. Also, their conditions have been
subject to evolution. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, external migra-
tion mainly constituted a function of the political and ethnic crises which
occurred in connection with the newly-established countries forming their
national identities. Since the mid 1990s, these patterns have started to take
on an economic nature, to balance the effects of socio-economic problems in
the poorer countries of the area, and to supply workers for the developing
labour markets in the wealthier counties.
A common feature of migration movements in the countries discussed is their
irregularity19. Migration processes have had a considerable influence on the
shape of the post-Soviet countries, their national composition and social
structure, and the spread of particular cultural patterns.
On the other hand, migration patterns in individual countries of the region
have many features that differentiate individual states from each other.
In simplified terms, different economic and demographic potentials of these
countries enable to divide them into two groups with respect to the charac-
teristics of their migration flows: immigration countries (Russia, and to a less-
er extent, Belarus) and emigration countries (Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, and
to a lesser extent, Ukraine and Azerbaijan). Also, the threat of illegal transit
migration is very different – from Ukraine, which lies on the main route of
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19 The term irregular migration (undocumented, unauthorised) implies migration movements,
which take place against the law of the source, transit or – most often – the destination state.
It usually refers to illegal crossing of the border or using false documents while crossing, but
also to illegal stay on the territory of a given country or illegal work. This type of migration
is often called illegal. The terms irregular migration is used among other by the UNHCR, The
Council of Europe, OSCE, IOM, ILO; whereas the European Union uses the term illegal migra-
tion; for more detailed information refer to: K. Koser, Irregular migration, state security and
human security, paper prepared for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of Global
Commission on International Migration, September 2005.
illegal migration from Southern Asia into Europe, to Armenia, which is locat-
ed on the periphery of the transit migration routes. Four countries (the Cau-
casian states and Moldova) have experienced armed conflicts on their terri-
tories, as well as mass exoduses of their populations.
1. The dynamics and areal structure 
of migration processes
The genesis of the modern migration movements in Eastern Europe and the
Southern Caucasus should be sought after in the common historical heritage
of this region. For centuries, it was part of the Russian (Tsarist) empire, and
then the USSR. Slavic settlers expanded alongside Russia’s conquest of the
new lands on the periphery of the empire. Over time, the dislocation of peo-
ple became a mass phenomenon.
In Stalinist times, the authorities deported entire nationalities (including Ger-
mans, and the nations of the Northern Caucasus) or unwanted social groups
(mainly rich peasants). Administratively regulated dislocation of people to
newly established industrial centres was a common practice at that time.
As the external borders of the USSR were closed, and individual republics dif-
fered in their degree of economic development and demand for workforce,
the Soviet empire also recorded intensive voluntary migration.
At the beginning, migrations within the USSR took place in one direction –
from the western ends of the state to the east of Russia and towards North-
ern Kazakhstan, and rarer to the other republics of Central Asia and the Cau-
casus. Intensive flows were also recorded between neighbouring republics,
especially those that were culturally and linguistically related.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Slavic demographic reserves started to run low,
and the Russian-speaking population started to return to the central regions
of the empire. Also, Moldavians and native inhabitants of the Southern Cau-
casus began to emigrate to Russia and Ukraine more often. These trends pro-
ceeded until the collapse of the USSR.
That collapse resulted in several fundamental changes in the migration proces-
ses. Firstly, the internal migration which had hitherto taken place became ex-
ternal migration. Secondly, the external borders were opened, and the USSR re-
publics became independent states with their own legislations and borders.
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Under new political conditions a spontaneous migration of population com-
menced, as part of the people wanted to return to the countries which they
considered their homeland, and to reunite with their families living in dif-
ferent countries of the former empire. Also, soldiers scattered all around the
region returned to their countries of origin. Moreover, as a result of armed
conflicts (Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Tajikistan),
several million people were forced to leave their place of residence.
The collapse of the USSR resulted in new social and economic conditions: the
deterioration of the population’s living standards, inflation and unemploy-
ment, as well as the possibility to undertake short-term economic migration
or frontier trade.
All these factors resulted in great dynamics of external migration movements,
which nevertheless – at least according to official statistics – was lower than
the migratory dynamics inside the USSR in the second half of the 1980s.
Russian researchers emphasise that in contrast to general opinion, the mo-
vement of people between individual countries of the CIS decreased after the
collapse of the USSR, which is connected, among other factors, with the eco-
nomic and political crises in the new independent states and the diminish-
ing possibility of legal migration20. On the other hand, it should be remem-
bered that in light of the administrative chaos which took place in this period,
part of the migration movements was not registered. Moreover, as was not-
ed by V. Yontsev and I. Ivanhiouk, migration patterns specific to the current
era demonstrate a greater participation of temporary migration. Once this is
taken into consideration, it turns out that the total migration in Russia in
the years has 1989–2001 increased by several times21. Thirdly, internal mi-
gration is governed by different laws, and is usually more numerous.
As shown in the graph above, the intensity of migration exchange has succes-
sively decreased; between 1990 and 2000, migration flows within the frame-
work of the CIS decreased fourfold. The greatest dynamics was observed at
the beginning of the 1990s (nearly 2 million crossings per year). Until around
1994–1995 it remained at a relatively high level. In the second half of the
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20 See V. Tishkov, Z. Zayonchkovskaya, G. Vitkovskaya, ‘Migration in the countries of the for-
mer Soviet Union’, paper prepared for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of Global
Commission on International Migration, September 2005, page 3.
21 V. Yontsev, I. Ivanhiouk, ‘Russia in the world migration flows: trends of the last decade’, 
World in the Mirror of International Migration, Vol. 10, Moscow 2002, page 50.
decade it decreased considerably. This may be linked to the end of forced mi-
gration and repatriation, the economic crisis in Russia and a trend towards
making the legal bases for movement of people stricter, among other factors.
In 2002, migration exchange amounted to only 660,000 crossings. In the pe-
riod 1991–2001 in all the countries discussed, the number of immigrants (least
in Russia, most in Armenia) as well as the numbers of emigrants (most in Rus-
sia, least in the Caucasian countries) decreased22. At the same time, it should
be remembered that in reality, the intensity of flows had been higher, at least
at the beginning of the 1990s, because a large part of this motion was not
recorded in migration statistics, including the movement of soldiers or the
escapes of forced migrants. Moreover, since mid 1990s temporary economic
migration, which is difficult to register, took the lead.
Most migration flows in the post-Soviet area still occur within the framework
of that area (with the exception of the Baltic States). Whereas at the begin-
ning of the 1990s, all the countries discussed (except Russia) recorded both
mass exoduses and fairly smaller immigration of people from abroad, in the
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22 Z. Zayonchkovskaya, ‘Dyesyat’ let SNG – dyesyat’ let migracyj myezhdu stranamy-uchast-
nykamy’, Demoscope Weekly, No. 45–46, 3–16 December 2001.
Figure 1. Migration flows dynamics between the CIS countries in the years 1989–2002 (persons 
in thousands)
Source: V. Tishkov, Z. Zayonchkovskaya, G. Vitkovskaya, ‘Migration in the countries...’, op. cit., page 4
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course of the past decade they have definitely become immigration or emi-
gration countries. The first group should include Russia as well as Belarus.
For many years the latter has maintained a migration balance with all the CIS
countries at a positive, yet not too high level. There is an individual situation
in Ukraine, which had been a country with a mass influx of members of the
Slavic nations and the Tatars, but also displayed more numerous, economi-
cally motivated emigration. The Caucasian countries and Moldova should be
included among the typical emigration countries.
Russia constitutes a centre of migration movements on the territory of the CIS.
Around 75% of all immigrants in the CIS region are in this country (the figure
was around 40% in 1989). According to official statistics in the years 1991–2000,
Russia accepted 6.9 million immigrants from post-Soviet countries23. Accord-
ing to the latest report prepared by the United Nations in 2005, 12.1 million
immigrants inhabited the territory of Russia, which ranked this country se-
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23 See Part III, Country Analysis on Russia.
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Figure 2. Migration balance in individual countries of the area in 1989 and 2000
Based on Demoskop Weekly, No. 45–46, 3–16.12.2001; http://demoscope.ru/weekly/045/tema04.php
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cond with respect to the amount of migrant population (just behind the
USA)24. According to official statistics, most immigrants came in 1994. This
number considerably decreased in the following years, and reached a stable
level at the beginning of this century. In this context, the year 2005 was
noteworthy as Russia recorded its greatest growth rate in four years25. This
geographic one-sidedness of migration processes on the CIS territory is con-
firmed by estimates of scale and the directions of illegal migration – Russia
is the largest market for illegal workers from the CIS countries.
Exchange between CIS countries and those outside this region is definitely
smaller than the exchange within the framework of the post-Soviet area.
Officially registered migration of this type mainly includes people of Jewish
and German origin, but also specialists leaving for the United States or West-
ern European countries. The main destination countries are Germany, fol-
lowed by Israel and the United States.
It is estimated that in the period 1992–2002, around 2.6 million people left the
CIS area, of which over 1 million were from Russia and 540,000 from Ukraine26.
According to estimates by Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, documented emigra-
tion from the CIS countries in 1991–1995 amounted to around 300,000 people
per year, and in the period 1998–2000 around 200,000 people per year27. After
the year 2000, this percentage insignificantly dropped. Furthermore, the
ethnic makeup of emigrants was subject to serious transformations. Where-
as at the beginning of the 1990s, the emigrants were mainly members of the
German and Jewish nationalities, currently the representatives of titular na-
tionalities predominate. It seems that the current relatively low level of legal
migration to the EU countries or to North America results both from the ex-
haustion of German and Jewish people who would meet repatriation criteria,
and the increasingly less liberal migration policy of the receiving states.
Illegal migration, which most frequently turns into labour migration, is at least
as numerous as legal migration. There are several million people from the CIS
area working in the West, who include Ukrainians, Russians and Moldavians.
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24 According to the methodology adopted in the report, the term immigrant refers to all peo-
ple who were born outside the borders of a country, which they inhabit.
24 See Part III, Country Analysis on Russia.
26 V. Tishkov, Z. Zayonchkovskaya, G. Vitkovskaya, ‘Migration in the countries...’, op. cit., page 15.
27 Z. Zayonchkovskaya, ‘Dyesyat’ let...’, op. cit.
Official immigration to Eastern European and Caucasian countries from out-
side the CIS is low. Undocumented immigration, however, takes on a different
form. On the territory discussed there is a relatively extensive, yet overesti-
mated, group of immigrants from Southern Asia (including China, Vietnam,
Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Afghanistan & Sri Lanka) and to a lesser extent
from Africa. Some of these immigrants treat the CIS as a transit area on their
way to Western Europe and USA and Canada. Nonetheless, some settle and
work illegally in the CIS. This mainly applies to citizens of China, Vietnam,
North Korea and Afghanistan.
2. Ethnic and labour migration
In general, migration processes in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus
can be divided into two basic categories:
(1) ethnic migration, i.e. voluntary migration conditioned by ethnic reasons
(including repatriations28 and impatriations29) or forced migration;
(2) labour migration – migration caused by economic difficulties and aimed
at finding work abroad.
The first type of migration movements prevailed at the beginning of the 1990s.
Labour migration (mainly illegal) has begun to predominate since midway
through that decade. Due to the unresolved ethnic and territorial conflicts in
Karabakh, Abkhazia and Transnistria, forced migration tends to be of a rather
permanent nature, and repatriations are definitely so. Labour migration tends
to be permanent, although temporary migration, including seasonal migra-
tion, prevails.
Ethnic and labour migrations intermingle. Ethnic migration processes consist
of all migration which was caused by ethnic, cultural and linguistic reasons,
keeping in mind at the same time that this movement was accompanied by
economic factors. In many cases, a declared willingness to return to the home-
land was used as an opportunity to change the current country of residence
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28 Repatriation implies return of people to their homeland organised by state authorities or
other public institutions; definition provided by the Migration Dictionary (www.migration-
news.uw.edu.pl/slownik.htm).
29 Impatriation implies the process of displacement of descendents of citizens of a given coun-
try, who were born and raised aboard, with specific nationality or origin, into the current bor-
ders of this country; thereto.
and to improve living standards. Meanwhile, in the case of involuntary mi-
grations, people left places where a conflict was in progress out of fear of the
dangers connected with war, as well as for reasons of economic crisis.
The basic direction of ethnic migration is that of the return of migrants to
their national states, or to countries of related cultural and language identity,
especially if these countries provide living conditions that are better than those
offered by the country of residence. In this way, the repatriation and impa-
triation of Russians from Central Asia and the Caucasus, who have constitut-
ed an extensive part of this movement, were directed to Russia, as well as to
Ukraine and Belarus. The emigration of Slavic nationalities affected the Baltic
States to a small degree, as the living standards in these countries were rela-
tively high. The trend described was also confirmed by migration flows from
areas subject to ethnic conflicts, thus from the Caucasus and Transnistria; in
these cases, the native population escaped to their titular countries, but also
to the Slavic countries, mainly Russia.
The main effect of ethnic migration is an increase in the ethnic homogeneity
of the CIS countries. This phenomenon is especially visible in the countries
of the Southern Caucasus, and to a smaller degree in Ukraine or Belarus. Rus-
sia is the only country which demonstrates an opposite trend.
The consequences of forced migration are seen in the presence of a great num-
ber of refugees and internally displaced people. Most of these people live in
the Southern Caucasus, especially Azerbaijan. Thanks to the gradual integra-
tion of internally displaced people and their return to the place of residence,
their number has decreased. However, the elimination of this problem seems
impossible unless the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh or Abkhazia are solved.
According to Russian data, at its peak in the mid-1990s this category of mi-
grants on CIS area amounted to 3.6 million people, although it should be
remembered that the definition of forced migration in this region30 does not
fully correspond to international standards. According to the International
Organisation for Migration (IOM), there were over 549,000 refugees from
this region (mainly Armenia and Azerbaijan) and over 1.3 million internally
displaced people (most in Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia)31 on CIS territory at
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30 Particularly until accession of individual states to the Geneva Convention.
31 IOM, Migration Trends in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: 2001–2002 Review, pages 17–18.
the end of 2000. The indicated number does not include Chechen refugees,
who fled to other regions of Russia in relation to the outbreak of the armed
conflict in 1999. According to UNHCR, around 350,000 people were in this situa-
tion32. Refugees and asylum seekers from outside the CIS constituted a slightly
smaller group; according to the IOM data, in 2000 there were around 27,000
of them, mainly from Afghanistan33.
Emigration outside the area of the former USSR has definitely been on a small-
er scale. According to IOM, CIS citizens filed over 54,000 applications for re-
fugee status in the Western and Central European countries in 200134. Most
of these applications originate from Russia. After the outbreak of the second
Chechen war, an increasing wave of refugees started to arrive to the West
from the Northern Caucasus. In 2004, Russian citizens filed over 28,000 appli-
cations for asylum in the EU countries (including new member states), and
in 2005, far fewer, namely 19,50035. This situation has most likely resulted in
part from a relative improvement of the security situation in Chechnya, and
in part from the tightening of the European Union’s asylum policy. After Che-
chens, next in line for refugee status are citizens of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Geor-
gia, and Ukraine. Most applications for the refugee status from the CIS area
are rejected as groundless or inconsistent with the criteria of the Geneva
Refugee Convention. According to the non-refoulement principle different
forms of temporary protection are awarded to persons who do not meet the
requirements, but who could be in danger, if returned to their homeland.
The ethnic migration has lost its principal impetus, even though it still conti-
nues. A large number of Slavic people, especially Russians, still live outside
their countries of origin. However, most of these people are not particularly
interested in changing their place of residence, unless some serious political
and social crisis occurs, or the general living standards offered by the receiv-
ing states do not in principle differ from these prevailing in their current home-
lands. According to evaluations by Russian demographers, there are around
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32 UNHCR, UNHCR Paper on Asylum Seekers from the Russian Federation in the context of the
situation in Chechnya, February 2003, In 2006, depending on the origin of statistics, the num-
ber of IDPs due to the Chechen conflict was estimated at the range of 24–170 thousand per-
sons.
33 IOM, Migration Trends..., op. cit.
34 Ibidem, page 175.
35 Data provided by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE).
4.5 million Russian speakers (out of around 17 million Russians or Russian speak-
ers inhabiting the countries of former USSR other then the Russian Federa-
tion) on the territory of the former USSR who are and might be willing in the
course of the next several years to emigrate to Russia. It seems that repre-
sentatives of the Russian-speaking Diaspora from Central Asia would be most
willing to emigrate for cultural and economic reasons, however according to
official statistics the most numerous Russian minority lives in Ukraine36.
Labour migration (mainly of an undocumented nature) is currently the most
popular type of migratory traffic on CIS territory. According to estimates pro-
vided by IOM in 2002, around 10 million people inside the region and several
million outside it are involved in such type of migration every year37. Similar
numbers are quoted by S. V. Ryazantsev; according to his estimate, the num-
ber of emigrants from CIS countries working outside their homeland ranges
from 8 to 11 million38. The authors of a study on labour migration conducted
in the years 2000–2003 within the framework of the Russian Independent
Research Centre for Migration of the CIS and Baltic States, also put forward the
number of 10 million, only they estimate the individual components different-
ly. They claim that this figure should be divided into the migration of Russian
citizens (3–3.5 million internal migrants and 1–1.5 million people working out-
side the CIS) and migration from other CIS countries (including around 3 mil-
lion migrants working in Russia and 2 million residing in other CIS countries
as well as outside the region). At the same time, the researchers emphasise that
the numbers they indicate are underestimated rather than overestimated39.
There are over one million officially registered foreign workers in this region.
The number of economic migrants outside the CIS area is also small.
The extent of labour migration on the territory of CIS can be determined
through estimates concerning Russia, the main country in the region receiving
foreign workers. Russian experts (Yelena Tyurkanova, Zhanna Zayonchkovska-
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36 These persons declared Russian nationality in the course of the census.
37 IOM, Migration Trends..., op. cit., page 16.
38 S. V. Ryazantsev, Economic migration in Russia and CIS Countries: Socio-economic Signifi-
cance and Approaches to Regulation, 2005.
39 Z. A. Zayonchkovskaya, Trudovaya migracya v stranach SNG: sryedstvo adaptacyi k ekono-
micheskomu krizisu y istochnik novyh vyzovov. Glavniye itogi miezhstranovych issledovaniy,
materials from conference entitled ‘Migration, social and intercultural aspects of sustainable
development’, Moscow, March 2004.
ya, Galina Vitkovskaya and Vladimir Mukomel) estimate the number of ille-
gal labour immigrants on Russian territory at the level of 3–5 million people.
As shown in Table 11, the scale of labour emigration and the significance of
this phenomenon for the individual countries of Eastern Europe and Southern
Caucasus are very different; starting from Russia, where economic emigrants
constitute a insignificant part of the professionally active population, up to
Armenia or Moldova where practically every third family has a member work-
ing abroad. Also, the destinations of this emigration are different. For the
majority of migrants from the CIS area, Russia is still the main destination
country, although the significance of other countries – EU member states,
the USA and Turkey – is gradually increasing.
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Country
Russia
Ukraine
Belarus
Moldova
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Armenia
Number of labour
emigrants in thousands
(estimates)
500–1000
2000–3000
200–280
350–60040
1000–1500
300–400
300–700
Number of professionally ac-
tive population in thousands
(as per the end of 2004)
72,909*
22,614 (2003)
4,428**
1,432***
3,865
2,049****
1,232** (2003) 
Main destination
countries
Germany, USA, Israel
Russia, Poland, Italy, 
Czech Republic, 
Portugal, Spain
Russia, Poland
Russia, Italy, Turkey
Russia, Turkey, Iran, 
UAE, Germany
Russia, Greece, Turkey, 
USA, Germany
Russia, USA, Western 
European countries
Table 11. Labour emigration from the Eastern European and Southern Caucasian countries
Author’s study on the basis of expert estimates; the professionally active population according to
calculations by the National Labour Organisation (except data referring to Georgia)
* de iure population
** de iure population without armed forces
*** de facto population
**** de facto population without armed forces
40 Without Transnistria.
3. Irregular transit migration
Undocumented transit migration from Asia (South-East Asia, and the Middle
East), Africa and CIS countries into Western European countries is a new phe-
nomenon, which the successor states of the former USSR encountered after
its collapse. For obvious reasons, the illegal nature of these proceedings makes
it difficult to estimate its real scale and dynamics and to evaluate the scale
of threats connected with this phenomenon. However, this is unquestionably
a great burden for migrations management systems of the CIS states which
have been barely developed, and which in addition function in the condi-
tions of poorly protected borders and poorly framed legislation. Also, the
tighter sealing of EU borders together with the simultaneously considerable
openness of borders inside the CIS area, may result in migrants who want to
proceed to the West being forced to stay in transit countries for good, as the
CIS countries have no effective mechanisms for removing them. As the IOM
experts emphasise, an attempt to deal with this phenomenon should involve
developing a greater space for legal migration and facilitating the transition
of migrants from the grey zone into the legal zone. Meanwhile, the govern-
ments of the CIS countries have manifested a tendency to interpret undocu-
mented migration as a crime, and are focusing on repressive methods of fight-
ing it, which worsens the problem even more41.
Estimating the scale of illegal migration is difficult for other reasons: the lack
of a standardized methodological approach nor any recognised definition of
this phenomenon, the incompleteness of the data collected and its public un-
availability. Moreover, it is difficult to separate transit migrants from illegal
workers. For these reasons, the data presented below includes all migrants
with unregulated status. As indicated by IOM, in 2002 the authorities of dis-
cussed states estimated the number of illegal migrants (both those from the
CIS region and from outside) at 0.5%–1% of the entire population of the indi-
vidual countries42. However, current official estimates are higher. The Russian
Ministry of Interior estimates the number of illegal migrants to be at least
several million people43. The International Centre for Migration Policy Deve-
lopment (ICMPD) quotes the evaluation of the border services, according to
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41 IOM, Migration Trends in Eastern Europe..., op. cit., page 31.
42 Data provided by IOM.
43 For more information refer to Part III, Country Analysis on Russia.
which there are around 1.5 million illegal migrants from Southern & Central
Asia and Africa on Russian territory44. According to Ukrainian information,
there are from some tens of thousands up to one million illegal migrants in
Ukraine45. It should be remembered that politicians from the CIS tend to over-
estimate the numbers of illegal migrants. Although the illegal transit migra-
tion through the territory of the former URSS seems to threaten the security
in Poland and the EU, it is not as massive as the wave of migration through
the Southern Europe.
The border statistics constitute an important source of information, which
could help in grasping the dynamics of irregular migration. Analysis of the
data provided by border services enables us to assess the real size of this phe-
nomenon, as people from outside the CIS often cross borders illegally. Citizens
of the CIS countries usually do not have problems with legal entrance onto
the territories of other post-Soviet countries. As Russian statistics show, over
the past 10 years the number of people arrested when attempting to cross
the border illegally has definitely increased. Ukrainian statistics from recent
years indicate a relatively stable yet high number of arrests of illegal migrants
(around 30,000 people per year, who have been arrested when attempting to
cross the border and on the territory of Ukraine)46. It is difficult to judge un-
ambiguously whether this situation results from an increase in the threat of
illegal migration, or whether it can be explained by an improved efficiency
of supervision on individual border sections. At the same time, it should be
remembered that the borders inside the CIS area, which are most exposed to
illegal migration, are barely protected.
Illegal immigrants usually enter the CIS area through Central Asian coun-
tries, and less frequently through the Southern Caucasian countries. Next, in
most cases they go to Russia, then Ukraine, Belarus or the Baltic states; from
there they try to get to Western European countries. Sometimes they fly in
directly to Ukraine or Belarus from their countries of origin, or from Central
Asian countries or Turkey. Migrants travelling by land prefer borders which for
different reasons are entirely unprotected or insufficiently protected, thus the
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44 International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Overview of the Migration Systems
in the CIS Countries, Vienna, September 2005, page 199.
45 For more information refer to Part III, Country Analysis on Ukraine.
46 See International Centre for Policy Studies, Institute for Public Affairs, White paper: Ukraine’s
migration policy to control illegal migration, Draft for Discussion, June 2006, page 9.
Russian/Kazakh border, the Russian/Ukrainian border, the Russian/Belarusian
border, or the Ukrainian/Belarusian border. Meanwhile, the most popular air-
ports are those which control documents less strictly, or ports which are so
large that groups of migrants travelling West do not generate a great atten-
tion. Also, airports in countries which have a relatively liberal visa policy, are
very popular.
Whereas in the past, illegal migrants on their way to the European Union
most often used the Polish/Ukrainian border, the Ukrainian/Slovak border is
currently more popular. Illegal migrants on their way to the Baltic states most
often cross the Belarusian/Lithuanian border. On the Polish territory, most
people are arrested by the border guards on the Polish/German border, how-
ever the number of arrests on the Ukrainian border has been increasing (see
Table 12). The number of migrants from Southern Asia detained when at-
tempting to cross the border illegally is falling (apart from Vietnamese citizens).
Meanwhile, the number of citizens from the CIS countries attempting to make
their way through illegally remains relatively stable.
The statistics provided by local border guards and the Ministries of Interiors
show that the citizens of China, Afghanistan, Vietnam, India, Pakistan, Bangla-
desh are most often involved in illegal transit migration. Usually, inhabitants
of Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and Iraq (principally Kurds) transit though
the Southern Caucasian countries (mainly Azerbaijan). Migrants from Afgha-
nistan, China, Vietnam enter Russia and other countries in Eastern Europe
mainly via the Central Asian countries.
Migrants usually enter the first transit country on the CIS territory legally,
or on the basis of forged documents, and then illegally attempt to cross sub-
sequent state borders by bus or by rail, and sometimes on foot. Migrants often
use tourist or student visas to get into the CIS area. Migrants from countries
located close to the CIS frequently try to cross the border illegally. Organised
crime groups, which operate as tourist offices and prepare forged documents
and transfer channels, is very popular. Transit migration has a well-organ-
ised character, as migrants rarely travel alone, usually in groups formed by
criminal structures. The transfer channels for illegal migrants are also used
for human trafficking, especially in women, who are then forced to work as
prostitutes or to a lesser extent forced workers in Western countries.
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Year
2003
2004
2005
Total number
of detained
5662
5762
4526
Foreigners
3592
4472
3598
Detained on individual 
sections of the border
with Russia: 80
with Belarus: 44
with Ukraine: 807
with Lithuania: 110
with Slovakia: 420
with Czech Republic: 1110
with Germany: 2706
On the sea border: 60
On the air border: 226
with Russia: 62
with Belarus: 72
with Ukraine: 659
with Lithuania: 62
with Slovakia: 231
with Czech Republic: 1131
with Germany: 3168
On the sea border: 77
On the air border: 215
with Russia: 39
with Belarus: 114
with Ukraine: 931
with Lithuania: 40
with Slovakia: 232
with Czech Republic: 887
with Germany: 1848
On the sea border: 76
On the air border: 224
Detained according to natio-
nality (selected countries)
Afghanistan: 140
Armenia: 41
Belarus: 56
China: 195
Georgia: 21
India: 216
Iraq: 28
Moldova: 144
Pakistan: 161
Russia: 310
Ukraine: 873
Vietnam: 243
Afghanistan: 45
Armenia: 80
Belarus: 101
China: 218
Georgia: 59
India: 93
Iraq: 12
Moldova: 276
Pakistan: 143
Russia: 557
Ukraine: 1884
Vietnam: 146
Afghanistan: 7
Armenia: 70
Belarus: 98
Georgia: 66
Georgia: 86
India: 7
Iraq: 10
Moldova: 355
Pakistan: 35
Russia: 456
Ukraine: 1388
Vietnam: 325
Table 12. Detained for illegal crossing of the Polish state border in the period 2003–2005
Data of the Border Guard of the Republic of Poland
4. Migrants and the source and destination states
Migration considerably affects the political, economic and social situation of
the countries discussed. This particularly applies to countries with a large
percentage of migrants (emigrants or migrants), such as Russia, Moldova or
Armenia. In the case of the source countries, migration processes carry the
risk of the departure of most educated people (the ‘brain drain’ phenomenon),
yet they also generate financial remittances from abroad, which are needed
by these developing economies. The destination states, on the other hand, are
confronted with the problems of irregular labour immigration and the threats
connected therewith: ethnic clashes, development of crime, and an increase
in xenophobic trends in the society.
Temporary labour migrants not only maintain contact with their homelands,
but also send money to the families they left behind. Nearly every third family
in Moldova and in the Caucasian countries, and every tenth family in Ukraine
or in Russia, is supported from these remittances47. The record statistics in this
area belong to Moldova and Armenia, which according to estimates by the
World Bank have the largest such transfers per capita in the region. The eco-
nomies’ dependency on remittances from abroad is particularly strong in the
case of the region’s poorer countries, where remittances (and this only refers
to those completed through official channels) constitute a great part of the
GDP of a given country, and usually exceed the level of foreign investments.
This has certain advantages, such as easing the social effects of economic
crises, the development of a middle class able to function under market con-
ditions, and the development of small entrepreneurship or of financial insti-
tutions. At the same time, it generates threats, including the strong depend-
ence of the sending countries on those countries that accept their employees,
and the lack of state control over the money transferred by the emigrants,
which to a great extent takes place outside the official banking sector. More-
over, in contrast to foreign investments, remittances from labour migrants
are usually designated for consumption, instead of development. On the other
hand, this consumption drives internal demand.
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47 V. Tishkov, Z. Zayonchkovskaya, G. Vitkovskaya, ‘Migration in the countries...’, op. cit., page 27.
The ‘brain drain’ phenomenon, which consists in losing the most valuable
human resource potential, often accompanies the migration phenomenon.
Educated people constitute a large percentage of all migrants leaving the
post-Soviet countries. In the 1990s, it was mainly scientists – specialists in
exact sciences who were first to go aboard, as well as experienced engineers;
currently it is mainly younger scientists or PhD candidates. Especially dan-
gerous was the outflow of specialists from the defence sector: intensive emi-
gration was especially noteworthy from the so-called ZATO (closed cities).
However, it is difficult to estimate the scale of the ‘brain drain’ and its real
consequences for the economies of the countries discussed. According to va-
rious estimates, in the 1990s between 10,000 and 30,000 scholars and uni-
versity professors have left Russia permanently, which was the centre of this
process50. The number of scientists who emigrated for temporary contracts
is much higher. According to expert estimates, Russia’s annual financial loss-
es resulting from this phenomenon are around US$ 50 billion (complete with
potential losses)51.
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Country
Moldova
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Remittances 
according to 
balance of 
payments (B)
464
16248
156
237
Remittances 
amount 
evaluation (A)
500 
(in 2004 700)
850
700
27549
Amount of
direct foreign 
investments
58
121
2352
334
B% GDP
23.8
5.9
2.1
6.0
A% GDP
25.6
30.8
9.5
6.9
Table 13. Amount of remittances sent by emigrants in selected countries in 2003 (in US$ million)
Source: IMF Balance of Payment Statistics Yearbook 2004; World Bank Global Development
Finance 2004 database
48 Higher estimates are presented in the 2004 USAID Report; See Part III, Country Analysis on
Armenia.
49 According to IOM estimates from 2003 – US$ 480 million.
50 I. Malakha, ‘On ‘brain drain’ from Russia during the second half of the 1990’s’, [w:] World in
the Mirror of..., Moscow 2002, page 142.
51 V. Yontsev, I. Ivanhiouk, op. cit., page 52.
On the other hand, the main effect of migration is the arrival of cheap labour
force. This problem mainly concerns Russia, which thanks to immigration re-
ceives the workers it needs in the process of development of its labour mar-
ket and the shortage of its own human resources. Russia has to import em-
ployees, but its improperly defined migration policy, insufficiently flexible
legislation and the underdevelopment of its labour markets cause most in-
coming immigrants to look for employment in the shadow economy. As a con-
sequence, the state generates no income from their work, and migrants often
become victims of abuses by employers. Also, competitiveness for local em-
ployees with low qualification increases. There is in addition an outflow of
capital abroad; according to estimates, it can amount from several to more
than ten billion dollars a year.
Irregular migration is directly linked with the phenomenon of organised crime.
On one hand, leaving immigrants in the grey zone increases the susceptibility
of this group to participation in organised crime (such as smuggling of illegal
goods, human trafficking or drug smuggling); on the other hand, this depriv-
es them of protection against criminal groups. A typical phenomenon in this
context involves crime groups operating as employment agencies on CIS terri-
tory, sending people to illegal work and recruiting women to work as pros-
titutes. On CIS territory, there exist crime organisations with an ethnic back-
ground, which recruit their members from among migrants originating
from a given nationality. Individual groups have taken control over specific
trade zones or other economic activities. On the other hand, it should be re-
membered that in receiving societies tendencies to link crime with specific
groups of emigrants are often exaggerated, and are a result of an increase in
xenophobia.
The increase in the popularity of xenophobic and nationalistic ideas is a seri-
ous problem connected with the arrival of a considerable number of foreign-
ers. This trend has been fuelled by an incompetently managed immigration
policy. As research shows, only one-third of inhabitants of Russian cities be-
lieve that immigrants bring advantages52. Anti-immigration phobias in Russia
mainly take the shape of ‘Caucasophobia’, which newcomers from the South-
ern Caucasus, the Russian Northern Caucasus and Central Asia are faced with.
Xenophobic manifestations and ethnic clashes have occurred for many years
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52 V. Tishkov, Z. Zayonchkovskaya, G. Vitkovskaya, op. cit., page 22.
in the southern regions of Russia as well as in Moscow and in St. Petersburg
(which are inhabited by large concentrations of immigrants). However, they are
also becoming more common in other parts of the country. Meanwhile, immi-
grants from the CIS territory who are of Russian, or at least of Slavic origin,
enjoy a relatively friendly attitude.
5. Migration policy and international cooperation
The migration policies of individual CIS countries are at different levels of ad-
vancement. Moreover, depending on the character of the migration trends in
each country, each government assumes different priorities while developing
these policies. However, a relatively clear division into states that are sending
migrants and states that are receiving them, economic dependencies and cul-
tural connections, cause that migration patterns rather link than divide the
post-Soviet countries. These states common heritage and the high interdepen-
dency of the migration processes thus cause that the migration systems in
all the countries discussed feature several common characteristics. These in-
clude: selectiveness, a lack of proper legislation and institutional basis, repres-
siveness, and a high level of international cooperation. The typical problems
of countries undergoing transformation, such as institutional weaknesses,
excessive red tape, corruption and organisational chaos, also influence the
migration policy.
The CIS states’ authorities took an interest in migration issues only a few
years ago. Immediately after the collapse of the USSR, the newly established
states, preoccupied with developing the foundations of their own statehood,
paid practically no attention to supervising migration flows. Migration poli-
cies at that time were liberal, and allowed the inhabitants of the entire post-
Soviet area to quickly obtain citizenship of one of the countries. Due to the
outbreak of ethnic conflicts and extensive wave of repatriation, in that period
the migration institutions concentrated on solving the problems of forced mi-
gration and refugees, and regulating the return of deported nationalities.
A subsequent stage in the migration policy’s development was the establish-
ment of basic legislation regulating the principles of entry and exit, the resi-
dence of foreigners and others. These provisions, which were to a great extent
based on the former Soviet bureaucratic approach to the regulating popula-
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tion flows, made it difficult for foreigners to legally register their residence.
With relatively open state borders, it created a field for the rapid development
of a ‘grey zone’ of migration. The termination of the Bishkek agreement on
visa-free movement, which was carried out when a trend to see migration
in the context of security started to predominate among the governments of
the Eastern European and Caucasian countries, can be considered as another
turning point in the evolution of migration systems. This resulted in an ex-
pansion of legislation focused on fighting illegal migration and development
of the proper institutions in this regard. As a result, migration policy became
more regulatory and repressive, since no concept for integrating migrants was
developed to balance it out. Even the repatriates were left on their own in the
arduous procedure of legalising their residence. A tendency towards changing
this approach is currently being observed. This is visible among others in Rus-
sia, which has introduced facilitations in the system for registering foreigners,
and has started implementing a special programme to attract repatriates.
The problem of labour migration was undertaken only several years ago, which
was apparently too late. In this time, emigrants at the CIS area had already
developed extensive and close-knit networks of informal work abroad, which
have often been supported by local authorities entangled in the web of crimi-
nal connections. In this situation, a few million citizens of the CIS countries
work illegally in Russia, and several million more in Western European coun-
tries. For this reason they are practically left unprotected by their home
countries. Migrants are left in this ‘grey zone’ because of the corruption among
officials and police officers. Also, the lack of coordination among the policies
of the states that send and receive migrants is an important problem. De-
spite the practice of signing bilateral agreements on labour migration among
the countries in the region, these agreements are not taken into considera-
tion when individual countries set quotas for migration, and do not guaran-
tee immigrants’ the access to social benefits. Also, the provisions of the agree-
ment on cooperation in labour migration and the social protection of migrant
employees, which was concluded in 1994 within the framework of the CIS,
remain a dead letter to a great extent.
It should be anticipated that this situation will improve over the course of the
next few years, as the problem of regulating labour migration is becoming
a political priority for the individual countries in the region. Russia is develop-
ing legislation that would make it easier to obtain a legal residence permit.
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It has also conducted experimental amnesty campaigns for foreigners ille-
gally staying on its territory. Ukraine has adopted an assistance programme
for emigrants working abroad. Moldova has developed a system supervising
companies which send people to work abroad, and a strategy for investing the
remittances sent back by its emigrants. Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasian
countries are also working towards concluding agreements for mutual protec-
tion of labour migrants and agreements on legal employment with the coun-
tries where their citizens work.
All the EU’s eastern neighbours are participating pretty actively in interna-
tional cooperation. In general, this cooperation can be divided into three topi-
cal and geographic areas. The first category consists in cooperation conducted
within the framework of international organisations and multilateral coope-
ration forums with a global or European coverage. Usually the countries dis-
cussed receive technical assistance, consultancy, and financial aid from these
organisations. Sometimes these organisations mediate in the process by which
individual Western states grant assistance. Another form of cooperation in-
volves participating in mechanisms developed within the framework of the
Commonwealth of independent States. The objective of the migrant-sending
countries is to maintain free access to labour markets of the other CIS coun-
tries, whereas Russia treats this forum as a mechanism for maintaining its in-
fluence in the region and an instrument for fighting illegal migration. How-
ever, the bilateral channels of cooperation which operate in this region have
proved much more effective. For several years, the EU’s involvement in the
cooperation on migration with the Eastern European and Southern Caucasian
countries has been increasing. Although this is mainly limited to the implemen-
tation of technical assistance programmes, the European Neighbourhood Po-
licy (ENP) acknowledges the border and migration issues as key areas of coope-
ration within the framework of Action Plans, which are the main instruments
for implementing the ENP53. For the CIS countries, the visa policy is the most
important area for cooperation with the EU. The main objective of these coun-
tries is the maximum liberalisation of the visa regime in relations with the EU,
and in the long-term perspective, the total abolition of the visa requirement.
The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are actively operating on the ter-
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53 See European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, 12 May 2004.
ritory of the CIS. The latter institution plays a particular role when there are
a great number of refugees and internally displaced people in the region. The
UNHCR’s role is gradually decreasing. Migration systems in the countries dis-
cussed became so firmly established that these states have developed their
own mechanisms for granting refugee status, and international assistance
to refugees in the CIS area is very limited. The IOM is actively present in all CIS
countries, helping them to develop their migration and border management
systems, advising in the preparation of documents, and acting as a forum for
coordinating policies between individual countries. The IOM, together with
the UNHCR and the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights, is also responsible for monitoring the implementation of the provi-
sions of the CIS conference on migration policy, which took place in 199654.
In addition, more informal consultative initiatives have been organised by the
EU states, as well as specialised international organisations. In this context,
the so-called Söderköping Process should be mentioned. It is organised joint-
ly by the IOM, the UNHCR and the Swedish Migration Council, and aims to
strengthen cooperation in the fields of migration and asylum between the
Eastern European countries and their European Union neighbours. After the
accession of the Central European and Baltic states to the EU, the so-called
Budapest Process, which was a forum for international dialogue on migration
management, was redirected to the CIS countries. Currently, this process in-
cludes almost 50 states and 10 international organisations55.
As mentioned above, the assistance granted by international organisations
is a factor influencing the shape of the migration policy of the Eastern Euro-
pean and the Caucasian countries. This phenomenon is most visible in the
smaller countries, where organisations are actively participating in devising
legal acts and concept documents, and in developing appropriate infrastruc-
ture (refugee centres, centres for victims of human trafficking, deportation
centres). This is conductive to the adjustment of legislation to international
standards, and helps inexperienced governments to adopt solutions that have
been tried and tested elsewhere. On the other hand, this leads to an asymmetry
in the development of migration systems, some areas such as the fight against
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54 Regional conference of CIS, of the representatives of individual countries, representatives of
international organisations and activists from non-governmental organisations concerning
refugee and asylum problem.
55 For more information see: www.icmpd.org
human trafficking are relatively well developed, while others have not even
been supported with the most basic legal instruments. The absence of mecha-
nisms to handle some of the migration phenomena characteristic to the CIS
countries has caused that international organisations sometimes omit topical
areas that are important from the recipient’s point of view.
The Eastern European and the Southern Caucasian countries are signatories
to the most important international conventions on migration. All the coun-
tries discussed have signed the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, and the Palermo Convention against Transnational Organised Crime
(in most cases, including additional protocols on combating human traffick-
ing, especially in women and children, and smuggling of migrants by air, land
and sea). The participation of the discussed countries differs as far as the in-
ternational agreements on labour migration are concerned. Currently, only
Azerbaijan is a signatory of the International Labour Organisation conven-
tion on protection of migrant workers56. Few countries are considering join-
ing this instrument.
Several agreements on migration have been prepared within the framework
of the Commonwealth of Independent States. These include the agreement on
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Country
Russia
Ukraine
Belarus
Moldova
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Armenia
The Geneva Convention 
relating to the Status 
of Refugees and the New
York Protocol
2 February 1993
10 June 2002
(New York Protocol
4 April 2002)
23 August 2001
31 January 2002
12 February 1993
9 August 1999
6 July 1993
The Palermo Convention
against Transnational
Organised Crime
26 May 2004
21 May 2004
25 June 2003
16 September 2005
30 October 2003
5 September 2006
1 July 2003
UN Convention on the
Protection of the Rights
of All Migrant Workers
Members of Their Families
Does not participate
Does not participate
Does not participate
Does not participate
11 January 1999
Does not participate
Does not participate
Table 14. Ratification of basic international documents referring to the migration and refugees
56 On the CIS territory also Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan adopted this convention.
no-visa movement (1992) and on assistance to refugees (1993). On 15 April 1994,
an agreement on cooperation in the area of labour migration and social pro-
tection of migrant workers was concluded. This agreement was not ratified by
Georgia and Turkmenistan. The failure of this document, which had been anti-
cipated as a convention covering all CIS countries, resulted in individual coun-
tries deciding to conclude bilateral agreements on economic migration. The
problem of developing a regional document on the regulation of labour migra-
tion re-emerged once more – in September 2004 the foreign ministers of the
CIS adopted a draft convention on the legal status of labour migrants and their
family members. However, there is considerable doubt as to whether this
document will come into force, taking into consideration the continual ineffec-
tiveness of the CIS, and the announcements made by some of its members of
their intent to leave this organisation. An agreement on cooperation in the
area of illegal migration was concluded in March 1998. However, the first ses-
sion of the joint commission for implementation agreement’s provisions took
place only in 2004, six years after it was signed. In August 2005, an agreement
on common border policy was concluded. One step towards greater effective-
ness of CIS action in the area of migration could be the adoption of the agree-
ment on transit migration which was proposed by Ukraine.
There are also numerous forums within the framework of the CIS for exchang-
ing opinions on migration. Meetings of country leaders, heads of governments,
the coordination council of foreign ministers, and council of border service com-
manders take place regularly. However, these meetings are often of a ceremo-
nial nature, and do not end in the adoption of any binding documents.
Furthermore in the second half of the 1990s, attempts to establish a single la-
bour market on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States were
undertaken. Because of the failure of this project, countries interested in econo-
mic integration established the Eurasian Economic Community, which, apart
from realising the aforementioned convention on no-visa movement, is plan-
ning to create a customs union. At a summit of the organisation in May 2006
in Minsk, the Russian president Vladimir Putin called the Community ‘an en-
gine for economic integration on the territory of the CIS.’ On the other hand,
even though the agreement on a customs union had already been concluded
in February 1999, it has still not been possible to establish a uniform external
customs rate, and it therefore seems that developing a common economic
space is an issue for the far future.
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P A R T  I I I
C O U N T R Y  A N A LY S E S
1. RUSSIA
The collapse of the USSR affected both the dynamics and the nature of migra-
tion movements. For the first time, the new Russia came into contact with
spontaneous, cross-border mass migration for economic and political reasons.
The lack of experience, resources and efficient state structures resulted in the
authorities being unable to control the chaos of migration for a long time. The
borders with the newly established countries were de facto open, and issues
of citizenship and the replacement of ID documents were not settled. Russia
became the main destination for illegal labour migrants from the CIS area.
The new Federal Migration Service concentrated mainly on reacting to current
needs resulting from an inflow of refugees and spontaneous repatriation.
Once President Putin took power, a migration policy started to appear mainly
in the context of national security. This resulted from changes in the very
existence of the system of governance in Russia, as well as the rise in aware-
ness of terrorist threats. The objective of the government of the Russian Fede-
ration was to exercise control over the migration processes, protect its la-
bour market, and minimise the phenomenon of illegal migration. The state’s
system for managing migration was reformed by handing it over to the Mi-
nistry of Interior and significant restrictive changes were introduced to the
national legislation.
With time, questions of whether the ‘closed door’ policy was compliant with
both Russia’s political and economic interests, started to arise. The state finds
itself in a deep demographic crisis, the population growth rate is negative,
and the number of people is decreasing, which does not correlate with dyna-
mic economic development. An influx of migrants is the only real opportunity
for Russia to make up its shortages on the labour market and to stop the pace
of depopulation. Work on implementing repatriation programmes are current-
ly in progress. Apart from for Russians from the diaspora, the authorities of
the Russian Federation are also interested in attracting selected categories
of former fellow citizens from the CIS area. It is difficult to state in advance
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what the outcome of these plans will be, as xenophobic attitudes are growing
in Russia as well as the tendency to treat immigration as a danger. The legal
assumptions of the migration policy are inherently contradictory, the system
is constantly being redeveloped, and the authorities are not able effectively
to control migration traffic, including a group of several millions of illegal em-
ployees.
1.1. Migration movements
After the collapse of the Soviet empire, the state’s activity in the field of mi-
gration dramatically fell, comparing with the USSR period, when the state
structures were the main initiators of migration processes. On one hand, this
change led to an increase in impulsiveness (chaos) in this field, and on the other
hand to a decrease in numbers, as for years Soviet society had been taught
not to show any initiative, a factor which could influence its mobility. As a re-
sult, the migration circulation in the Russian Federation with the so-called
‘near abroad’ in the period 1991–2000 decreased by around 40% in compari-
son with the previous period; internal migration also fell by a similar degree.
However, the real decrease might be less, as the registration system was ope-
rating less efficiently than before.
Whereas in the initial period, different ethnic movements were the most im-
portant ones, occurring spontaneously within the framework of the former
USSR, and others organised outside its border (movements of Jews and Ger-
mans), labour migration has nevertheless become the most significant migra-
tory trend. Russia is the most important labour market for such migrants
from the CIS area, and its positive balance in this exchange amounts to sever-
al million people per year.
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Arrived Russia
Left Russia
Migration circulation
Migration growth rate
1981–1990
8.9
7.2
16.1
1.7
1991–2000
6.9
3.1
10.0
3.8
Table 15. Migration exchange between the Russian Federation and the other former republics of the
USSR in the years 1981–2000 (in millions of persons)
Source: Demoskop, No. 37/38, 2001
1.1.1. Ethnic migration
The last Soviet national census, from 1989, indicated that around 25.3 million
ethnic Russians and around 2.5 million representatives of other titular natio-
nalities (Tatars, Bashkirs, Chechens and others) lived outside the Russian So-
viet Federal Socialist Republic. After the collapse of the USSR, these groups
found themselves within the borders of state entities which they often con-
sidered as foreign (and where they were treated as aliens), or on territories
which were subject to conflicts. An impulsive return to their homelands com-
menced, which activated the reunification of families separated by the new
borders. The most intense streams of re-emigrants entered Russia from Kazakh-
stan and Ukraine, that is, from those countries where the Russian diaspora was
most numerous.
The new Russia was definitely more open to the world than the USSR had
been; this was reflected in the rapid increase in border traffic in the 1990s.
The opening-up coincided with an economic and social crisis which forced
many representatives of the Russian Jewish and German community mem-
bers to take advantage of the repatriation programmes offered by their coun-
tries of origin. The 2002 national census showed that the number of Russian
Jews decreased from 537,000 to around 230,000 people, in comparison with
1989. At the same time, the number of Germans decreased from 842,000 to
597,000 people (although some Germans had migrated to the Russian Fede-
ration from Kazakhstan). At the same time, the number of Armenians and
Azeris, who immigrated to Russia from the conflict-plagued Southern Cau-
casus, doubled.
Throughout its entire existence, the Russian Federation had a positive migra-
tion balance. This can be explained by the fact that the Russian-speaking dia-
spora was the most numerous on the territory of the CIS, and the living stan-
dards were higher there than in most of the neighbouring countries. At the
beginning of the 1990s, the inflow of migrants considerably compensated
for population losses in Russia which resulted from the negative population
growth rate. In the period 1992–1997, the numeric compensation therefore
amounted to over 60%. However, the basic migration reserves in the former
USSR started to run out, and the Russian government failed to prepare any
repatriation programmes. As a consequence, at the beginning of this century,
the inflow of migrants compensated for only around 10% of shortages. The
rapid deterioration of the migration balance which took place in 2001 was ac-
companied by a tightening of Russia’s security policy and a deterioration of
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the social atmosphere around migrants. Presumably, the considerable increase
in the number of registered immigrants in 2005 resulted mainly from people
already staying in Russia having legalised their position.
As the tables show, a long-term decreasing trend is observed in the entire mi-
gration exchanges between the Russian Federation and abroad, whereas the
pace of decrease varies. Migration to Russia in 1997–2004 decreased more
than fivefold. Still, emigration from Russia decreased only threefold in the
course of this period. This considerably influenced the migration balance,
which decreased much more quickly than the migration circulation dropped.
Differences in the proportions of migration movement between Russia and
the CIS and Russia and the rest of the world are considerable. Whereas 90%
of all people immigrating to Russia are newcomers from the CIS region, for
several years most emigrating Russian citizens have opted for the so-called
‘further abroad’, of which 70% have headed for Germany. After all, this coun-
try is the absolute leader among the destinations for Russian migrants, even
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Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006 (I–XI)
Arrived
849
913
1147
841
622
598
514
380
359
193
185
129
119
177
166
Left
673
483
337
339
288
233
213
215
146
121
107
94
80
70
50
Migration balance
176
430
810
502
344
365
301
165
213
72
78
35
39
107
116
Table 16. Migration balance of the Russian Federation in the years 1992–2005 
(in thousands of persons)
Source: Russian Federal State Statistics Service; L. Rybakovsky: Demographicheskoye budushcheye
Rossii migratsyonnye protsessy. Socis, 3/2005
taking the CIS region into consideration. Russia has a positive migration bal-
ance with the CIS region (to date, only Belarus has been the exception) and
a negative balance with the rest of the world. Most people coming to Russia
from outside the former USSR are re-emigrants, who for various reasons
were not able to settle in their new homelands.
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Total
Including from 
the CIS states
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Ukraine
From outside the CIS
Germany
Israel
Lithuania
Latvia
USA
Estonia
Table 17. Immigrants to Russia in the period 1997–2004
1997
597,651
582,829
29,878
19,123
17,575
24,517
235,903
13,752
13,750
23,053
16,501
39,620
138,231
14,822
2,379
1,626
1,785
5,658
668
3,483
2000
359,330
350,290
14,906
15,951
10,274
20,213
124,903
15,536
11,652
11,043
6,738
40,810
74,748
9,040
1,753
1,508
945
1,785
439
786
2001
193,450
186,226
5,587
5,814
6,520
9,674
65,226
10,740
7,569
6,742
4,402
24,873
36,503
7,224
1,627
1,373
758
1,283
432
535
2002
184,612
177,314
5,635
6,802
6,841
7,128
55,706
13,139
7,562
5,967
4,531
24,951
36,806
7,298
1,962
1,670
722
990
455
534
2003
129,144
119,661
4,277
5,124
5,309
5,540
29,552
6,948
6,391
5,346
6,299
21,457
23,418
9,483
2,692
1,808
535
906
484
445
2004
119,157
110,374
2,584
3,057
5,650
4,886
40,150
9,511
4,816
3,339
3,734
14,948
17,699
8,783
3,117
1,486
339
819
518
446
Source: Russian Federal State Statistics Service
1.1.2. Labour migration
Currently, labour migration is the most significant of all types of migration
movements, due to its scale and its direct influence on the everyday life of
Russians. The Russian labour market is the most extensive in the region, and
the economy is developing rapidly in connection with the increase in prices
of raw materials, which by force of events makes Russia the most important
destination country for economic migrants from the CIS area. Russians
themselves go abroad in search of work more rarely. However, their number
can be estimated in the range of several hundred thousand. This figure
should include ‘brain drain’ departures (scientists, artists), specialists’ con-
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Total
Including 
to the CIS states
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Ukraine
From outside the CIS
Germany
Israel
Lithuania
Latvia
USA
Estonia
Table 18. Emigrants from Russia in the period 1997–2004
1997
232,987
149,461
4,302
2,578
18,928
3,286
25,364
6,296
5,715
2,474
1,532
7,370
69,116
83,526
43,363
12,873
1,162
636
9,087
702
2000
145,720
83,438
3,183
1,519
13,276
1,802
17,913
1,857
2,237
1,158
676
3,086
35,601
62,282
40,443
9,407
376
365
4,793
385
2001
121,166
62,545
2,170
1,362
11,175
1,339
15,186
1,333
1,660
993
352
1,974
24,026
58,621
43,628
4,835
262
311
4,527
402
2002
106,685
52,969
1,704
1,114
8,829
964
13,939
1,080
1,385
827
272
1,400
20,585
53,716
42,231
2,764
293
256
3,134
321
2003
94,018
46,081
1,771
1,098
7,016
939
14,017
959
1,234
922
251
1,130
16,744
47,937
36,928
2,048
268
259
3,199
351
2004
79,795
37,017
1,336
654
5,671
740
12,504
656
907
549
168
717
13,115
42,778
31,876
1,733
282
226
2,919
265
Source: Russian Federal State Statistics Service
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tracts (up to 60,000 per year, including sailors and aviators) and victims of
trafficking in human beings57. Nonetheless, departures abroad in search of
work do not constitute a social problem in Russia.
Labour migration to Russia can be divided into legal and illegal kinds. People
who came within the quota system introduced in 2002 are working legally
in the Russian Federation. The limit is approved every year on the basis of re-
ported regional demands, and it is thus subject to considerable fluctuations.
It amounted to around 214,000 people in 2005, 329,000 in 2006; over 30% of
these newcomers went to Moscow58. Until January 2007 only citizens from
countries with which Russia has visa relations were included in these fig-
ures. Since that period two types of limits are in effect: 309 thousand per-
sons for citizens of countries where visa regime with Russia is enforced and
6 million for foreigners from other countries. In addition, Belarusian citizens,
who enjoy similar rights to Russians, can work legally in Russia. Moscow has
signed separate agreements with some CIS countries on principles for opening
the labour market. In total, it can be estimated that there is about 1 million
people working legally in Russia59. On the other hand, the amount of illegal la-
bour immigrants is much greater; some estimates even mention up to twelve
million people. However, this number seems exaggerated.
According to Mukomel’s estimates, around 4.6 million people come to Russia
every year to work illegally, mostly in the summer season; in the winter the num-
ber of employed drops to around 2 million people. Nearly 80% of these illegal
employees come from the CIS countries. Their numbers are dominated by citi-
zens of Azerbaijan and Ukraine. The importance of Central Asian countries, espe-
cially Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, is growing. The most numerous group of guest
workers from outside the CIS area originated from China. Most illegal migrants
concentrate around Moscow agglomeration, perhaps as many as 50% of them.
They often undertake occupation which is not very attractive to the permanent
residents. In Moscow, for instance, they are drivers of public transport, janitors,
57 Author of one of the studies on this subject claims that the number of Russians working abroad
can even range to 1–1.2 million people, mainly in the US, Germany, Israel and Greece. Every year
they send approximately US$700–800 million to the country. S.V. Ryazantsev, Economic migra-
tion in Russia and CIS Countries: Socio-economic Significance and Approaches to Regulation, 2005.
58 Data provided by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 21 April 2006.
59 According to the Federal Migration Service 1,15 million of foreigners worked legally in
Russia in 2006.
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employees of municipal cleaning services and unqualified construction work-
ers60. Outside Moscow, they often work in agriculture and trade. A considerable
part of the money they earn is transferred to their countries of origin. Accord-
ing to estimates, over US$ 3.5 billion is transferred every year from Russia61.
The money from this source constitutes a considerable part of the foreign-cur-
rency income of poorer CIS countries such as Moldova or Tajikistan.
Country of
origin
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Ukraine
Total other 
countries
Including:
China
Northern Korea
Vietnam
Afghanistan
Total
Number of 
employees
(in thousands)
1000
280
117
100
180
154
504
390
1000
1055
800
55
100
100
4850
Over 10
890
73
63
22
40
74
111
86
430
350
136
44
80
90
2154
Paƒstwo
From 5 to 9
90
179
47
73
131
71
368
285
380
263
232
8
15
8
1948
Up to 4
20
28
7
5
9
9
25
20
190
442
432
2
5
2
749
Average
number of
employed
947
166
87
59
106
110
298
231
644
600
306
48
88
94
3227
Average 
work time 
(in months)
11.4
7.1
9.0
7.1
7.1
8.6
7.1
7.1
7.7
6.8
4.6
10.6
10.6
11.3
8.0
Assumed stay in Russia
(in months)
Table 19. Estimate data from 2005 on the number of labour immigrants (in thousands) and their
average stay in Russia*
Source: V. Mukomel, ‘Economy of illegal migration in Russia’, Demoskop Weekly, no. 207–8, 
as of 20.06/14.08.2005 (*according to the author, only around 200,000 people from the mentioned
countries are working legally in Russia)
60 A proceeding that formally a local person is employed on the basis of employment contract,
but is replaced with a foreigner (working for a lower rate), is quite popular.
61 Vladimir Mukomel, ‘Economy of illegal migration in Russia’, Demoskop Weekly, No. 207–8,
20 June/14 August 2005. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation Yurij Fyedo-
tov claimed, quoting official data that in 2004 foreigners employed in Russia could have sent
as much as US$12–15 billion outside its borders; Interfax, 24 May 2005.
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The deepening demographic crisis in Russia leads us to believe that the state
will be more and more dependent on the inflow of the foreign workforce. On
a mass scale, which in considerable part is uncontrollable, this phenomenon
contains a significant potential for instability and destruction, which will emer-
ge particularly in crisis situations. At the current stage of social development,
this may be conductive to an accumulation of xenophobic and nationalistic atti-
tudes in Russia. The illegal inflow of a workforce is usually accompanied by the
development of shadow economy, corruption, lack of control over money circu-
lation, ethnic crime and modern forms of slavery. For the aforementioned rea-
sons, the authorities of the Russian Federation are interested in bringing order
and legality to the labour market for foreigners. The effect of these measures
have not yet proved too extensive, which can be explained by the popularity
of corruption practices and the ineffectiveness of administrations in Russia as
well as by the fact that immigration issues are often used in Russia as elements
of current political considerations A good example of that can be the regula-
tion, which excludes foreigners from work at open markets. The pretext for
putting that in effect was ethnic unrest in Karelia as well as the crisis in Rus-
sian-Georgian relationships, which ensued in the second half of 2006.
1.1.3. Refugees and internally displaced persons
The process of the USSR’s collapse was accompanied by numerous ethnic and
religious conflicts, which sometimes turned into open armed confrontation
(as in Tajikistan, the Caucasus and Transnistria). These conflicts generated mas-
ses of refugees who had families and friends living in more peaceful regions of
the collapsing empire. A considerable number of these people went to Russia,
which somehow obliged the authorities to react. In June 1992, the Federal Mi-
gration Service was established; as of 2 February 1993, the authorities of the
Russian Federation had also rapidly joined the Geneva Convention on the status
of refugees from 1951 and the New York Protocol from 1967. These measures
were dictated by the hope of obtaining financial and logistical assistance from
the international community to solve the problems connected with refugees.
The peak arrival of different categories of refugees to Russia was in the first half
of the 1990s. At the beginning these were people of Slavic origin escaping
Tajikistan, which was in a state of civil war, and Armenians from Azerbaijan
and Georgia. In the following years, Russians from Kazakhstan started to pre-
dominate among refugees. They had decided to take this step mainly for econo-
mic and cultural reasons. The majority of IDP’s were found in the Caucasus;
initially these were victims of the Ingush and Ossetian conflicts, and then
that in Chechnya. At the beginning of the 1990s, after the collapse of the pro-
Moscow government in Kabul, over 100,000 Afghans came to Russia; this
was the only significant group of refugees to come from outside the territory
of the former USSR.
All categories of refugees could only count on symbolic assistance from the
central authorities. Ethnic Russians had problems not only with accommo-
dation but also with obtaining Russian citizenship, which made it difficult
for them to look for work. The situation of the Meskhetian Turks, who had been
expelled from their homes in the Ferghana Valley, was so critical that the US
authorities decided to include them in a special immigration programme.
Ethnic Ingush, expelled from their homes in the Republic of North Ossetia, are
basically still unable to return there today, despite numerous repeated promi-
ses made by the federal authorities. The refugees from Afghanistan cannot
legalise their stay in the Russian Federation. According to data of 1 January
2005, only 309 people were granted refugee status. In comparison, Ukraine,
where there are far fewer Afghans than in Russia, has granted over 1,500 peo-
ple refugee status. It seems that this is an intentional policy of the Russian
Federation, aiming at limiting the number of people eligible for state assis-
tance.
According to official statistics, the number of people newly registered in the
Russian Federation who had been forced to leave their place of residence sig-
nificantly decreased in recent times. Also, the total number of such people in
the censuses has decreased systematically. Some of them have migrated out-
side Russia, others have received Russian citizenship, whereupon their legal
status is changed. As of 1 January 2005, the state registers of the Russian Fe-
deration still contained around 238,000 people who had been forced to leave
their homes (40% of whom had originated from Kazakhstan). It seems that
this number has been underestimated, and does not include many cases of
Chechens, among others. Also, the number of people with refugee status
(614 people) does not correspond to the actual scale of the problem, if in Russia
there are around a few tens of thousands Afghans in Russia with any grounds
to obtain this status, according to estimates.
Russia is the country of origin of a large group of people, mainly ethnic Che-
chens, who are applying for refugee status in other countries.
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1.1.4. Russia as a route for illegal migration
The significance of Russia as a route for illegal migration seems to be de-
creasing. The threats connected thereto were most significant in the 1990s,
when the state structures lost control over migration flows. The socio-politi-
cal crisis, the outdated legal base, corruption and disputes of competence
between the power structures and the entirely open so-called ‘new’ borders
made Russia a convenient corridor for trafficking people from East to West.
At present, the conditions in many of the areas mentioned have changed;
this has considerably increased the logistical costs of trafficking, with a simul-
taneous increase in the degree of risk. For illegal economic migrants from
such regions as Central Asia, China or Vietnam, Russia as such is only inte-
resting as a potential labour market. The risk of pushing through to the EU
area is undertaken mainly by persons who intend to stay there for good.
A growing number of difficulties has led to the increasing professionalism of
smuggling. Trafficking channels through Russia are often developed with the
participation of diaspora representatives (such as Chinese or Armenians).
For people from South-East Asia who are trying to get through into the EU
from that direction, the Central Asian states is the point of exit. Their visa
policy is not coordinated, corruption is omnipresent, and state structures are
rather ineffective. The trafficking route goes by land through the poorly pro-
tected Russia/Kazakhstan border, and then through the Russian borders with
Belarus and Ukraine, which can also be forced quite easily. Some people arrest-
ed when attempting to illegally cross the EU’s eastern border have crossed
this route. There have been some cases of trafficking in the eastern direc-
tion, for instance citizens of Uzbekistan attempting to get through Russia
into South Korea.
It is difficult to estimate the number of people who try to use Russia as a route
for illegal migration. Official sources from the Russian Ministry of Interior esti-
mate the number of illegal migrants on the territory of Russia to range from
1.5 to 15 million people. An illegal immigrant is deemed to be any non-citizen
whose stay in the country is not regulated, but this also includes ethnic Rus-
sians who came to the Russian Federation in the 1990s, yet for different rea-
sons failed to complete the formalities connected with obtaining citizenship.
A great majority of illegal migrants are citizens of CIS states, who have enter-
ed Russian territory legally, but extended their stay illegally and found work.
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The problem of illegal migration is often used as a political tool. Evaluating
the degree of the threat posed by this phenomenon depends on the current
state policy and the needs of the departments which deal with it. Many con-
tradictory opinions made by competent officials can be cited. On 24 Novem-
ber 2004, the General Secretary of the Collective Security Treaty Organisa-
tion (CSTO), Nikolai Borduzha, stated without presenting any statistics that
Russian territory was being ever more extensively used as a transit corridor
for trafficking illegal migrants from Asia and Africa into the EU. Several days
later, while visiting Moscow, the Chief of State Border Guard Committee of
Belarus, General Pavlovsky, stated that thanks to the efforts of the Russian and
Belarusian parties, it had been possible to considerably reduce the stream of
illegal migrants62.
There is no doubt that of the entire number of illegal migrants, only a small
part treat Russia as a transit country. Accumulations of xenophobic and natio-
nalistic attitudes in the Russian Federation may lead to a change of this situa-
tion, increasing the pressure on the EU’s eastern borders. Also, difficulties
with legalising residence (among others, by obtaining refugee status, among
other methods) encourage potential migrants to take risky decisions.
1.2. Migration policy
After the collapse of the USSR, the emphasis in the migration policy was
placed on the problem of those persons who had been deported outside Rus-
sia’s borders and who were now returning, and on responding to emergency
situations. Meanwhile, when President Putin took power, a migration policy
started to emerge mainly in the context of national security, as it was consi-
dered a phenomenon that could be conductive to terrorism and organised
crime. This led to a significant tightening-up of legislation in this area, and
a deterioration of the social atmosphere surrounding migrants, among other
results. The increasingly negative demographic trends seemed to be forcing
the authorities to moderate their excessively restrictive position. In his last
address on the state of the nation, delivered on 10 May 2006, President Putin
declared that an effective migration policy as one of the most important means
of stopping the decrease of population in the Russian Federation. Due to that
certain initiatives aimed at attracting immigrants to Russia were undertaken
62 Interfax, 24 November 2005 and 30 November 2005.
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in mid summer (among others in areas of registration and employment of
foreigners). The planned liberalization was largely undermined by adaptation
of new restrictive legislation passed at the end of the year, among others in
areas of street vending, limiting of foreigners’ work and penalizing illegal em-
ployment.
In Russia the migration policy bears the imprint of imperialistic traditions
and power ambitions. This has led to its considerable ideological exploitation
and use as a political tool. The interest of the state, and not that of the citi-
zens, is the government’s priority. In a situation when Russia as such has had
problems defining its position in the world, this was not conductive to defi-
ning the principles of a migration policy or solving the practical problems.
Despite all this, it became possible to create the framework of a system for
managing migration policy and to pass an entire package of acts dealing with
migration. However, the efficiency of the management system has been lower-
ed by constant reorganisations.
1.2.1. Evolution
The authorities of the Russian Federation were prepared neither mentally
nor organisationally to face the migration challenges which emerged after the
collapse of the USSR. After all, their problems did not constitute a priority in
a situation when everything – the borders, state structures, the army with its
nuclear weapons, and finances – all required urgent adaptation to the new
situation. On the other hand, such phenomena as spontaneous mass popu-
lation exchanges between the newly established states and inflow of refugees
from conflict areas required a specific reaction from the state authorities.
In the beginning, the Committee for Migration at the Ministry of Labour
handled all migration problems; however as early as June 1992, a decision was
made to establish a separate structure, the Federal Migration Service (FMS).
It was managed by Tatyana Regent, a rather incidental person in this position,
without any political influence; in Russian reality, this must have had a consi-
derable impact on the effect of the new institution’s operation. The FMS’
structures were developed in a situation of increasing chaos in the area of mi-
gration. Its most important test was the Chechen conflict, which in Decem-
ber 1994 turned into a fully-fledged war. Neither in this nor in any other case
did the FMS stand up to the challenge. Its interventions were usually late
and on too small a scale. The FMS activity did not show any keynote, nor ele-
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ments of situation prognosis. This structure was not able to control the migra-
tion processes, and especially not to shape them. However, initiating work
on draft acts referring to migration, which were intended to fill the gaps in
Russian legislation, should be considered among the positive aspects of FMS’s
operation.
In 1999, the FMS entered into a phase of personnel and structural changes,
which considerably weakened its activity. After Regent’s resignation in Fe-
bruary 1999, subsequent directors were changed every few months, openly cri-
ticizing the effect of their predecessors’ work. The service was marginalised,
which in the end led to its liquidation on 18 May 2000. The FMS’ structures
were incorporated into the Ministry for Federation and Nationality and Migra-
tion Policy. The liquidation of the office at the moment of escalation of the Che-
chen refugee problem was an unambiguous sign of the government’s opinion
of its effectiveness and usefulness. Within the framework of the Ministry,
the migration problems were pushed further to the side. This was a tempo-
rary solution, which proved that the government structures had failed to
understand migration problems and the policy concept in this area.
The attitude of the Russian Federation’s authorities towards the migration
problem changed by the second half of 2001. This was immediately reflect-
ed both in the fate of the structures and in the legal solutions which were
prepared. The Concept of State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation,
which was developed over three years and which was formally accepted by
the government, has since been rejected. On 16 October 2001, the Ministry
for the Federation, Nationalities and Migration Policy was liquidated. The
block of issues referring to migration policy was assigned to the Ministry of
Interior. In his speech on 25 December 2001 to the directors of the service,
President Putin stated that their priority tasks, along with fighting terrorism
should also include supervision of the migration processes and combating
illegal migration.
Several factors influenced the change in the policy of the Russian Federation’s
authorities towards the migration problem. Firstly, the Russian government’s
elite has accepted the state and its borders as constant values, and has be-
come attached to the idea of a powerful centre of authority, which supervises
and controls all the processes occurring on its territory. Another factor was
the increased threat of terrorism, connected either with the Chechen war or
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Russian participation in the anti-terrorist coalition. The Kaliningrad ques-
tion was the third important factor. Negotiations with the EU made the
Russian Federation authorities aware of the importance of the problem and
of their partners’ expectations, particularly in connection with the idea of
visa-free movement as proposed by President Putin. Fourthly, in some areas
of the Russian Federation, especially in the south, uncontrolled migration
has led to a sharpening of ethnic conflicts. The authorities of Krasnodarsk
region have tried to solve these problems on their own, without even taking
the Constitution of the Russian Federation into consideration.
The issues connected with migration and border policy grew in importance
thereafter. The Security Council of the Russian Federation handled them
comprehensively. The inter-departmental working group on improving migra-
tion law was appointed, pursuant to the presidential decree 674 of 3 Decem-
ber 2001, and supervised by the Deputy Chief of President’s Administration.
A Migration Commission was appointed within the government of the Rus-
sian Federation. On 23 March 2002, the president signed the decree 232 on
the improvement of state management in the area of migration policy. The
decree specified the tasks and structure of the Federal Migration Service of
the Ministry of Interior. Since then it has supposedly been managed by a Head
with the rank of deputy minister of interior.
Together with reform of the state’s system for managing migration policy,
an amendment of the legal basis was also among the leading tasks. It be-
came apparent that the weakest link in the system is Russian legislation in
this area. The most glaring instances of negligence emerged here. The law was
outdated and inconsistent with the actual state of affairs; the key laws still
had their roots in the Soviet system.
The ‘Law on Citizenship of the Russian Federation’ was passed by the Assem-
bly of People’s Deputies of the Russian Federation on 28 November 1991, still
during the formal existence of the USSR. The law entered into force on 6 Feb-
ruary 1992. All the people permanently registered on the territory of the
Russian Federation at that moment automatically received Russian citizen-
ship. The remainders, who had a passport from the former USSR and did not
receive citizenship for any of the new states established after the collapse of
the USSR, could apply for citizenship from the Russian Federation. The new
Law on Citizenship of the Russian Federation, signed by the president on 31
May 2002, tightened the regulations for granting citizenship. Only people
over 18 years old, who had been living in the Russian Federation at least five
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years on the basis of a document of permanent residence and who know the
Russian language can apply. The Law also anticipates a simplified method
for granting such citizenship, mainly for former citizens of the USSR; it will
come into force as of 1 January 2008. The fact that it prevents the state from
applying such measures as deprival of citizenship or outlawry, which were
frequently practiced in the Soviet time, should be numbered among the ad-
vantages of the new act.
Another key act referring to migration which required drafting was the ‘Law
on the Legal Status of Foreigners in the Russian Federation.’ In Russia, these
issues were still regulated by the Law of 24 June 1981. In December 1998,
a portion of the LDPR submitted a draft of a new Law on ‘Legal Status of Fo-
reigners in the Russian Federation.’ The first reading of the draft took place
in 1999, after which there was a long break. A considerably re-edited draft
was returned to the Duma in the summer of 2002 as a priority, after which
it swiftly passed through the entire legislative path, and came into force on
1 November 2002.
The scope of the Russian Federation’s control over the movement of foreign-
ers on state territory was considerably increased. Competences in the area
of issuing permits to work in the Russian Federation were handed over to
the Ministry of Interior. The Law specified these tasks in detail, introducing
solutions to matters such as the annual number of work permits, which was
specified on the basis of demand from the federation’s entities. A system of
fees for issuing work permits (which increased considerably) was devised, and
all the costs of the possible deportation of foreign employees were imposed
on the employers.
For administrative purposes, the Law introduced the concept of the migration
card. Every foreigner crossing the border of the Russian Federation is obliged
to fill out such a card. It consists of two parts, one of which is kept by the
authorities when entering the territory of the Russian Federation, and the
other part which should be returned upon exit. On 12 November 2002, the
Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation registered the standard form of
the card. It contains such information as the purpose of visit and the place
of temporary residence on the territory of the Russian Federation. A foreigner
who does not have this card, cannot register his stay in Russia, and if he is
caught by a control action, he is subject to administrative fines and depor-
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tation. The information contained on the card is supposed to form the basis
for the planned database. Foreigners who remain on the territory of the Rus-
sian Federation have already had to complete the card as of 22 November
2002, and on the Russian/Belarusian borders they have been issued since 14 Feb-
ruary 2003.
On 15 December 2002, at the second and third readings the Duma passed a draft
the Introduction of Changes and Amendments to the bill ‘Concerning the
principles of entry onto and exit from the territory of the Russian Federation’
of 15 August 1996’. It came into force in April 2003. Apart for the issues of
order, the amendments specify the principles which the border services of the
Russian Federation should follow when not admitting foreign citizens onto
the territory of the Russian Federation. Among others, Article 27, item 1 states
that a foreign citizen will not be admitted onto the territory of the Russian
Federation, if this essential to ensure defence and national security, social or-
der and protection of the population’s health.
In parallel, albeit after a certain delay, the government issued numerous exe-
cutive acts for the previously passed acts. On 11 October 2002, the Regula-
tion 754 was passed, concerning a list of areas, organisations and facilities
which the foreigner may only visit on the basis of a special permit; the list
contains 11 items. Alongside traditional items, such as closed administrative-
territorial formations (ZATO), epidemic zones, military facilities and border
areas, item 6 contains the point ‘areas where anti-terrorist operations are be-
ing conducted.’ In mid-November 2002, the government approved a resolution
on developing a database on foreigners and stateless persons residing on the
territory of the Russian Federation. The Ministry of Interior was appointed as
coordinator of the measures in this area. The planned dates for completing
work on the database were postponed, and eventually the Central Database
for the Registration of Foreigners was started on 1 January 2006 (the data
recorded in the database remains incomplete). The Regulation 941 on the prin-
ciples of issuing work permits to citizens of other states and people without
citizenship was passed on 20 December 2002.
The increased strictness of legislation and the consideration of migration issues
mainly in the context of national security has led to a deterioration in the
social climate around immigrants. The positive migration balance of Russia
decreased considerably, which was a negative phenomenon in the context of
the demographic crisis. At the same time, the authorities were unable to limit
underground migration movements. The implemented policy turned out to
be inefficient, and so attempts were made to amend it. Currently, its objective
seems to be to increase the income of migrants to Russia (mainly Russian
speakers) from the territory of the former USSR. This has been confirmed by
specific actions.
In 2005, an experiment was conducted in several entities of the Federation,
which was supposed to demonstrate the problems connected with the legali-
sation of immigrants. The status of around 7,500 people was legalised. An in-
ter-departmental team was established, managed by the Deputy Chief of the
Presidential Administration, to develop a draft for a repatriation project. Work
on this project was completed in June 2006, and on 26 June 2006, it was ap-
proved by a presidential decree. The programme anticipates considerable pre-
ferences for Russian speakers from the CIS area, who are willing to migrate
to those areas of the Russian Federation which are sparsely populated (in-
cluding Siberia and the Far East).
January 2007, when legal regulations disregarding the planned liberalization
and in fact increasing the level of restrictions toward the foreigners went into
effect, marks the next important milestone in development of migration poli-
cy. Changes to the ‘Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners’ have been intro-
duced. They foresee new rules of granting the temporary stay and residency
permits (including the possibility of setting an annual limit for number of fo-
reigners, who may seek a residency permit) as well as granting employment
permits (different rules apply to foreign nationals depending on the fact,
whether they come to Russia in visa or visa-free regime). The ‘Law on Foreign
Nationals Registration’ also went into effect. That legislation simplified the
process of foreigners’ registering (from now on, it will take a form of report-
ing instead of a permit). The changes to Administrative Code concern an in-
crease in penalties for illegal work and illegal employment of foreigners. The
most controversial regulation concern trade at open markets. The ‘Organiza-
tion of Activities of Retail Markets’ Law specifies that by 15 January, the
number of foreigners employed at open markets may not exceed 40% of the
total employment force, while by 1 April only the Russian citizens will be
permitted to work there. An introduction of new legislation clearly indicates
that the Russian authorities – at least in a short term perspective – have not
decided to make changes, which would make meaningful the declaration to
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allow the immigration legislature to compensate for the consequences of
a demographic crisis. Instead, Russia has once again exhibited its unwilling-
ness to change the restrictive immigration policy.
1.2.2. Structures
The current structure of the central offices responsible for implementing tasks
in the area of migration policy was established in 2004. The greatest responsi-
bility is held by the Ministry of Interior. Other important organs are the Fe-
deral Security Service, including the Border Service of the Russian Federation,
the Ministry of Health and Social Development (including the Federal Service
for Work and Employment within its structures) and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs which operates within its framework. The strategies and objectives
of the migration policy are outlined by the Security Council of the Russian Fe-
deration. As can be seen, the ministries included in the so-called ‘power
block’ predominate on this short list; this may explain why the problems of mi-
gration policy have to date mainly been observed through the prism of secu-
rity policy.
In the framework of the Ministry of Interior The Federal Migration Service is
responsible for implementing tasks connected with migration policy. Its cur-
rent organisational structure and competences were specified in a presiden-
tial decree of 19 July 2004. The FMS is a federal organ with executive power,
subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. It is managed by a director whose
powers are invested in him by the Deputy Head of the Ministry of Interior.
The FMS employs over 18,000 employees and has branches both outside the
borders of the Russian Federation and within the entities of the Federation.
The competences of this institution are very extensive, and cover practically
the entire range of problems connected with the migration, citizenship, resi-
dence and employment of foreigners. The FMS issues documents confirming
the identity of Russians and maintains their files, residency registrations and
departures, and it is responsible for the procedures of awarding citizenship,
it issues permits to enter the territory of Russia and to reside there, controls
foreigners’ compliance with their residence permits, and together with other
authorities is responsible for fighting illegal migration, and takes responsibi-
lity for the issues of refugees and displaced persons, as well as control over
the rules for employing foreigners in Russia, and of Russians outside the state
borders. The FMS prepares draft acts on issues connected with migration, and
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its representatives participate in all the bodies developing the principles of
migration policy.
1.2.3. International cooperation
Russia defines its interests on a global scale, although with respect to issues
connected with migration policy, its international cooperation within the
framework of the CIS and its contacts with the EU are of primary impor-
tance. Recently, the importance of China has also been increasing. Russia is
represented in all the significant international organisations dealing with
migration issues. It seems that Moscow is becoming more and more aware
of the importance of these issues for the future of the world (in processes of
globalisation), and is becoming more interested in taking advantage of other
countries’ experiences.
Russia is a key state of the CIS; it defines the priorities of this organisation
and sets the tone for its operation. Moscow treats the CIS as an instrument for
maintaining its influences. However, the most important agreements have
been concluded in bilateral contexts.
On CIS territory, Russia developed close cooperation with Belarus. Since 1999,
both states have formed the Union of Russia and Belarus, and have been
attempting to co-ordinate their migration policy. The border between them
is provisional, and their citizens are treated with priority in comparison with
citizens from the remaining countries. Except for Georgia and Turkmenistan,
Russia has agreements on visa-free traffic with all CIS states. Moscow has sign-
ed a series of bilateral agreements on regulating migration processes (the
last such agreement was signed with Ukraine in 2001) and on the labour mi-
gration and protection of migrants’ social rights (the last one, with Tajikistan,
was signed in 2004). Intensive consultations on concluding a series of bilate-
ral agreements on readmission are ongoing, although Russia has to date been
evading them.
The cooperation between the Russian Federation and the European Union in
the area of justice and home affairs (JHA) has gained significance only recent-
ly. This should be associated with events such as the terrorist attack on New
York in September 2001, and the expansion of the EU in May 2004. The first
event demonstrated the need to coordinate efforts in fighting international
terrorism, and the second raised the issue of agreement in the area of trans-
port of people and goods between Russia and its Kaliningrad enclave. In May
2003, during the Petersburg Summit, the parties agreed on four main areas of
cooperation, which also included JHA. The schedule for actions in this sphere
was adopted during the Moscow Summit in May 2005.
Representatives of the Russian government have stated openly that the pur-
pose of their actions is to sign an agreement on visa-free traffic with the EU.
President Putin has made reference to this idea on many occasions. Currently
this seems a distant possibility. Recently the parties have been conducting
intensive negotiations on liberalising the visa regime. Talks on signing the ap-
propriate agreement were initiated in October 2004. At the same time, talks
on concluding the agreement on readmission were in progress (since the be-
ginning of 2003). The European Union has linked both these issues, which has
not been appreciated by Russia; this has led the negotiations to become rather
drawn out.
Agreements on visa facilitations and on readmission were signed on 25 May
2006 in the course of the meeting in Sochi. This visa agreement is based on
similar agreements concluded between Russia and some EU states, including
France and Germany. It anticipates the facilitation of access to short-term
visas (issued for a period of 90 days) to some categories of citizens, including
sports people, scientists and businessmen. Visa fees will remain at 35 euro.
The agreement on readmission anticipates a three-year long transition peri-
od, in the course of which Russia will not be obliged to accept citizens from
third-world countries who have been deported from the EU. This will enable
Moscow to conclude readmission agreements with the home countries of the
migrants; the Russian Federation has already submitted a proposal to sign
appropriate agreements to 30 states.
Russia is one of the main beneficiaries of the European Union TACIS Pro-
gramme, which among other stipulations provides financing to JHA-related
projects. In March 2003, the EU financed the preparation of a feasibility study
on fighting the trafficking of women. The National Indicative Programme (for
the period 2004–2006) referring to Russia anticipates expenditures of 20 mil-
lion euro on migration-related projects. The EU is interested in developing
cross-border cooperation (the common border currently exceeds 2200 km).
There is still much work to be done in this area, as the position of Russia on
border cooperation with Latvia and Estonia is very strict.
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1.3. Conclusions
The authorities of the Russian Federation were not prepared, neither men-
tally nor organisationally, to face the migration challenges which emerged
after the collapse of the USSR. In the 1990s, these issues were not treated as
priorities. Their significance only increased after the terrorist attack in New
York in 2001, when they were started to be considered mainly in the context
of national security. Currently, the economic and demographic aspect is grow-
ing in significance.
The Russian-language Diaspora is the most numerous in the CIS region, and
the living standards in the Russian Federation are higher than in most neigh-
bouring countries, which results in a constantly positive migration rate in
Russia. In the beginning, ethnic migration was the most important of the
migration flows, which was connected with the specifics of migration pro-
cesses resulting from the collapse of the USSR. Aside from ethnic Russians,
representatives of other nationalities also arrived in the Russian Federation.
Predominantly, the migrants came from the east and south to the west. The
place of repatriated Germans and Jews was taken by representatives of South-
ern Caucasian and Central Asian nations.
Due to its scale and influence on the Russian people’s everyday life, labour
migration is currently the most important of all the types of migration flows.
Russia is the largest labour market in the CIS region, absorbing the excess of
the workforce from neighbouring countries. This situation will not change
until the high prices of raw materials remain stable. Most guest workers
work illegally in Russia, and the current efforts the authorities are making to
change this state of affairs have not brought any notable results. The situation
on the Russian labour market has a great influence on the social and econo-
mic situation in most of the CIS states, as Russia is one of the main foreign
currency income sources in the region.
Russia’s significance as a route for illegal migration seems to be decreasing, as
in comparison with the 1990s, the logistical cost of smuggling has increased
considerably, as has the degree of risk. The observed difficulties in legalising
residence, the accumulation of xenophobic and nationalistic trends, and a pos-
sible socio-political crisis may lead to a change in this situation, increasing
the pressure of illegal migrants on the eastern borders of the EU.
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Russia has succeeded in developing a framework for a system to manage the
migration policy, and pass an entire package of acts referring to migration.
However, the effectiveness of the system is lessened by continuous reorgani-
sation, lack of specific assumptions of the migration policy, the excessive
repressiveness of the state structures and corruption.
Russia’s migration policy bears the imprint of imperialistic traditions and am-
bitions as a great power, which influences it strongly in the area of interna-
tional contacts. Russia defines its interests on a global scale, although with
regard to the issues discussed, cooperation within the framework of the CIS
is most important. The importance of the EU and China is increasing. The CIS
region constitutes a reserve of cheap workforce and possible re-emigrants for
Russia, who will be able to ease the negative effects of the demographic crisis.
Usually, Moscow perceives access to its labour market as yet another instru-
ment of political pressure on the territory of the former USSR. In its relations
with the EU, Russia is mainly interested in liberalisation of the visa policy.
2. UKRAINE
Modern Ukraine is characterised by intensive migration flows. For many
years, this state recorded a negative migration balance, which was a result
of the mass emigration of its inhabitants, caused by ethnic, cultural and econo-
mic reasons. Emigration negatively affected the demographic situation of Ukrai-
ne. In 2005, for the first time in many years, the migration balance of Ukraine
reached a positive value.
Currently, the main migration trend in Ukraine consists in temporary labour
migration, which is not recorded in the migration statistics. According to the
estimates there are at least 2 to 3 million Ukrainians working aboard. The main
routes of illegal migration on the post-Soviet territory pass through Ukraine
also. The Ukrainian state is not able to handle this proceeding on its own, as its
borders with the CIS states are poorly guarded. Ukraine also faces problems
with the deportation of illegal migrants which have been transferred by its
neighbours. Even though the Ukrainian migration management system has
been subject to important transformations in recent years, it is still faced with
problems consisting of poor coordination, insufficient financing and the lack
of concept of migration policy.
M i g r a t i o n  c h a l l e n g e s
P
a
r
t 
II
I.
 C
o
u
n
tr
y
 a
n
a
ly
s
e
s
87
2.1. Migration movements
According to official data, around 2.5 million inhabitants left Ukraine and 2.2
million people came to Ukraine in the period 1991–200463. The migration
trends observed in this country are conditioned by three basic groups of fac-
tors: mass dislocation of the population during the Soviet period, the coun-
try’s current social and economic difficulties, and Ukraine’s geographical lo-
cation on the transit migration route from Asia to the European Union.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, which prevented voluntary migration
movements and applied mass dislocation of population on orders from higher
authority, the foreigners living in Ukraine and ethnic Ukrainians residing in
other parts of the former USSR started to leave spontaneously for the newly
established national states. The opening of the borders also facilitated travel-
ling to the West; mainly Jewish and German people left for this destination. The
culmination point of this ethnic migration was in the period 1992–1993.
In subsequent years, natural repatriation processes became increasingly less
intensive, and economic causes became the main motivation for Ukrainians
to leave. Even though Russia remains the leading destination country in this
category, Central European countries also enjoy such popularity, and recently
certain South-Western European countries have joined the list of favoured de-
stinations. According to official statistics, this type of migration is also decreas-
ing (see Table 21). However, it should be remembered that due to the tempo-
rary nature of these flows, they are not comprehensively registered in the Ukrai-
nian statistics. The situation abroad is similar, as Ukrainian guest workers
usually work illegally.
Ukraine’s location brings it popularity among inhabitants of the CIS region,
Asia and Africa who are trying to pass through to the European Union, both
legally and illegally. Part of these migrants, unable to enter the EU states,
tries to obtain refugee status on the Ukrainian territory.
63 See O. Malynovskaya, ‘Caught between East and West, Ukraine Struggles with Its Migration
Policy’, Migration Information Source, January 2006; by this author; ‘Ukraina bez barierov’,
Otyechestvyennyje zapyski, No. 4, 2004.
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As shown in Table 21, according to official data, the negative migration balance
of Ukraine amounted to around 230,000 people in the period 1998–2005.
Throughout these years, the negative balance gradually decreased, and 2005
was a breakthrough year as the balance then became positive. The trend to
increase will most probably be maintained in 2006; the statistics for the first
half of the year indicate nearly six thousand more entrances than exits. In
this period, 16,381 people arrived to Ukraine and 10,385 left the country. In-
terestingly enough, for several years, the number of people entering has re-
mained at quite a stable level, whereas the number of people deciding to
leave Ukraine permanently has been decreasing. The incomers usually come
from the CIS region; particularly intensive exchange takes place between
Ukraine and Russia64.
2.1.1. Ethnic migration
The peak of ethnic migration in Ukraine was recorded in the period 1992–1993.
At that time 828,000 people (of which 377,000 or 45.5% were ethnic Ukrai-
nians) entered the country from the territory of the former USSR. In this
period, 468,000 people left (of which 140,000 or 30% were ethnic Ukrainians).
The arriving were mainly Russians and Crimean Tatars. This was the move-
ment of a spontaneous nature, and the migrants coming to Ukraine could
not count on any significant assistance from the state.
Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2003
2004
2005
Total
Left
149,286
110,589
100,325
88,804
63,699
46,182
34,997
593,882
Arrived
71,810
65,794
53,712
45,765
39,849
38,567
39,580
355,077
Migration balance
-77,476
-44,795
-46,613
-43,039
-23,850
-7,615
+ 4,583
-238,805
Table 21. Migration balance in Ukraine in selected years in the period 1998–2005
Source: Ukrainian State Statistics Office
64 It seems that vast majority of these people were inhabitants of Russia, who bought apart-
ments in Ukraine, however do not intend to settle there for permanent residence.
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The particularly deep social and economic drop which Ukraine has experien-
ced resulted in a fairly rapid reversal of the migration trends. Whereas in
1992–1993 Ukraine had a positive migration balance, in 1994, the balance was
already negative and amounted to 143,000 people. This trend turned out to
be constant. In the period 1995–1999, the total negative migration balance
amounted to 462,000 people. Those departing were mainly Russians, Ukrai-
nians and Jews.
The repatriation and impatriation processes mainly concerned two ethnic
minorities, the Jews and the Crimean Tatars, who in 1944 had been forcibly
deported to Central Asia. The former group mainly left Ukraine, and the latter
ones took advantage of the situation to return to their historic lands. The 1989
census showed 484,300 Jews in Ukraine; at that time, this minority constitut-
ed the third largest nationality group, after Ukrainians and Russians. The 2001
census conducted by the authorities of the now-sovereign Ukraine recorded
only 103,600 Jews. The situation of Tatars was the opposite; in 1989, there
were 46,800 of them in Ukraine, and by 2001 as many as 248,200. The peak of
their return (mainly from Uzbekistan) took place in the period 1989–1993,
when over 20,000 people (around 44,000 in 1990 alone) came back every year.
Currently, the scale of returns varies between 1,500 to 2,000 people per year;
and according to the experts, including Irina Pribytkova, no change in this
situation should be anticipated. The Ukrainian authorities have assumed that
the return of around 15,000 to 20,000 Tatars and representatives of other
deported nations can be anticipated until 201065.
The natural repatriation processes are disappearing. The current exchange
of population between the states of the former USSR is increasingly econo-
mically marked, despite the fact that migrants declare their family bonds to
be the main reason for leaving. Russia is Ukraine’s most important partner in
this area. According to the 2002 census, 2,943,000 ethnic Ukrainians remained
in Russia, and according to the 2001 census, 8,334,100 ethnic Russians remain-
ed in Ukraine. It should be assumed that in the future some of these people
may want to change their country of residence. The scale of this movement
and its direction will depend on the migration and social policy of the Russian
65 Such assumptions were included in the repatriates adaptation programme from May 2006;
Interfax, 15 May 2006.
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Federation and Ukraine. Currently, Russia seems to feature many more advan-
tages, as it constitutes an attractive centre for immigrants on CIS territory.
2.1.2. Labour migration
The low living standards in Ukraine force a considerable part of its citizens
into temporary economic migration. According to estimates by the Human
Rights Ombudsman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, since 2003 between
2 and 7 million Ukrainians are earning their living this way at any given mo-
ment. Most experts question this data, claiming that they contradict both the
results of a national census of 2001 and the analysis of border traffic. More-
over, as shown by the research of the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian
Academy of Sciences completed in March 2005, only 8% of adult Ukrainians
have worked abroad, and 6.4% were planning a possible departure for this
reason66. Therefore, it seems that the number of Ukrainians working abroad
is closer to the lower rather than the higher limit of the estimates quoted.
This corresponds with reference estimates made in November 2004 by the
Minister of Labour and Social Policy Mikhail Panev, according to which around
3 million Ukrainian labour emigrants live abroad.
Russia remains the most important labour market for Ukrainian citizens.
According to estimates by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, over
a million Ukrainian citizens work there illegally67. Central European countries
are also a popular destination for the Ukrainian labour emigrants, which is
caused by their geographic proximity and liberal visa regime, among other
factors. The intensive border trade practised at the beginning of the 1990s also
paved the way for Ukrainian economic migration routes. The Ukrainian Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs estimates that around 300,000 Ukrainian citizens work
in Poland68, and between 100,000 and 200,000 in the Czech Republic69. In re-
cent years, the rapid rise of migrants from Ukraine was also noted by Southern
European states. This results from both the better pay conditions in these coun-
tries and relatively liberal laws towards foreign employees which allows them
to be more readily legalised. According to the aforementioned data by the
66 See I. Pribytkova, Transnational Economic migration: Ukrainian Perspective, Warsaw: CSM
2006, page 3.
67 Report of the Ombudsman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, Kiev 2003, page 18.
68 Polish estimated referring to the number of illegally employed Ukrainians range from
100,000 to 300,000.
69 Report of the Ombudsman..., op. cit.
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Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, around 200,000 Ukrainians work in
Italy, 140,000–150,000 in Portugal and around 100,000 in Spain. Ukrainian citi-
zens have also found employment in Turkey (around 35,000) and the US (around
20,000 people)70.
In most cases, Ukrainian migrants abroad are working illegally, although the
number of legally employed Ukrainians in Southern European countries is
increasing71. A certain percentage of migrants also illegally cross the border,
usually into Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, on foot or by air. In 2005,
the Polish Border Guard arrested 1,388 citizens of Ukraine (including 888 on
the Polish borders with the EU states) for illegally crossing the border72.
An opinion poll conducted in 2003 at the request of the National Institute for
International Security Problems disclosed that 38.4% of illegal economic
migrants from Ukraine were employed in construction, 15.1% in trade and
14% as domestic help73. Economic migration of Ukrainians is mainly of tem-
porary character. The average stay of illegal labour emigrant depends, among
other factors, on the organisational costs they incur. Usually, the average stay
of a Ukrainian illegally working in Portugal lasts longer than a similar stay
by his fellow citizen in Poland.
Men predominate among the migrants. The phenomenon of economic emigra-
tion is most apparent in western Ukraine, and less so in the eastern regions
of the country. The emigrants usually come from villages and smaller towns74.
It is difficult to calculate even the approximate amount of remittances made
by Ukrainian citizens working abroad, as much of it is transferred informally.
In 2003, the Human Rights Ombudsman N. Karpachova presented estimates,
which show that Ukrainian migrants earn around US$400 million every month.
According to other sources, the annual money transfers amount from between
70 Ibidem.
71 As a result of legalisation programmes conducted in the years 1997–2002, approximately
166,000 Ukrainians legalized their stay in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy; See ICMPD,
Overview of Migration Systems..., op. cit., page 277.
72 For more information refer to the first part of this study on illegal transit migration.
73 S. Pirozhkov., O. Malynovskaya, A. Khomra, ‘External labour migrants in Ukraine. The social
and economic aspect’, Kiev 2003, page 45.
74 For more information refer to: I. Pribytkova, op. cit.
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US$ 4 to 6 billion75. According to estimates by Mukomel, the average annual
transfer from Russia to Ukraine amounts to over US$ 1 billion.
2.1.3. Ukraine as a route for illegal migration
Regarding the threats posed by illegal migration, Ukraine should be consider-
ed as the weakest link in the chain of states bordering Poland in the east.
The main migration channel through the Eurasian area crosses the Rus-
sian/Ukrainian border, and then passes through the Ukrainian territory to-
wards this state’s borders with Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.
After the accession of its western neighbours to the Schengen zone, Ukraine
may experience an intensified influx of illegal migrants, including those al-
ready deported from the EU states. This country’s state structures are still
relatively weak, corruption is widespread, and the borders (especially those
in the east) are poorly protected. Experts also cite other factors which favour
illegal transit migration, such as the weakness of the visa policy, the absence
of effective supervision over operations of legal entities and natural persons
which invite foreigners, the existence of structures which organise illegal
migration; the possibility for long-term illegal residence, illegal work and
unhindered relocation within the country. Moreover, the effectiveness of the
Ukrainian migration management system may be reduced by the signing of
a re-admission agreement with the European Union, unless before that time
Ukraine carries out the appropriate legislative and infrastructural changes,
and in particular, develops mechanisms for the deportation, detention and
registration of illegal migrants.
It is difficult to determine how many illegal immigrants are currently resident
in Ukraine. Estimates range from several thousand to a million. Official Ukrai-
nian estimates mention 600,000 such people. According to Sergei Pirozhkov,
estimates in the range of 120,000 to 150,000 people staying there simulta-
neously seem most realistic76. Olena Malynovska considers 500,000 as the most
likely number which corresponds with the estimates provided by the IOM
and representatives of the Ukrainian border guard77. According to Victor Chu-
75 See O. Malynovskaya, ‘Caught between East and West...’, op. cit.; Vedomosti, 24 January 2006.
76 See article of S. Pirozhkov from 2000 on the migration policy of Ukraine; this article is avail-
able on the following Internet site: http://www.demoscope.ru/center/fmcenter/piroj.html
77 O. Malynovskaya, ‘International migration in contemporary Ukraine: trends and policy’,
Global Migration Perspectives, No. 14, October 2004, page 17.
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mak, it can be assumed that an annual flow of illegal immigrants crossing
Ukraine may top one million persons78. It should be remembered that part of
this group is made up of small entrepreneurs, immigrants from the Southern
Caucasus and Central Asia, who trade in Ukraine and have no intention of
proceeding onwards to Western Europe.
More specific data refer to the number of illegal immigrants arrested, while
crossing the border or inside the country. In the period 1991–2003, the Ukrai-
nian border service arrested over 91,000 illegal immigrants; the Ministry of
Interior detained around 10,000 people in the period 2001–2003. Starting
from 2000, the number of people arrested while attempting illegal border
crossings has gradually decreased; meanwhile, the number of illegal migrants
arrested inside the country has increased. According to Ukrainian experts,
every year around 30,000 illegal migrants are arrested in Ukraine. According
to official statistics from 2005, the Ministry of Interior arrested 14,800 ille-
gal migrants, and the border service 17,900. Moreover, 38,200 people (of which
12,400 were deported) were held administratively liable for infringement of
regulations concerning residence on Ukrainian territory by the Ministry of
Interior, and 6,900 were held on the same basis by the border service (of who
6,800 were deported)79. In 2006 the border service has apprehended a total
of 26 thousand persons, who attempted to illegally cross the border, which
amounted to more than 50 per cent increase over the previous year’s figure.
Among those people the biggest group was made up of citizens of Moldavia
(9.5 thousand) followed by Uzbekistan (2.5 thousand) and Armenia (2.3 thou-
sand). In the previous years most of those arrested were citizens of China,
India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Bangladesh and Iran. Recently, an in-
creasing trend in the percentage share of the arrested CIS citizens, was noti-
ceable. Most illegal immigrants are arrested in the Kiev and Zakarpattia (Trans-
carpathian) oblasts.
Ukraine is one of the most important European states regarding the recruit-
ment of victims of international trafficking in human beings. It is also a tran-
sit country for trafficking women from other regions of the CIS or Asia. It is
extremely difficult to estimate the number of Ukrainian women and children
78 Interview of 23.01.2007 for the web portal Grani.plus.
79 See State Committee for Nationalities and Migration of Ukraine; http://scnm.gov.ua/ua/
a?news_coment_001.
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aboard who have been forced into prostitution or slave labour. The Inter-
national Organisation for Migration estimates that in the period 1991–1998,
over half a million women from Ukraine were sent abroad from there to the
West. According to information provided by the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior,
in 2005 415 crimes connected with human trafficking were recorded, and
446 victims of this proceeding were returned home, which was an increase
in comparison with 2004. According to the same source, the main destina-
tion countries where Ukrainian citizens are sold are Turkey, Poland, Russia,
Israel, Germany, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Italy.
2.1.4. Refugees and internally displaced people
At the beginning of the 1990s, refugees from ethnic conflicts on the territory
of the former USSR started to arrive in Ukraine. In 1992, Ukraine received
around 60,000 refugees from Transnistria, usually of Ukrainian nationality.
Also, 3,000 persons displaced by the Abkhazian conflict, 2,000 Chechens and
around 5,000 refugees from Tajikistan, which was then in a state of civil war,
found shelter there. These people received aid from the Ukrainian state pur-
suant to a special decision of the government, and not on the basis of the Ge-
neva Convention, which Ukraine joined only 4 years ago.
In the following years refugees from outside the region started to arrive in
the Ukraine, mainly citizens of Afghanistan. For several years now, the num-
ber of people applying for refugee status has remained at a relatively low le-
vel; around 1500 applications for refugee status are filed every year. In 2005,
the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration (SCNM) received 1594
such applications. At the beginning of 2006, there were 2 346 refugees regis-
tered in Ukraine, 37 of whom received the status in 2005. The refugees origi-
nate from: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Russia (Chechnya) and Armenia, among
other places. The statistics provided by UNHCP are similar.
It is highly likely that the number of asylum applicants will increase. This is
connected with the increasing number of transit migrants, who cannot pass
through to the European Union while in Ukraine. Some of them, who are
unable to apply for refugee status in EU countries, will surely file such appli-
cations in Ukraine.
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2.2. Migration policy
Initially, the solution to the Ukrainian migration problems mainly consisted
of declarations unsupported by concrete action. The situation only started to
change in recent years, and actual achievements in this area are still quite
modest. A package of migration acts complied with international standards
was passed and general principles for a migration policy were developed;
however, considerable difficulties have been encountered in implementing
them. These difficulties result not only from financial problems or the lack
of executive instruments, but also from the state political instability and the
lack of specialised personnel. Institutional changes do not keep pace with
legal changes. Moreover, the Ukrainian state has sometimes tended to take
international commitments regarding migration upon itself, which it has
then proved unable to fulfil.
The Ukrainian migration policy has a temporary nature, and as such provides
no answers to the questions of the role and place of migration movements
in the process of national development. The Ukrainian authorities have failed
to develop a draft migration policy. Moreover, according to some analyses,
this policy is too closely connected with Ukraine’s social policy, and fails to
consider economic issues, i.e economic costs and benefits, which migration
generates. Nor is there any concept of assimilating migrants and protecting
Ukrainian economic migrants working abroad.
The creation of a migration management system in Ukraine has not been com-
pleted; the responsibilities and competences of the institutions involved in
these matters are vague. After the ‘Orange Revolution’, the new government
initiated the process of restructuring the entire state’s administration system,
including those organisations responsible for migration issues. Nevertheless,
a target vision for the migration system has yet to be developed.
2.2.1. Evolution
The Ukrainian authorities did not have the experience of managing the mi-
gration movements of such a nature and on such a scale as emerged after the
collapse of the USSR. The fact that Ukraine decided to sign readmission agree-
ments (including that with Poland, concluded in May 1993), despite not being
organisationally or financially prepared for their implementation, demon-
strates the difficulties, which the Ukrainian authorities had in fully compre-
hending the migration problem.
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The repatriation and ethnic migration issues were the first subject area the
new authorities dealt with. In 1991, a relatively liberal Law on Ukrainian Citi-
zenship was passed, which permits descendants of former Ukrainian citizens
to obtain citizenship. However, problems connected with repatriation, such
as the integration of displaced persons or property rights, were not address-
ed. The Supreme Council passed an Law on the Reinstatement of Rights to
Persons Deported for Ethnic Reasons’ only on 24 June 2004. In May 2006, the
Ukrainian government approved the current programme for adaptation and
assistance to the Ukrainian Tatars and representatives of other deported na-
tions80. The absence of any state support programmes for repatriates caused
many people of Ukrainian origin from the CIS area to emigrate to Russia in-
stead of Ukraine.
In the period 1993–1996, the Ukrainian authorities started to develop legal
foundations for a migration policy. In December 1993, an Law on Refugees
was passed; in January 1994, a Law on the Entrance and Exit of Ukrainian Citi-
zens, and in February of the same year, a Law on the Legal Status of Foreign-
ers. Moreover, the Law on Employment contained provisions establishing
agencies to deal with organising work for Ukrainians abroad; the basis of
the migration management system also started to emerge. However, this
was a chaotic and uncoordinated process. In 1993, within the framework of
the Ministry of Interior, a Registration and Migration Service was establish-
ed. In June 1994, the Council of Ministers passed a resolution “on the estab-
lishment of migration service organs in Ukraine”, but this has not been fully
implemented. The Ministry of Nationalities and Migration was established,
and in July 1996 it was transformed into the State Committee for Nationa-
lities and Migration. Soon afterwards, the authorities deemed the work of
this organ to be unnecessary, and incorporated it into the Ministry of Justice.
In September 2001, alongside the activation of government policy in the
area of migration, President Leonid Kuchma reactivated the committee as an
independent organ of the higher state administration.
The second half of the 1990s was a period where migration policy showed
little activity. It was only in the period 2000–2001 that the Ukrainian authori-
ties decided to complete the migration management system and develop
an appropriate policy concept. New laws on refugees and on immigration
were then passed, and the Law on Citizenship was amended. In addition, a pro-
80 First such programme (until 2005) was adopted in 2002.
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gramme for fighting illegal migration was also approved, the State Depart-
ment for Migration, Citizenship and Registration was established within the
Ministry of Interior and reform of the Border Service was commenced. The
changes adopted in this period enabled Ukraine to join the Geneva Conven-
tion and obtain IOM membership.
In August 2003, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a programme for regulating
migration processes in the years 2003–2005. The following migration policy
development priorities were mentioned in this document: completing the
development of normative and legal bases and developing effective mecha-
nisms for regulating the migration processes; the legal protection of refugees;
favouring the repatriation to Ukraine of emigrants and their descendants;
the development of legal and socio-economic principles regulating labour
migration; and the development of international cooperation in the area of
migration.
The period 2004–2006 saw Ukraine subordinating the development of its mi-
gration policy to endeavour to meet international standards, including the
requirement to sign an agreement with the European Union on liberalising
principles for the movement of people. The Ukrainian authorities have paid
most attention to the problem of fighting illegal migration; in 2004, Ukraine
adopted the second consecutive plan to combat this phenomenon (for the
years 2005–2007). It also introduced changes into legislation by increasing
penalties for crimes connected with illegal migration and illegal crossing of
the border. The law enforcement agencies have started to monitor universi-
ties and tourist agencies in order to detect whether these entities have been
issuing false certificates entitling them to legalise residence for illegal mi-
grants. The actions undertaken by Ukraine are thus of a mainly regulatory
and repressive nature, which does not give immigrants any opportunity to
escape from the grey zone. This problem could be solved by announcing an
amnesty, as was suggested back in 2004 by the management of the Com-
mittee for Nationalities and Migration.
The basic challenge, which Ukraine must face, is that of developing a pro-
tection system for its citizens working abroad. The above-mentioned report
by the Human Rights Ombudsman in 2003 indicated the weakness of this
element of Ukraine’s migration policy. Ukraine is not a member of the UN
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers Members
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of Their Families, or of the European Convention on the Legal Status of Mi-
grant Workers, however work on joining these conventions is in progress.
Ukrainian citizens working abroad usually do not have access to the Ukrai-
nian retirement and social benefits system. The cooperation agreements in
the area of economic migration, signed in the 1990s with such countries as
Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania and some CIS countries, in prac-
tice operate within a very limited scope. Concrete actions on labour migra-
tion have only been undertaken by the Ukrainian authorities in the last two
years. In November 2004, a programme to protect the rights and interests of
citizens going abroad was approved. An assistance centre for Ukrainian citi-
zens working abroad was opened by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
as part of this programme. This centre is an information point for potential
migrants, and provides assistance to Ukrainians, who are abroad. There are
plans to open offices in five regions of the country. Moreover, Ukraine is con-
ducting negotiations with countries where Ukrainians work, suggesting that
they finalise agreements on the mutual protection of economic migrants.
The Ukrainian authorities are also trying to improve the legal and institutio-
nal bases for protecting refugees, illegal migrants and victims of human traf-
ficking. In May 2005, the Law on Refugees was amended by extending the
deadline for persons applying for refugee status to file their applications.
Also, regional centres of migration service, which handle refugee procedures
among other duties, were established. On the other hand, the content-related
preparation of offices to process these applications is insufficient, and inte-
gration programmes for refugees are of merely a symbolic character. Further-
more, the authorities’ record on giving persons seeking asylum the oppor-
tunity to appeal to court, and of not expelling foreigners to countries which
use torture, must also be deemed inadequate. This was confirmed by the
Ukrainian authorities’ decision in February 2006 to deport eleven refugees
from Uzbekistan, who had been denied asylum. Yet another problem consti-
tutes the poor treatment of illegal migrants, who are often detained in the
custody of the border guards, instead of in deportation centres, and who are
subject to lengthy deportation procedures81.
81 See Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: On the Margins Rights Violations against Migrants and
Asylum Seekers at a New Eastern Border of the European Union, November 2005.
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A separate issue is the use of immigration inflows, including repatriation, to
improve the demographic situation. In contrast to Russia, Ukraine did not
decide to develop any legislation facilitating the inflow of immigrants from
the CIS region. Also programmes that would encourage Ukrainian migrants
to return from abroad and invest the money earned abroad in their home-
land, and so develop private entrepreneurship, are missing.
At the end of May 2006, the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration
presented the plan of migration policy concept which had long been antici-
pated. The document recognises the following current objectives: legally de-
termining the main tasks of the state’s migration policy and adopting the
normative acts necessary to implement it, as well as establishing the insti-
tutional and financial collateral to implement this policy. The document em-
phasises that despite the adoption of many documents on this matter, there
is as yet no organ in Ukraine which can cover the entire area of the migra-
tion question. It also emphasises a lack of automated population databases,
including databases on migration flows. The draft sets very ambitious long-
term objectives, such as (1) the development of a migration situation that
would favour the socio-economic, demographic and cultural & educational
development of the country and (2) preventing the outflow of the country’s
workforce and intellectual potential. To implement these tasks, the document
suggests that an internal migration programme be developed as an alternative
to foreign migration and an idea to attract emigrants from Ukraine back there.
2.2.2. Structures
Most Ukrainian central offices have been mentioned in the documents con-
cerning the regulation of migration processes. However, the following enti-
ties are directly responsible for actions in this area: the State Committee for
Nationalities and Migration (SCNM), the Ministry of Interior, the State Border
Guard, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Ministry of Justice. It is also covered by institutions such as the National
Security and Defence Council and the Ukrainian Security Service. The com-
petences of different institutions have not been rationally divided; there are
cases in which tasks are duplicated, and there are also difficulties in deter-
mining which organ is responsible for a given area of policy. This is confirmed
by the migration policy concept mentioned above. The development of the
migration management system has still not been completed, and it is not
known whether the main organ currently responsible for the migration policy,
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the Committee for Nationalities and Migration, will not undergo liquidation
or a far reaching restructuring. According to the November 2006 decree of the
Cabinet of Ministers, the Committee is to be merged with the National Depart-
ment for Religion, which may lead to marginalisation of migration policies
and an evolution of the Committee into a structure of a ethnic-social makeup.
The competences of the SCNM include the implementation of acts on refugees
and repatriates, and the preparation of documents concerning migration.
In July 2003, part of the work on illegal migration concerning the prepara-
tion of deportation resources was passed to its administration. The Committee
is also responsible for granting refugee status. Moreover, pursuant to the de-
cision of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers taken in May 2004, the regional
organs of the migration service were subordinated to the SCMN. The ineffec-
tive and duplicated nature of the migration management system is confirm-
ed by the fact that the divisions of the State Department on Migration, Citi-
zenship and Registration of the Ministry of Interior of Ukraine operate inde-
pendently of the SCMN’s offices.
Information regularly emerges concerning the possibility that the Committee
will be liquidated or restructured. In the beginning, pursuant to the act of 2003,
its future destiny was supposed to be connected with the development of
a new structure, the migration service of Ukraine. However, the act was not
adopted. In February 2005, President Victor Yushchenko announced plans to
reform the state administration, including plans to liquidate the SCNM. To
date, the only real effect of restructuring the Committee has been the appoint-
ment of its new chief82. The investigation of infringement of the refugee pro-
ceedings procedure, instituted by the public prosecutor’s office in mid-2006,
was unfavourable to the authority of the Committee83.
The Department on Fighting Illegal Migration in the Ministry of Interior, which
focuses on human trafficking and detecting transfer channels for illegal im-
migrants, is responsible for combating illegal migration within the country.
The Ministry of Interior conducts part of its operations in cooperation with
the State Border Service, which is increasingly involved in fighting illegal mi-
gration. In 2001, a special division for combating this phenomenon was es-
82 Hennadiy Moskal was replaced by Serhij Rudyk (dismissed in January 2007).
83 Fakty, 11 July 2007.
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tablished within the framework of the border service. Issuing work permits,
both for Ukrainian citizens outside its borders and foreigners in Ukraine, is
the responsibility of the State Employment Centre of the Ministry of Labour
and Social Policy.
2.2.3. International cooperation
Ukraine’s external policy for migration concentrates on two basic geograph-
ic directions: the CIS area and the European Union states. Ukraine also coope-
rates with international organisations specialising in migration problems.
Due to close cultural, ethnic and economic connections, the objective of Ukrai-
nian policy regarding the CIS states consists on one hand in maintaining
a relatively liberal visa regime and principles of residence for its citizens on
the territory of these countries (especially in relations with Russia), and on the
other on stopping the wave of illegal migration coming from this area. Even
though Russia has usually accepted the illegal immigrants arrested by the
Ukrainians on the border, it is unwilling to act in conformity with the formal
records of the readmission agreement. In February 2006, the assumptions of
the Ukrainian-Russian readmission agreement were determined at the expert
level; however, it is difficult to judge whether Russia will in the end agree to
sign it. As far as CIS territory is concerned, Ukraine has only been able to sign
readmission agreements with Georgia, Moldova, Turkmenistan and Uzbeki-
stan. Belarus is making the conclusion of its agreement dependent on the
prior conclusion of such an agreement between Ukraine and Russia.
The presence of a considerable community of Ukrainian migrants (mainly
illegal) in Russia provides Moscow with a tool to pressurise Ukraine. In the
autumn of 2004, during the course of the presidential campaign in Ukraine,
Russia – which wanted to increase Prime Minister Victor Yanukovich’s chances
of winning – had extended the duration of unregistered residence for Ukrai-
nian citizens from 3 to 90 days. The asymmetry in migration flows with Rus-
sia also makes Ukraine the party most likely to make concessions and initiate
the development of cooperation in the field of migration. Ukraine’s decision
from 2001 requiring CIS citizens to enter the Ukrainian territory with foreign
passports did not include Russian citizens84. For several years, Kiev has been
negotiating a comprehensive agreement with Russia to regulate the problem
84 And Belarus.
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of labour migration, including a provision for the full rights of Ukrainian 
employees.
Ukraine is a signatory of the basic conventions and cooperation programmes
in the area of migration adopted within the framework of the CIS, and repre-
sentatives of Ukraine regularly participate in official meetings on these issues.
In its relations with the EU and its members, Ukraine is aiming towards libe-
ralising the visa regime and concluding agreements facilitating the legal em-
ployment of Ukrainians. Moreover, Kiev is hoping that cooperation with the
EU will result in financial aid and technical assistance to reform the migra-
tion system, especially the expansion of the refugee protection system and
the development of centres for detaining illegal migrants. The Action Plan in
the area of JHA (Justice and Home Affairs) from 2001, which was incorporated
in February 2005 into the general EU–Ukraine Action Plan implemented with-
in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, constitutes the cur-
rent fundament of cooperation between the EU and Ukraine in the area of mi-
gration and asylum.
In November 2005, negotiations between Ukraine and the European Union
on the easing of visa restrictions to the Ukrainian citizens were commenced.
An agreement in this matter, along with the readmission agreement85, will be
signed soon. The accords were paraphed in October 2006 during the EU–Ukrai-
ne Helsinki Summit. The shape of the possible readmission agreement raised
many controversies. Ukrainian experts emphasise that, despite the fact that
the visa facilitations offered to Ukraine will be similar to those once proposed
to Russia, Ukraine was still being offered a less advantageous readmission
agreement (without the clause stating no acceptance of third-country citizens
for a specific transition period). Therefore, Ukraine is counting on the Euro-
pean Union to offer it a considerable financial aid to solve problems connect-
ed with receiving illegal immigrants from EU countries. As follows from the
information of the EU side, the total expenditure in 2007 will most probably
amount to 30 millions euros.
In the 1990s, Ukraine signed agreements on economic migration with Russia,
Belarus, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia and the Czech Republic86, Slovakia and
85 Ukraine concluded bilateral agreements on readmission with all its western neighbours i.e.
Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.
86 No longer prevails.
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Poland, among other countries. However, these agreements remain in limbo
to a certain extent. New-generation labour migration agreements making it
easier for facilitating migrants to work legally have been concluded only be-
tween Ukraine and Portugal. Ukraine is negotiating analogous agreements
with Italy, Greece, Spain, Poland, the Czech Republic and other countries.
Ukraine’s aim of developing a migration management system compliant with
generally accepted international standards means it is eager to use the support
and assistance of the International Organisation for Migration, the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, OSCE and many other such
organisations. It also participates in the Söderköping and Budapest Processes.
2.3. Conclusions
The socio- economic crisis and the transformational difficulties which Ukraine
experienced in the 1990s, whose results are still being felt to date, resulted
in the increased emigration of its population, both permanent and tempo-
rary. Only in 2005, for the first time in many years, did Ukraine’s migration
balance became positive. According to official data, over 2.5 million inhabi-
tants left Ukraine in the period 1991–2004, although the actual number of
emigrants may be much higher. In the same period, around 2.2 million people
came to Ukraine. Outside the state borders, there is a considerable group of
labour migrants; every year, several million citizens emigrate in search of work.
Most migration flows through Ukraine take place within the framework of
the former USSR.
In the first half of the 1990s, ethnically motivated migration was dominant in
Ukraine; Jews, Germans and Russians left, and Ukrainians arrived (although
fewer than representatives of other titular nations in the CIS region), as did
Crimean Tatars. Such ethnic migrations are slowly ceasing. Despite the fact
that there are around 3 million Ukrainians in Russia alone, it should be pre-
sumed that unless there is a serious social and economic crisis in Russia, and
Ukraine prepares an attractive repatriation programme, these people will
remain in their current country of residence.
Currently, the basic motivation for Ukrainians travelling abroad is the desire
to earn money. Due to the predominantly illegal nature of the employment
undertaken by Ukrainian guest workers, estimates referring to this number
vary considerably. Most probably, there are between 2 and 3 million Ukrai-
nian labour migrants currently working abroad. The main destination coun-
tries are the Russian Federation, Poland, Italy and Portugal. Within the past
two years, the increasing number of illegal labour emigrants has forced the
authorities to undertake measures to legalise their employment abroad.
Another typical migration situation in Ukraine is the intensive transit migration
passing through its territory. The main transfer channel through the Eurasian
area crosses the Russian/Ukrainian border, and then passes through the Ukrai-
nian territory and towards its borders with Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.
Estimates of the number of illegal immigrants staying in Ukraine range from
several thousand to a million. Kiev is unable to handle this phenomenon, and
so mechanisms for protecting its eastern borders, as well as for the deporta-
tion, detention and detection of illegal migrants, need to be improved.
The development of the migration management system has not been fully
achieved in Ukraine. The administrative reform of the state, which will include
the current structures responsible for migration issues, has been announced
for several years now. Ukraine has adopted a package of basic documents
and developed general assumptions for a migration policy. However, Ukrai-
nian migration policy as yet has a temporary nature, without having been
thought through properly, and does not give answers to the questions regard-
ing the role of migration movement in the process of national development.
A draft migration policy is yet to be developed. However, it seems that the
main objective of Ukraine’s migration policy is not permitting the country
to become a centre for illegal immigration, and to civilise the economic mi-
gration of its citizens.
The objectives of Ukraine’s external policy of in the area of migration are as
follows: to allow its citizens to freely travel and work, and to obtain finan-
cial aid and advice from the international community in the fighting illegal
migration. Ukraine aims both for Russia to maintain its liberal principles of
entrance onto its territory, and to introduce principles simplifying movement
of people with the EU countries.
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3. BELARUS
The migration situation in Belarus differs from that ones which we can ob-
serve in Ukraine or Moldova. Since the collapse of the USSR, Belarus has re-
corded a positive migration balance, which results from both the relatively
low-intensive labour migration and the constantly decreasing, yet still incom-
ing stream of immigrants. On the other hand, because of the existence of the
Union of Russia and Belarus, Bielarusian immigrants residing in Russia are
not included in the statistics.
Belarus, which borders Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, remains an attractive
country, albeit less so than Ukraine, to transit migration from other countries
of the CIS region, Asia and Africa into the European Union. Despite the fact
that the western frontiers are well protected, the border with Russia remains
entirely open, which makes it difficult for the Belarusian authorities to con-
trol it effectively.
3.1. Migration movements
Belarus has a positive migration exchange balance with all the countries es-
tablished after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the period 1990–2003, its
positive exchange migration balance within the framework of the former USSR
amounted to over 265,000 people. Around 90% of this exchange is attribut-
able to three countries: Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. On the other hand,
from the very beginning of its independence, Belarus has recorded a nega-
tive migration balance with countries from outside the post-Soviet area. How-
ever, these are not large flows.
In the first years after the collapse of the USSR, Belarus experienced the most
intensive migration flows. The opening of the borders and the establishment
of an independent Belarus resulted in the return of Belarusians (and also
Russians) from other post-Soviet countries, while Jews and others left. The
officially registered flows gradually decreased, and Belarus’ positive migra-
tion balance started to shrink. The decreases mainly concerned immigration
flows; however emigration also decreases, this process is still not as rapid.
In 2004, the migration balance amounted to just over 2,000 people, and in
2005 (as of November) less than 1,500 people (see Table 22).
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Belarus is both the country of origin of labour migrants, and a destination
country for labour migration (mainly from the CIS area). The routes of transit
migration pass through Belarus into the European Union states. Most often
attempt to cross into Europe through Belarus are made by inhabitants of Asia
and Africa, but also of the former USSR countries. These immigrants arrive
from their countries of origin in transit from Russia or directly to Belarus.
3.1.1. Ethnic migration
The first wave of migration in independent Belarus was of an ethnic nature.
Immigrants who felt nationally and linguistically connected with the Bela-
rusian state, including ethnic Belarusians (constituting around 50% of all
immigrants) together with Russians were the first to arrive. Belarusians from
other post-Soviet area states also left for Russia and Ukraine. Those who emi-
grated from Belarus were mainly representatives of national minorities and
people who during the Soviet period had come to Belarus for professional or
family reasons, including soldiers, workers and students.
The pace of these migration flows gradually decreased, and their dynamics is
currently nearly 10 times less than at the beginning of the 1990s. This results
from an exhaustion of simple repatriation exchange reserves, and the stabili-
sation of the political and economic situation in the CIS as a whole, as well
as relative drop in the attractiveness of Belarus as a destination settlement
country. According to data of the Russian 2002 census, Russia was inhabited
by 815,000 ethnic Belarusians. These people could constitute a potential im-
migration background, even though when comparing the current economic
Year
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005 (I–XI)
Total
Left
13,238
13,812
14,270
13,378
12,986
12,510
10,342
90,536
Arrived
30,830
25,943
23,355
18,939
18,146
14,642
11,759
143,614
Migration balance
17,592
12,131
9,085
5,561
5,160
2,132
1,417
53,078
Table 22. Migration balance in Belarus in the period 1999–2005
Source: Ministry of Statistics and Analysis of the Republic of Belarus
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and social trends in Russia and in Belarus, it does not seem that the ethnic
Belarusians living in Russia intend to leave the latter country.
The emigration of representatives of other national groups, including emi-
grants of Jewish origin, who predominate in this category, is coming to a halt.
These emigrants from Belarus are mainly focused on Germany, USA and Israel,
and it is these countries which generate the most migration exchange be-
tween Belarus and the so-called ‘far abroad’.
3.1.2. Labour migration
The officially issued number of permits to leave Belarus for work purposes
abroad, as well as for the employment of foreigners in Belarus, is relatively
small. In the years 1994–2003, a total of around 34,500 Belarusians left for
labour purposes, and around 12,100 people arrived in Belarus. There is a cons-
tant trend of those incoming being outnumbered by those outgoing; pre-
sently, this difference is growing. A considerable jump in the number of per-
mits issued to Belarusians for work abroad has been observed since 2003,
which mainly results from the greater interest of students in seasonal work
opportunities in the US.
The state authorities in Belarus are quite active in monitoring the observance
of law concerning both Belarusians leaving to work abroad and the employ-
ment of foreigners in Belarus. However, the corrupt administrative proce-
dures in the CIS pose questions regarding the efficiency of such monitoring.
Belarusian experts quite commonly call the official statistics on labour emi-
gration of Belarusians into question, claiming that they do not reflect the scale
of this phenomenon. V. Migas and A. Niekhai, in an article entitled “Global
and Belarusian experiences in the regulation of external labour migration”
estimate that around 50,000 citizens of this country work abroad87. It seems
that these estimates are rather cautious. In Russia alone, the number of em-
ployed Belarusians may be much higher because, as citizens of the Union of
Russia and Belarus, they can be easily employed there. The official statistics
on the number of Belarusians working in Poland are inadequate to the actual
state of affairs; it can be estimated that every year at least several dozen
thousands Belarusians come to work to Poland. Russia and Poland are among
87 Belarusian Journal of International Law and International Relations, 2004, No. 1.
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the most popular countries for Belarusian guest workers, although not the
only ones. The estimates made by Professor Ryazentsev from the Academy of
Sciences of Russia, who believes that between 200,000 and 280,000 Belarusian
citizens work outside the country, can be considered as relatively credible.
The future scale of this phenomenon will mainly depend on development of
the social and economic situation in Belarus. The constant large dispropor-
tion in the level of salaries between Belarus and neighbouring countries will
encourage Belarusians to seasonal labour migration. On the other hand, the
authorities do not seem to favour unregistered labour migration; they claim
that it is accompanied by negative phenomena such as human trafficking,
smuggling or the development of a shadow economy. Currently, in some re-
gions of the country and in some sectors of the economy (including in agricul-
ture) there are problems with finding labour force. A shortage of workforce
had forced the Belarusian government to issue a regulation which legalised
the residence of CIS countries’ citizens in Belarus who at various times had
come to work in agriculture. This regulation applied to around 3,000 people.
3.1.3. Belarus as a route for illegal migration
The statistics on illegal migration announced by representatives of the Bela-
rusian authorities differ considerably from one another. On 27 November
2003, at the inauguration of a conference on “Illegal migration as a threat to
international stability and security of states” in Minsk, the Chairman of the
upper chamber of the Belarusian Parliament Hennadz Navitski stated that
there are between 500,000 and 800,000 people who could be classified as ille-
gal immigrants on the territory of Belarus88. A few days later, in his interview
with Der Spiegel, President Lukashenka said that recently, around 200,00 illegal
migrants had entered Belarus, and now constituted an excessive financial
burden for his country89.
Meanwhile, on 23 June 2004, during a meeting with the Chairman of the CIS’
Executive Committee Vladimir Rushailo90, the Belarusian Prime Minister Siar-
hiei Sidorski estimated the number of illegal immigrants in Belarus as be-
tween 50,000 and 100,000 people. This number seems more realistic. This is
confirmed by information indicated by the force structures. At the beginning
88 Belapan, 27 November 2003.
89 Reuters, 6 December 2003.
90 www.government.by/rus/council_mnisters.htm
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of 2005, the Deputy Chief of the Department for Citizenship and Migration
of the Ministry of Interior, Alexei Begun, estimated that around 30,000 foreign-
ers, who wish to migrate into the EU illegally, come to Belarus every year91.
Meanwhile, according to the head of the Belarusian KGB, Stephan Sukharenka,
the number of illegal transit migrants coming to Belarus every year increased
from 30–50,000 to 100,000 after the EU enlargement in 200492. However, when
trying to estimate the number of illegal immigrants remaining in Belarus, it
should be borne in mind that the Belarus/Russia border is open. Transferring
a group of illegal immigrants by car from the Moscow region to the Polish bor-
der is a matter of around 10 hours.
The statistics on the arrests of foreigners who violated border crossing regu-
lations or terms of residence may help to estimate the actual scale of illegal
migration in Belarus. According to official data from the Belarusian Ministry
of Interior, in 2004 over 24,000 foreigners were prosecuted for violating the
principles of residence and transit crossing93 (around 37,000 in 2003), includ-
ing over 2,000 deported (2,300 in 2003). In the first eight months of 2005,
16,000 foreigners were held administratively liable for violating the princi-
ples of residence, of whom 1,300 people were deported. It should be remem-
bered that this category includes all foreigners who one way or another
have violated the principles of residence in Belarus, and therefore statistics
of border arrests and the arrests of illegal migrants’ groups may also prove
useful when estimating the number of illegal transit migrants.
According to the State Border Guard Committee over three thousand illegal
migrants were arrested in the years 1999–2004, and 160 in 200594. In com-
parison with Ukraine, these statistics are not very high, nor do they show any
trend to grow. The increase in the number of irregular migrants arrested in
groups constitutes a disturbing trend; whereas in 2000 36 such groups (com-
prising 321 individuals) had been arrested, in the first eleven months of 2004
this number increased to 122 (comprising 1,017 individuals)95. Citizens of China,
India, Pakistan and Afghanistan predominate among those arrested for ille-
91 See ‘Illegal migration – a significant problem of international security’, www.soyuz.by, 
13 January 2005.
92 Belapan, 29 November 2005.
93 Ibidem.
94 www.gkpv.gov.by/ru/fghfg
95 Statistics provided by the Department for Citizenship and Migration of the Ministry of Interior.
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gal crossing of the border. Meanwhile, people breaking the principles of resi-
dence in Belarus are often citizens of other CIS states. The statistics mention-
ed indicate that the number of illegal migrants arrested in Belarus has stabi-
lised at the level of 2,000 to 3,000 people per year. This migration is increas-
ingly taking on an organised nature, and international crime groups partici-
pate therein.
Belarus is also a country of origin and transit for victims of human trafficking.
This procedure mainly applies to young women, who under various pretexts
are taken away from Belarus to Western Europe, South America, Japan or to
the Middle East, and then are forced to work as prostitutes. The International
Organisation for Migration emphasises that also men are forced to work and
often become victims of modern forms of slavery. According to estimates from
the Ministry of Interior, the scale of this phenomenon is between 2,000 and
20,000 people a year. In the last five years, the number of disclosed crimes
connected with human trafficking has increased threefold. In 2004, 229 peo-
ple were prosecuted for this type of crimes, in 2005 359 people, and since
June 2006 121 people96.
3.1.4. Refugees and internally displaced persons
The main wave of refugees reached Belarus in the first half of the 1990s, when
there were no legal and organisational bases for handling this problem. In the
period 1992–1996, the migration service in Belarus registered over 30,000
people from the CIS area who applied for refugee status but faced with the
lack of proper legislation, they did not receive it97. Belarus passed its first
Law on Refugees in 1995, and started to grant refugee status in February
1997. In the period from February 1997 to May 2004, around 3,000 people
applied for the refugee status. In 2001, Belarus ratified the Geneva Conven-
tion and the New York Protocol, and has begun work on granting refugee
status on the basis of these documents. Over 20% of applications have been
approved, which demonstrates quite a large degree of liberalism of the Bela-
rusian migration institutions.
96 Belapan, 28 June 2006.
97 See L. P. Skhahodko, ‘Specification of external migration in Belarus’ (Osobiennosti wynuzh-
donnoy migracyi w Belarusi), speech at a conference entitled ‘Migration, social and trans-cul-
tural aspects of state development’ (‘Migracya, sotsyalnye i mezhkulturnye aspekty ustoitshi-
vogo razvityja’), Moscow 10–12 March 2004.
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According to data provided by the Ministry of Interior, 771 refugees were re-
gistered in Belarus in June 2005, of which 661 were resident in this country.
This number contains inhabitants of Afghanistan (547 people), Georgia (117
people), Tajikistan (32), Azerbaijan (28 people) and Ethiopia (23 people). The
number of asylum applications remains at a rather stable low level; in 2003,
140 applications were filed, in 2004 170, and in 2005 21098.
Due to frequent cases of human rights violation, Belarus is the country of
origin of people seeking for asylum. However, this group is not very numerous.
According to the UNHCR statistics, in 2004 2624 citizens of Belarus applied
for refugee status and asylum in 36 most industrialised countries in the world,
and in 2005 the figure was 2214 people. At the end of 2003, 2172 citizens of
Belarus, among others residing in Austria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany
and the US had refugee status. The further strengthening of the Lukashenka
regime may intensify this process. Also, the unprecedented scale of repression
towards the political opposition which occurred in connection with the presi-
dential elections in March 2006, should be emphasised.
3.2. Migration policy
Currently, together with the Department for Citizenship and Migration of the
Ministry of Interior, the most important role in migration affairs is played by
the State Border Guard Committee and the KGB. All these are power structures,
which is quite characteristic for Belarus, and reveals its priorities in migration
policy. In its repressive and supervisory functions, this system is rather effec-
tive, while neglects other elements, such as humanitarian functions.
Migration movements are subject to the authorities’ increasingly severe re-
striction. In the last two years, Belarus has restricted the right of its citizens
to leave the country as well as the right of foreigners to enter. The main prio-
rity in the area of migration seems to be fighting illegal migration and rigo-
rously regulating the population’s residence and internal movement. The Be-
larusian authorities emphasise threats connected with migration, such as
organised crime or international terrorism. The issue of combating criminal
groups organised on ethnic bases dealing with smuggling of persons occu-
pies much of the discourse in public statements by Belarusian officials.
98 Data provided by UNHCR.
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Despite the fact that Belarus is recording a negative population growth rate,
it is not treating immigration as a method for improving its demographic situa-
tion. Ethnic Belarusians are an exception to this rule; however, their repatria-
tion remains in the sphere of an intellectual exercise, rather than in real actions.
3.2.1 Evolution
In the first phase of forming its migration system, Belarus focused on adopt-
ing legislation which provided legal grounds to the regulation of migration
flows passing through its borders quite freely. According to L. Tikhonova, the
Belarusian government, faced with the lack of any efficient mechanisms to
regulate migration, adopted an ‘open door’ policy with respect to the problem
of incoming foreigners99. The Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners and People
without Citizenship from 1993, and the Law on Entry into and Exit from the
territory of the Republic of Belarus from the same year, should bee seen as
rather liberal. Also, the Law on Citizenship from 1991 was not especially re-
strictive, and granted Belarusian citizenship to all people with permanent
residence in Belarus as of the moment it came into force. This document also
anticipated numerous facilitations for people connected with Belarus to obtain
citizenship, either by origin or by workplace.
In the second half of the 1990s, together with the decrease in the intensity
of migration and certain experiences the Belarusian authorities had gained
in the area of managing migration, a decision was taken to develop the legal
assumptions of the state’s migration policy. In 1998, the Council of Ministers
of the Republic of Belarus first adopted a document entitled the “State migra-
tion programme for the period 1998–2000”. This programme constituted an
attempt to systematise the most important tasks of the state in the area of mi-
gration, to specify deadlines for their implementation and appoint competent
authorities. Emphasis was laid on issues such as improving the law in the
area of migration, organizing migration control and regulating its streams,
placing refugees, and conduct with reference to immigrants in compliance
not only with Belarusian standards but also those of international law. After
the adoption of this programme, the Belarusian authorities began filling the
gaps in the country’s migration legislation; in 1998, a Law on Immigration
was passed, and in 1999 a Law on External Labour Migration.
99 L. E. Tikhonova, ‘Contemporary migration trends In Belarus’ [in] J. R. Azrael at al. (edit.)., Co-
operation and Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Migration, 1996, page 82.
Another stage in the development of Belarus’ migration policy was connected
with expanding the competences of the Ministry of Interior in this area. Addi-
tionally, legislation connected with fighting illegal migration and human
trafficking was expanded. In 2000, a bill on pursuit of crimes connected with
migration was introduced, and the Palermo Convention was ratified with its
additional protocols. Moreover, the refugee protection system was adjusted
to the requirements of international law. In 2001, Belarus joined the Geneva
Convention, and in 2003 it passed a new version of the Law on Refugees.
In 2001, Belarus adopted the ‘State migration programme for the period
2001–2005’. From descriptions of this document, it seems that the following
are among the priorities of the Belarusian migration policy: developing fa-
vourable conditions to attract ethnic Belarusians to the country, regulating
immigration and integration with the global labour market, optimising the
refugee protection system.
In recent years, the migration policy has been subordinated to the primary
political objective of the President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime, which
is to prevent the outbreak of any ‘colour revolution’ and eliminate the politi-
cal opposition. To that end, the Belarusian authorities have commenced orga-
nisational measures restricting the entrance of foreigners supporting the oppo-
sition, including journalists or independent political observers. An important
element of this strategy also constitutes the introduction of principles making
it difficult for citizens (especially young people) to leave. Also, the currently ob-
served intensification of measures focused on fighting illegal migration allows
the authorities to monitor the flow of people with respect to their political
activity.
The first group of new laws contains provisions regarding the citizens of Bela-
rus. In March and November 2005, Alyaksandr Lukashenka issued decrees on
human trafficking. According to these documents, students who want to go
abroad and start studying, or even to participate in cultural and sports events,
must obtain permission from the Ministry of Education.
In February 2006, the Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners was amended,
which among other provisions, expanded the scope of reasons why a foreigner
may not be allowed to enter Belarus or may be deported from this country.
Pursuant to the new provisions, authorities can refuse the right of entry to
people who during a previous stay in Belarus were detained for legal or
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administrative reasons at least twice. Also, more restrictive provisions con-
cerning the principles of residence of foreigners, their registration and transit
through Belarus were introduced. It seems that the Belarusian authorities
will not be satisfied with these changes. In May 2006, the Parliament at its first
reading passed further amendments imposing criminal liability on foreigners,
who were previously deported and wish to enter Belarus before the term of
their ban expires. Also, foreigners who have repeatedly infringed the principles
of residence in the country will be subject to penal sanctions. Furthermore,
a bill has been introduced allowing for the dissolution of fictitious marriages
concluded by foreigners with Belarusian citizens in order to obtain the right
of residence.
3.2.2. Structures
At first, the organs responsible for labour and social policy were also respon-
sible for the migration question. In the period 1992–1997, the State Migra-
tion Service operated within the State Committee for Labour and Social Care.
In 1997, this service was transformed into a Migration Committee at the Mi-
nistry of Labour, whose competences were considerably expanded to include
issues connected with labour migration, refugees and international coopera-
tion. In September 2001, the Migration Committee was transformed into the
Migration Department within the framework of the Ministry of Labour and
Social Care (MLSC). The limitation of its independence was accompanied by
a limitation of competences; for example, in 2002 the department was de-
prived of general control over the implementation of the national migration
programme.
According to this trend, which could also be observed in Russia, the competen-
ces in migration issues have gradually been shifted towards the Ministry of
Interior. In April 2002, this Ministry became the main institution coordinating
the struggle against illegal migration. In addition, the competences of the
Passport and Visa Service were expanded. The Department for Citizenship and
Migration was established within the structure of the Ministry of Interior
upon a presidential decree of 30 December 2003. The new department took
over both the regional migration services as well as coordination over all
state institutions in the area of control over migration processes and fight-
ing illegal migration. The Migration Department at MLSC was closed down.
Apart from the general coordination of migration issues and the develop-
ment of legal acts in this area, the scope of competences of the Department
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of Citizenship and Migration covers all issues connected with citizenship,
residence permits, the legal status of non-citizens, the granting of asylum
and refugee status, the regulation of labour migration and combating illegal
migration. Some prerogatives in the area of fighting illegal migration remain
in the responsibility of the State Border Guard Committee. Moreover, there
is an inter-agency Migration Commission operated by the Council of Mini-
sters, which plays coordinative and legislative roles.
3.2.3. International cooperation
President Lukashenka’s authoritarian method of wielding power limits Bela-
rus room for manoeuvre on the international arena and dooms it to coopera-
tion within the framework of the CIS, mainly with Russia. Due to its drastic
cases of human rights violations, Belarus, which could potentially be one of
the most important partners of the EU in the area of Justice and Home affairs
(JHA), is receiving from the European Union very limited assistance. Program-
mes connected with sealing the borders have suffered relatively little from the
worsening relations between the EU and Belarus, as cooperation in this area
is advantageous to both parties. In addition, The EU’s states are not interest-
ed in restricting the entrance of ordinary citizens on its territories; such sanc-
tions have only been taken towards a limited group of the regime’s officials.
Belarus is cooperating most extensively with Russia, with which it has formed
a Union of Russia and Belarus since December 1999. The Russian/Belarus
border remains open. Thanks to close cooperation with Russia, Belarus does
not have a problem with transferring arrested illegal immigrants to Russia;
it can also count on the exchange of information and logistical assistance.
The Union of Russia and Belarus has a separate budget for financing projects
concerning border issues, among other matters.
The equal relations within the framework of the ‘common state’ are more
formal than real. In February 2003, Belarus undertook the responsibility to
issue migration cards to foreigners that are analogous to the Russian ones,
even though officially the agreement in this matter was only signed by both
states’ Ministers of Interior on 5 October 2004. Despite the existence of the
Union of Russia and Belarus, Belarusian citizens for many years had not en-
joyed identical rights in Russia as Russian citizens in Belarus, who could apply
for a permanent stay on the basis of a simplified procedure, among other such
privileges. In January 2006, the presidents of Belarus and Russia adopted
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several significant agreements on the freedom to move and choose the place
of residence, which allows Belarusian citizens to settle freely in Russia, and
extended the period in which citizens of both countries can stay on each
other’s territory without registration from 3 to 30 days.
Belarus unambiguously supports the development and deepening of coope-
ration within the framework of the CIS. It is a member of all the forums estab-
lished within the framework of this organisation, a signatory of most agree-
ments and treaties, and a participant in all meetings and conferences. On one
hand, the authorities in Minsk have opted to maintain different types of con-
veniences in the movement of people within the framework of the CIS, but on
the other hand they criticise the visa policy for some CIS countries as being
too liberal, which in their opinion results in illegal migrants entering the CIS
region. It also seems that the certain uneasiness on the part of Belarusian autho-
rities is caused by the inflow of foreigners from countries such as Ukraine or
Georgia100, which have experienced so-called ‘colour revolutions’.
In response to the actions of the Belarusian authorities in the course of re-
cent presidential elections, the European Union has imposed on this country
sanctions in the form of bans on several senior Belarusian officials from en-
tering its territory, including President Lukashenka. Previously, the Council
of the European Union had restricted contacts with representatives of Bela-
rusian authorities and re-allocated the aid programmes designated for Belarus
to the development of a civil society. Belarus does not participate in the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy either. All these reasons limit the cooperation
between Belarus and the European Union in the area of migration. The EU only
supports the expansion of the border infrastructure on the Belarusian/EU
border, combating illegal migration and improvement of the refugee protec-
tion system. The Belarusian authorities attempt to bypass these restrictions
and obtain greater aid and resources, referring to the problem of the threat
to the EU from illegal transit migration, which (in their opinion) has so far
been prevented by Belarus.
Belarus strives for cooperation with international organisations dealing with
migration problems. In issues referring to border and migration problems,
100 However on the contrary to Russia, Belarus failed to introduce the visa obligation with
respect to Georgia citizens.
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apart from the EU, the UNHCR and the International Organisation for Migration
cooperate with Belarus. After several years of attempts, in November 2005
Belarus was accepted into the International Organisation for Migration. This
organisation implements a programme for combating human trafficking in
Belarus, among other matters, to which it will allocate US$6 million by the
end of 2009101. Belarus is also an active member of the Söderköping Process.
3.3. Conclusions
In contrast to the 1990s, the legal migration in Belarus is currently not too
intensive, and it does not affect the economic and demographic situation of
the country. Belarus has a positive migration balance, which however shows
a decreasing trend. Most migration flows through Belarus are conducted with-
in the framework of the CIS area. Labour emigration from Belarus is some-
what different; officially, sources estimate that it is at the level of several thou-
sands a year. However, it seems that undocumented labour emigration may
apply to at least several dozen thousands (or more) Belarusians. Russia, where
Belarusians can freely travel to, and Poland, are the main destination countries.
Belarus poses a certain threat to the EU as a potential transit country for ille-
gal migration. The Belarusian authorities emphasise the extensive streams of
irregular migrants passing through their country and the organised nature
of this transit. Irrespective of the size of the discussed phenomenon, which
is difficult to estimate, it seems that the Belarusian authorities are in the habit
of exaggerating the scale of illegal migration.
The system for managing migration policy is in the hands of the power struc-
tures. Security issues are the priority. Fragmentary integration programmes
are mainly implemented by international and non-governmental organisa-
tions. This system is becoming increasingly subordinated to the problem of
controlling society. In the past two years, the Belarusian authorities have
adopted a series of provisions making it difficult for citizens to leave the coun-
try and for foreigners to enter Belarus. These instruments allow the authori-
ties to control the flow of people with respect to their political activity.
101 See: Regnum, 17 August 2005.
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The policy of the Belarusian authorities has resulted in significant restric-
tions to this state’s ability to operate on the international arena. Minsk is
currently destined mainly to develop its cooperation within the framework
of the CIS. In the JHA area, Belarus is strongly dependent on Russian policy,
which co-finances the Belarusian and EU borders protection programme.
There is no border control within the framework of the Union of Russia and
Belarus, and the citizens of both countries have recently become able to settle
freely on the territory of the other party.
Relations between the EU and Belarus, which could be one of the most im-
portant partners in the east in the area of migration, are currently minimal.
Belarus is taking advantage of the European Union programme to only a limit-
ed degree. The recent internal events in this country, including the undemo-
cratic presidential elections and mass repression in relation to the opposition,
do not allow for this situation to change.
4. MOLDOVA
Due to its economic and cultural conditions, Moldova participates mainly in
migration exchanges with the CIS region (mainly with Russia) and with South-
ern Europe. Because of low standards of living, Moldova is not attractive to
labour or transit migrants. On the other hand, one part of the Ukrainian smug-
gling route for migrants passes right through Moldova. This trend may accele-
rate due to the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the European Union.
The main feature of Moldova’s migration situation is the mass labour emi-
gration of its citizens, to the extent of around 600,000 people.
One of the main internal problems, which Moldova must confront, is the se-
paratist movement in Transnistria. The existence of this quasi-state, which
borders on Ukraine, prevents Moldova from fully controlling the migration
flows passing through its territory. An important step towards regulating
this problem was deployment of a European Union mission on the Ukrai-
nian/Moldovan border (including the border line separating Ukraine from
Transnistria) at the end of 2005, which supports the control over this section
of the border, as well as the earlier takeover of control of the border with
Transnistria by the Moldovan authorities.
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4.1. Migration movements
Since the beginning of its independence, Moldova has experienced an out-
flow of its population abroad. In the first years after the collapse of the USSR,
Moldovan emigrants mainly left to Russia. Over time, Turkey, the South Euro-
pean countries, and more recently Germany, the United Kingdom, and Ireland
have become increasingly popular. In the first part of the 1990s, ethnically
motivated migration was dominant. In subsequent years, alongside the socio-
economic breakdown in the state, labour migration started to dominate.
After the worst moment of the crisis in 1999, the Moldovan economy started
to develop rather dynamically, but despite that, the number of people leaving
abroad to work has continued to grow.
Moldova is not popular among immigrants. The annual immigration quotas
allocated by the Moldovan government, on the principle that the number of
immigrants arriving every year may not exceed 0.05% of the country’s total
population, fulfils the needs of those foreigners who want to settle. In total,
according to the official statistics, 18,905 citizens of foreign countries emi-
grated to Moldova in the period 1992–2004, 7784 of whom did so within the
definition of reunification of families, 8078 for educational purposes and 3043
for labour purposes102. According to the results of the 2004 national census,
77,000 migrants from Ukraine, 76,000 from Russia, nearly 7,000 from Kazakh-
stan, nearly 4,000 from Belarus, 2,000 from Russia and over 12,000 emi-
grants from other countries came to Moldova until 2004103.
The armed conflict in Transnistria and the political chaos connected therewith,
together with the serious socio-economic crisis, has led to difficulties with
efficient registration of migration flows in Moldova. For this reason Moldo-
van statistics on migration, particularly from the 1990s, are rather poor.
4.1.1. Ethnic migration
Of the states along the route of ethnic migrations connected with the col-
lapse of the USSR, Moldova was not considered attractive. Other factors also
102 Data provided by the National Migration Office of the Republic of Moldova.
103 Population of this part of Moldova, which is controlled by authorities in Chisinau, amounts
to 3.4 million (statistics of the Moldovan national census), while Transnistria is inhabited by
over 500,000 people.
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contributed to that state of affairs, included the low standard of living, poor-
ly developed industry and education and the threat of internal conflicts. Esti-
mates show that around 252,000 people left from Moldova to other republics
of the former USSR in the period 1990–1998, and around 195,400 people came
from this area104. Also, a considerable part of the large Jewish diaspora emi-
grated from Moldova. Due to ethnic and language connections, many Mol-
dovans left for good to Romania, or received Romanian citizenship, while at
the same time keeping their Moldovan citizenship105.
The National Migration Office has exact data only on people, who came to
Moldova as repatriates or impatriates. People who wished to leave for good,
were obliged to inform the appropriate offices in Moldova. However, this re-
quirement is not always fulfilled. Repatriation is decreasing (from 8,005 people
in 1994 to 1,816 people in 2004), as can be observed on all the CIS’ territory.
The vast majority of repatriates have come from Russia and Ukraine. In the
period 1994–2002, almost 90% of repatriates came from these countries (out
of the total number of 41,659 persons, 21,262 came from Russia and 15,730
from Ukraine). In the same period, people who declared Moldovan nationality
predominated among those repatriates, numbering 22,039 people. There were
7,777 Ukrainians, 7,188 Russians, and 4,658 people of other nationalities.
It seems that repatriation has influenced the decrease of ethnic Moldovans
in Ukraine, where according to the census of 2001 258,600 had been living
(79.7%, in comparison with 1989)106. In Russia, the number of Moldovans has
remained at a stable level: 173,000 in 1989 and 172,000 in 2002. People com-
ing to Moldova as repatriates automatically receive a permanent residence
card, and can count on more convenience in obtaining citizenship. However,
the state is unable to provide financial assistance to them, which makes the
decision to come back to Moldova definitely more difficult.
104 Institute of Public Policy, Migration Policies in the Republic of Moldova, Chisinau 2004,
page 21.
105 The number of Moldovan citizens with Romanian passport amounted at least to 500,000
people.
106 This phenomenon can also explain the change of national self-identification of people who
considered themselves Moldovan into Romanians.
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4.1.2. Labour migration
Low living standards (Moldova is among the poorest countries in Europe)
and unemployment force the Moldovan people to labour emigration en masse.
There are no precise statistics on the number of Moldovans working abroad,
which is mainly connected with the illegal nature of the employment they
undertake. Moreover, many Moldovans have dual citizenship, Moldovan and
Romanian, and they use the latter when entering other countries. The Mol-
dovan media estimate this figure at between 600,000 and 1 million people.
The authors of the UN report on the migration issues in Moldova also quote
the figure of 600,000 people107. According to data from the Moldovan Depart-
ment of Statistics and Sociology (which does not include Transnistria), there
were around 294,000 people employed both legally and illegally outside the
country in 2003 (Table 23). The legally employed people constituted a small
percentage of this number, as only 6,678 people had obtained permit to work
outside the country (mainly in Israel) in the period 1993–2003108. The national
census from October 2004 shows that 273,000 people were temporarily resi-
dent outside the borders of the country (excluding Transnistria).
Russia is the most popular country for Moldovan guest workers. This is caus-
ed by many factors, such as tradition (Moldovans used to come and work here
during the Soviet period), the lack of visas and any language barrier, and the
absorbency of the Russian labour market. According to some estimates, only
in the Moscow region there are over 200,000 Moldovans109. However, it seems
that this number is only appropriate in the context of the entire Russian Fe-
deration110. People who have little chance to succeed directly in the West,
107 Migration Management Moldova, Assessment 2003, page 4.
108 Yearbook statistics regarding migration fluxes in the Republic of Moldova, Year 2004; These
statistics do not refer to the CIS area. There were 7,853 Moldovan citizens working in Russia
on the basis of inter-state agreements in 2001.
109 New Borders In South Eastern Europe. The Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, 2002,
page 118.
110 According to estimated of V. Mukomel, currently 154,000 labour migrants from Moldova
reside in the Russian Federation; demoscope.ru/weekly/2005/0207/tema04.php
Year
Number of persons
2000
138,000
2001
149,000
2002
234,000
2003
294,000
Table 23. Number of Moldovan citizens working outside their country
Source: Department of Statistics and Sociology of Moldova
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and who are poorer and worse prepared from the professional perspective
(mainly coming from rural areas), come to Russia. Many of them treat work
in Russia as an intermediate stage before trying to get into the EU.
Apart from Russia, the South European countries are among the most popular
destinations for Moldovan emigrants: Italy (where around 19% of all migrants
work), Spain and Portugal, as well as Israel, Greece and Turkey. The latter is
most popular among the Gagauz, a minority population of Moldova, closely
related to the Turks.
The scale of labour migration is one of the most important indicators of the
socio-economic situation of Moldova. Experts believe that every Moldovan
guest worker is able to transfer at least US $1000 per year back to the country.
Considering the scale of the phenomenon, this adds up to a level comparable
with 30% of the gross domestic product. According to data provided by the
International Monetary Fund, in 2004 Moldovan citizens working abroad trans-
ferred around US$ 700 million to the country. Labour emigration is also con-
nected with many negative aspects, starting from the workforce drain from
the Moldovan labour market (between 30 and 40% of professionally active Mol-
dovans could be working outside the state borders), through the develop-
ment of organised crime, all the way to the intensification of negative demo-
graphic phenomena.
4.1.3. Moldova as a route for illegal migration
The geographic location of Moldova means it cannot be considered as a con-
venient place on the illegal migration route from Asia to the European Union.
The Ukrainian borders, which directly adjoin the European Union, are easier
to penetrate. The situation in this respect may deteriorate as Rumania, which
borders Moldavia, has entered the UE. Moreover, another factor increasing the
risk of illegal migration is the Moldovan government’s lack of control over
part of its territory. Local experts believe that one of trafficking routes from
the Ukraine goes through Transnistria, Moldova and then through Romania.
According to data provided by the Security and Information Service of the
Republic of Moldova, in the period 1992–2002 over 15,000 people were arrest-
ed and deported from this country on charges of attempting to cross to the
West through the Romanian border111. However, definitely fewer people were
111 New Borders In South Eastern Europe. The Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, 2002,
page 118.
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arrested for direct attempt to cross the Romanian border. In 1997 there were
around 200 of such cases, in 1998 around 250 cases, and in 1999 around 290
cases. In 2001, when the officers of the Moldovan Border Guard took control
over the section of the border with Ukraine, the number of persons arrested
increased to 578112.
Tighter control of Moldova’s borders has resulted in an increase in the pro-
fessionalism of the groups smuggling illegal immigrants. This process became
particularly apparent as of 2001. In 2004, two immigrant transfer channels
through Moldovan territory used by India’s citizens were broken up. Accord-
ing to local experts, this contributed to a considerable decrease in the inten-
sity of attempts to transfer illegal immigrants through Moldova.
Human trafficking, especially of young women, who are forced into prosti-
tution by organised crime groups, is a separate problem connected with ille-
gal labour migration. The scale of this phenomenon is difficult to estimate.
In the period from 2000 to May 2005, the International Organisation for Mi-
gration helped 1,581 victims of trafficking, although (as experts admit) this
is only the tip of the iceberg113. Women from Moldova were particularly fre-
quently transferred to the territory of the former Yugoslavia; around 70% of
the victims ‘worked’ in Macedonia, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo, where
in brothels they provided service to UN soldiers, among others. Currently, the
geography of this proceeding is changing; female citizens of Moldova are now
more frequently smuggled into Turkey and Russia.
4.1.4. Refugees and internally displaced persons
Moldova was already coping with a refugee problem at the beginning of the
1990s. This concerned refugees from armed conflict in the Transnistria
(around 51,000 internal refugees, and over 80,000 external ones, who mainly
fled to Ukraine)114, victims of conflicts in the others areas of the former USSR
(Armenia, Georgia) as well as outside its borders (Afghanistan). Most inter-
nally displaced persons on Moldovan territory returned to their permanent
places of residence. However, according to the Moldovan authorities, there
are still around 25,000 internally displaced persons in the country, victims of
112 Therein, page 124.
113 IOM Chisinau Counter-trafficking Unit.
114 Data provided by UNHCR.
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the Transnistrian conflict115. The IOM does not include this group of people
in its statistics.
In the 1990s, the UNHCR was responsible for the refugee procedure in Mol-
dova; this function was taken over by the Moldovan authorities in 2002–2003.
The number of refugees or people with a similar status staying in the territo-
ry of Moldova is relatively low. According to data provided by the High Com-
missioner for Refugees, since the beginning of the UNHCR office’s operation
in Chisinau (1997), 688 cases (951 people) were registered by 1 January 2003,
of which refugee status was granted in 123 cases (266 persons). According
to data as of the end of 2004 175 people with refugee status were found on
Moldovan territory. Chechens constituted the largest single national group
among them (32 people). Previously, the UNHCR had granted them refugee sta-
tus, but now the Moldovan authorities restrict to granting Chechens humani-
tarian status116. Syrians, Palestinians, Sudanese and Armenians are among other,
more numerous national groups. Meanwhile, according to the statistics pre-
sented by the UNHCR, by the end of 2005, in Moldova there were 84 refugees
who received refugee status according to the Geneva Convention, and 148 peo-
ple who were in the middle of the refugee procedure117.
For many reasons, Moldova is unattractive to potential refugees, even though
it cannot be ruled out that the EU’s expansion to Romania and Bulgaria could
influence the number of asylum seekers in Moldova, who will aim to enter the
European Union area.
4.2. Migration policy
Moldova has fairly developed governmental structures for dealing with mi-
gration issues, as well as certain state documents on these issues. This quali-
ty change, which took place in this matter a couple of years ago, was undoub-
tedly caused by the less ambiguous orientation of Moldovan foreign policy
towards the EU, as well as the increasing significance of labour migration.
The effectiveness and professionalism of the responsible Moldovan offices may
115 Status as per 2004.
116 In February 2004 16 Chechens, who were denied the refugee status, announced the hunger
protest.
117 UNHCR 2005 Global Refugee Trends.
be questioned; however, this is a rather common incapacity of state struc-
tures throughout the area of the former USSR. Many delays and negligence
also result from insufficient funding. The main weakness of Moldovan policy
is the lack of any effective system for registering migration flows.
4.2.1. Evolution
Moldova started to develop the legal and organisational bases for indepen-
dent policy in the area of migration quite early. On 19 December 1990, the Law
on Migration was passed, in accordance with which the Migration Depart-
ment was established within the framework of the Ministry of Labour and
Social Care (MLSC). In the following years, Moldova adopted some basic legal
acts regulating the sphere of migration, including the Law on Citizenship
(1991), on Entrance and Exit (1994) and on the Legal status of Foreigners and
Stateless Persons (1994).
The increasing labour migration of the population forced the Moldovan autho-
rities to develop a comprehensive migration management system. In 2001,
the State Migration Service was established (which has expanded its compe-
tences and changed its name twice since then; it currently operates as the Na-
tional Migration Office). In the same year, the National Committee for the Fight
against Human Trafficking was established. In 2002, the Moldovan govern-
ment ratified the Geneva Convention and initiated the development of the re-
fugee protection system (by appointing a unit responsible for refugee proce-
dures, and constructing the first centre for refugees). Two main documents
in the area of migration were developed in the same year: in November a con-
cept of migration policy, and in December the new Law on Migration.
The migration policy concept defined the principles, tasks and priorities of the
state migration policy. The following were considered as the basic tasks of
this policy: adapting law in the field of migration to global standards; develop-
ing cooperation with international organisations; improving the coordination
and efficiency of migration policy implementation, developing a new govern-
mental centre coordinating that policy; signing agreements with states where
citizens of the Republic of Moldova work, so that their rights are respected
and they receive better conditions; developing setting for reintegrating immi-
grants and repatriates; and developing a database registering migration
movements.
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Part of the priorities outlined in the concept have been implemented. The Mi-
gration Department, a new organ which was responsible for implementing
state policy in the area of migration, was established in August 2003. Legal
bases for a national system of asylum and refugee were developed. Actions
aiming at legalising the status of Moldovan labour migrants were taken, and
a system for monitoring companies sending people to work aboard was estab-
lished as well. Also, efforts to combat illegal migration and the trafficking in
women were initiated; in November 2001, the National Committee for the Fight
against Human Trafficking was established. Most problems are caused by im-
plementing these tasks, which are connected with extensive financial outlays,
such as developing efficient database of migration flows. Furthermore, a sys-
tem for the efficient detention and identification of illegal migrants is lack-
ing, which makes it difficult and sometimes even impossible to deport them.
4.2.2. Structures
The National Migration Office (NMO), which was established in mid-2005 by
renaming the Migration Department, is the main organ responsible for migra-
tion and asylum. The following are among the office’s main tasks:
– ensuring the state implements a consistent migration policy;
– harmonising national legislation in the area of migration with internatio-
nal legislation;
– developing databases on all categories of immigrants;
– preparing governmental documents on migration issues;
– forecasting and managing migration streams;
– supervising the system for registration of the entry and exit of foreigners,
with the participation of the competent organs.
The Moldovan National Migration Office deals with all migration issues, while
the other state offices concentrate on selected issues, particularly these re-
ferring to security. In this context, the Information and Security Service, the
Border Service and the Ministry of Interior can be listed.
The Illegal Migration Department operates as part of the Ministry of Interior.
It deals with crimes and administrative offences committed by foreigners and
on foreigners, monitors the legality of their residence in Moldova and organi-
ses deportations.
The Ministry of Information Development (MID) plays a specific role in Mol-
dova’s migration policy; since 2001, as an independent office, the MID has
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issued documents essential for legalising foreigners’ residence, and also con-
ducts the central register of population.
4.2.3. International cooperation
Moldova actively participates in international undertakings concerning mi-
gration issues, which is conditioned by its status of a country which sends
migrants and is dependent on remittances from its citizens who work abroad,
as well as its efforts to obtain external support in developing a migration
management system. As in the case of other states in the area discussed, the
two main directions of Chisinau’s external activities are Russia and the CIS
area, and the EU and its member states.
Moldovan policy towards Russia has an ambivalent nature; on one hand Chi-
sinau aims to maintain proper relations with Russia, which allow guest work-
ers to work freely in Russia, and on the other hand to abolish the de facto in-
dependence of Transnistria as soon as possible, which contradicts Russian
plans for this territory. The issue of labour migrants constitutes an important
potential pressure instrument on Moldova; in February 2005, prior to break-
through parliamentary elections in Moldova, the Russian Duma threatened
to impose a visa obligation upon its citizens. In 1993, Moldova concluded an
agreement with Russian on labour migration; however, its workers usually
work in Russia illegally. Moldova has concluded similar agreements with
Ukraine and Belarus. In addition, Chisinau is a signatory of the most impor-
tant CIS’ agreements on cooperation in border and migration issues.
Together with the reorientation of Moldova’s foreign policy and increasing
the role of the EU member states in the process of the Moldovan workforce’s
emigration, the importance of the European direction has considerably in-
creased in Moldovan migration policy. Within the framework of the ENP, on
22 February 2005 Moldova and the European Union signed an Action Plan
which included migration issues. The EU committed itself to provide Mol-
dova with consultancy and financial aid in order to develop a more effective
migration management system. Meanwhile, Chisinau declared that its prio-
rities will include the development of an electronic database to monitor mi-
gration flows from and to Moldova, the adoption of a National Action Plan
in the area of migration and asylum, and adaptation of its legislation to the
international standards. Moldova is participating in the EU assistance pro-
grammes in the areas of migration and border protection. Since December
2005, a special European Union mission has been operating on the Moldo-
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van/Ukrainian border, the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Mol-
dova and Ukraine (EUBAM), which trains and consults with local border and
customs services. In July 2006, a decision to expand the scope of the mission
was made. A decision was taken to draw more attention to the internal border
between Moldova and Transnistria. In addition, the liberalisation of a visa
regime is one of Moldova’s strategic objective in its relations with the EU.
As in the case of Ukraine, Moldova aims to conclude agreements on labour
migration with those states where its citizens work. Such an agreement has
been concluded with Italy; agreements with Portugal, Spain, Greece, and the
Benelux countries are ready to be signed118. In order to expand the circle of
states ready to conclude such agreements, Moldova is most eager to conclude
these readmission agreements although it usually agrees only to receive its
own citizens.
Chisinau has been cooperating quite actively in the field of migration and bor-
ders with international organisations such as the IOM, the ILO and the UNHCR,
which have agencies in this country. Moldova participates in the work of the
group on combating human trafficking which operates within the framework
of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. It is also a member of the Sö-
derköping and Budapest Processes, and is a signatory of the most important
international conventions regulating the area of migration and asylum.
4.3. Conclusions
Since the collapse of the USSR, Moldova has had a negative migration balance.
It is the country of origin for numerous labour emigrants and victims of hu-
man trafficking; however, it is out of the way of the main migration move-
ment in the CIS area. This situation may change upon the scheduled expan-
sion of the EU to include Romania and Bulgaria. The poor protection of the
state border and the lack of control over the Transnistrian section of the bor-
der with Ukraine will also act in favour of the situation.
The scale of labour migration is among Moldova’s main socio-economic pro-
blems. According to estimates, 600,000 Moldovans work abroad, usually ille-
gally, which constitutes a considerable percentage of this rather small country’s
118 Information provided by ICMPD.
professionally active population. There is no indication that this trend will
change in the immediate future. Russia is the main destination country for
Moldovan guest workers, and in the EU these are Italy, Portugal and Greece.
The Moldovan authorities aim to control the labour migration phenomenon
by signing international agreements that legalise the residence and employ-
ment of their citizens abroad and allowing to send employees to predefined,
legal work places, among other measures. The correct use of the considerable
financial remittances sent by emigrants to their families who remain in Mol-
dova is also a strategic challenge, so that these funds are not used for consump-
tion only, but are also employed for the investment and the development of
entrepreneurship.
In Moldova, both fairly developed governmental structures to deal with mi-
gration issues and basic draft documents on these issues exist. However,
efficient implementation mechanisms are missing, in the areas of registering
migration flows and fighting illegal migration, among others. Many cases of
negligence and delays in the sphere of migration result from insufficient fi-
nances, the low effectiveness of the bureaucracy and coordination difficulties.
The opportunity to order the migration management system and improve bor-
der control has been created though Moldova’s cooperation with the Euro-
pean Union. At the end of 2005, the EU had initiated mission supporting the
control of the Moldovan/Ukrainian border. The proposal to provide Moldova
with assistance in improving its migration management system is contained
in the EU–Moldova Action Plan implemented within the framework of the Eu-
ropean Neighbourhood Policy. The government in Chisinau is also applying for
the liberalisation of the visa regime in the movement of people with the EU.
Relations with Russia also remain a key issue for Moldova. This is the most im-
portant labour market for Moldovan emigrants, and its influence on the situa-
tion in Transnistria is hard to overestimate. Chisinau’s willingness to provide
its migrants with free access to the labour market in Russia and other CIS coun-
tries determines its participation in the agreements concerning migration,
which have been adopted within the framework of the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States.
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5. AZERBAIJAN
The Southern Caucasian states are those members of the CIS where migration
and exile have left the greatest imprints. Armed conflicts, ethnic persecutions,
and sudden deteriorations of the socio-economic situation have all resulted
in mass exodus of this region’s population from their homelands. In addition,
migrations have became the basic factor in the process of establishing the in-
dependent Caucasian states, which have been formed on the basis of ethnic
criteria.
The migration situation of Azerbaijan, which is the largest and most densely
populated state in the region, is slightly better than in neighbouring Georgia
and Armenia, where emigration has led to very serious and irreversible demo-
graphic effects. Yet another characteristic of Azerbaijan results from its strate-
gic geographic location. Important routes for the transit of illegal migrants
from the Middle East and South Asia pass though this country. Moreover, the
problem of refugees and internally displaced persons has a different shape
than that in other states of the region. Among Caucasian states Azerbaijan
has accepted the biggest number of the victims of ethnic conflicts.
5.1. Migration movements
Azerbaijan shows a considerable domination of emigration flows over immi-
gration, as well as great migration dynamics. The most intensive population
movements took place in the beginning of the 1990s as a result of the Kara-
bakh conflict. In later years, this dynamics gradually decreased. According to
the official statistics, in 1990, 137,000 people left Azerbaijan and 84,000 people
arrived, whereas in 2004, only 2,800 people left the country, whereas 2,400
arrived (Table 24). It is difficult to estimate the actual scope of the migration
flows passing through Azerbaijan, as due to the predominantly irregular
nature of these streams, many of them have not been included in the migra-
tion statistics. A definite majority of the migration exchange of Azerbaijan
takes place between the CIS states, mainly Russia (the Russian 2002 census
shows that since 1989, the number of Azeri people in Russia increased two-
fold), and to a lesser extent Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The remaining
countries to which the inhabitants of Azerbaijan leave are Turkey, Israel, the
US, and Western European states.
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Azerbaijan’s current migration balance, while it remains negative, is still much
smaller than the one recorded at the beginning of the 1990s. Economic deve-
lopment based on the exploitation of raw energy materials leads Azerbaijan
to record a small labour immigration, mainly in the oil sector. According to
data provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Popula-
tion, around 42,000 people, mainly from Russia, Georgia and Ukraine, immi-
grated to Azerbaijan in the period 1995–2004.
5.1.1. Ethnic migration
The mass ethnic migration which took place in Azerbaijan in the first years
after it became independent had two underlining causes: the outbreak of the
armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and ethnic cleansing and persecutions
connected therewith; the collapse of the USSR, which resulted in mass dis-
placements of population. In the former case of population fleeing from areas
subject to war or pogrom, this was a forced migration, and in the latter, of
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Total
Immigrants
84.3
66.3
35.7
16.3
8.6
6.2
5.8
7.5
5.4
4.8
4.4
2.6
1.2
2.5
2.4
254.0
Emigrants
137.9
106.4
49.9
28.5
19.6
16.0
13.2
15.7
10.5
9.1
9.9
7.3
4.3
3.8
2.8
434.9
Migration balance
-53.6
-40.1
-14.2
-12.2
-11.0
-9.8
-7.4
-8.2
-5.1
-4.3
-5.5
-4.7
-3.1
-1.3
-0.4
-180.9
Table 24. Migration balance in Azerbaijan in the period 1990–2004 (in thousands of persons)
Source: the State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan119
119 Calculated on the basis of data provided by the Visa and Registration Divisions (OVIR’s).
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a population going to the newly established homelands, the movement was
more in the nature of a repatriation or impatriation. Irrespective of how volun-
tary the given migration movements may have been, the first wave which
went through Azerbaijan was undeniably ethnically conditioned.
Ethnic migration in Azerbaijan took two principal forms. Armenians were
leaving Azerbaijan en masse, together with a smaller number of representa-
tives of Slavic nationalities. Nearly the entire Armenian population (number-
ing around 270,000 according to Azerbaijani data) left120. Meanwhile, ethnic
Azerbaijanis came from Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh which had been occupied
by Armenia, as well as from ethnically Azeri areas which were moved to Arme-
nians. Also, refugees from Uzbekistan, Meskhetian Turks and Kurds, were among
the immigrants. Some refugees then emigrated to third countries, mainly to
Russia.
The first refugees started to come from Armenia onto the territory of Soviet
Azerbaijan as early as 1987. The emigration to Azerbaijan reached its peak in
the period 1990–1991. According to data from the State Statistical Committee
of Azerbaijan, 205,000 refugees from Armenia and 29,000 from Uzbekistan
were registered in 1990121. In the period 1993–1994, internal migration was
predominant; the Azeri population left the territories around the Nagorno-
Karabakh occupied by Armenian separatists en masse. By the end of 1993,
there were 779,000 internally displaced people registered in Azerbaijan who
had fled from Nagorno-Karabakh. This number does not seem too reliable; it
may have been overestimated, as the refugees often registered themselves
in several places.
Russians were a specific group of repatriates who left Azerbaijan in the wave
of the ethnically motivated migrations; according to statistics from national
censuses from 1989 and 1999, the number of Russians in Azerbaijan decreas-
ed in this period by around 64%122. To a lesser extent, representatives of other
Slavic nationalities showed the same trend. As in the case of other CIS coun-
120 According to Armenian statistics approximately 330,000 Armenians left Azerbaijan in the
years 1988–1993.
121 Smaller number of these refugees stayed in Azerbaijan permanently. Some of them decid-
ed to emigrate further; See A. Junusow, ‘Ethnodemographic processes in the South Caucasus
in post-soviet period’ (Etnodemographitsheskie protsessy na Yuzhnom Kavkazie w postsoviet-
sky period), Kavkazskiy Sbornyk 2005, V. 2, page 260.
122 By 250,600 people.
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tries, nearly the entire Jewish population left Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, the num-
ber of Turks, and to some extent that of Georgians and Kurds, increased.
Migration flows of an ethnic nature have in principle already been exhausted.
An exception to this rule may possibly be the immigration of the ethnic Azeri
population of Northern Iran (an Azeri minority of around 20 million inhabits
this area) if there is any further deterioration of the security situation in Iran.
According to official sources, in comparison with the previous years, the num-
ber of Iranian citizens visiting Azerbaijan considerably increased in 2005.
The media also report mass purchases of real estate by newcomers from Iran,
although this is denied by the authorities in Azerbaijan123.
5.1.2. Labour migration
Local experts estimate that between 1 and 1.5 million people (out of 8.4 mil-
lion inhabitants in total) have left Azerbaijan to work. However, one expert,
A. Yunusov, believes that there may be 2 million Azerbaijani citizens working
in Russia alone, most of them illegally124. Meanwhile, according to the estimates
of a Russian researcher, V. Mukomel, there are around 1 million Azerbaijani
migrants working in Russia125. The statistics given by official sources are much
lower. In 1999, the Azerbaijani authorities referred to estimates which show-
ed that around 800,000 emigrants from Azerbaijan had left to Russia for work.
According to statistics of the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of Po-
pulation, 90,836 Azerbaijani people officially emigrated from Azerbaijan in
the period 1995–2004, of which 84,423 had gone to the CIS states (including
70,500 to Russia). It seems that these figures fail to illustrate the actual mi-
gration flows; they only refer to people who reported their departure from
their place of residence, while most emigrants still maintain their apart-
ments in Azerbaijan and have immediate family there.
In the first years after the collapse of the USSR, emigrants from Azerbaijan
mainly left for Russia or for other post-Soviet countries. In the second half of
the 1990s, Turkey, Iran and the United Arab Emirates become more popular
destinations, as did Western European countries. However, Russia remains
the primary destination. Inhabitants of Nakhichevan usually leave for Turkey.
123 Day.az, 17 May 2006.
124 A. Yunusov, ‘Ethnodemographic...’, op. cit., page 264.
125 Vladimir Mukomel, ‘How many illegal immigrants are in Russia?’ (Skolko v Rossiji nezakon-
nyh migrantov?), Demoscop Weekly, 20 July – 14 August 2005.
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5.1.3. Azerbaijan as a route for illegal migration
The number of illegal immigrants in Azerbaijan is difficult to estimate; some
local estimates mention as many as 70,000 to 100,000 people. Illegal immi-
grants in Azerbaijan are often transit migrants, who are trying to get through
to Europe. Azerbaijan has a key position among the Southern Caucasus states
on the route of illegal migration from Asia to Europe, which results from its
central geographic location, its porous border with Iran, and its cultural pro-
ximity to immigrants from the Middle East, among other factors. The threat
of illegal migration in Azerbaijan increased after 11 September 2001, and after
the start of Afghani and Iraqi military campaigns. The possible outbreak of
a political crisis in Iran could result in another wave of immigrants.
Illegal transit migrants using the Azerbaijani route come from the Middle
East, Southern Asia and to a lesser extent from African countries. These per-
sons are trying to cross Azerbaijan’s border illegally, or they use forged docu-
ments on country’s border crossings, sometimes crossing the Iranian and
Azerbaijani border legally and then using forged documents try to leave for
the West. According to the State Border Service of Azerbaijan, the following
illegal migration routes are most popular: Iraq (Suleymaniya)–Tehran–As-
tara–Baku–Europe; Afghanistan–Iran–Astara–Baku–Europe; Afghanistan–Pa-
kistan–Iran–Bilasuvar–Baku–Europe; Iran–Baku–Urumchi–Tokyo–Europe.
Some immigrants also travel by sea126.
According to experts, most illegal immigrants use intermediaries connected
with international crime groups, with their headquarters in Iran, Iraq, Russia
and Western European countries. This procedure is favoured by widespread
corruption in Azerbaijan.
As reported by the border service of Azerbaijan, in 2005, 2,781 people were
arrested for having violated the border crossing regulations, including 199 Geor-
gian citizens, 81 Iranians, 63 Russians, 30 Turks, 26 Uzbeks and 25 Pakistanis.
153 of them had tried to cross the border on the basis of forged documents, and
42 people had been using someone else’s documents. Furthermore, 14 crime
groups, smuggling and transferring transit migrants, were liquidated127.
126 www.mfa.gov.az/eng/foreign_policy/inter_affairs/fightmigr.html
127 See: trend.az, 27 February 2006.
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Azerbaijan is also the country of origin and transit for women trafficked from
the CIS countries into Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.
5.1.4. Refugees and internally displaced persons
According to official state data, the number of fugitives living presently in Azer-
baijan, who came to this country after the outbreak of ethnic persecution in
the early 1990s, amounts to around 1 million persons128. In accordance with
the UNDP data of 2002, quoted by many experts, there were 789,000 inter-
nally displaced persons and refugees recorded on the territory of Azerbaijan.
The majority of the refugees from Armenia were granted Azerbaijani citizen-
ship, therefore, this is not included in the statistics of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees. However, it should be assumed that some of the
overmentioned persons have emigrated abroad. According to the UNHCR
statistics, the number of internally displaced persons living at present on
Azerbaijan’s territory amounts to around 578,000129.
The Chechens are the other category of refugees looking for protection in
Azerbaijan. The UNHCR estimates that the influx of Chechen refugees into
Azerbaijan amounts to around 8,000; around 3,000 of them have been regis-
tered directly in the UNHCR office. However, according to some estimates,
the number of Chechens may be as high as 19,000. The authorities of Azer-
baijan are reluctant to grant the Chechens a refugee status on the basis of
the Geneva Convention; they are usually granted the status of a temporarily
protected person, which is provided to them on the basis of an extended defi-
nition of a refugee. Azerbaijan is also a place of residence for refugees from
Middle Eastern and South Asian countries, including Afghanistan, Iran and
Iraq. According to data from the State Committee for Refugees and Internally
Displaced Persons, there were around 11,000 foreigners in Azerbaijan in
mid-2005 who had applied for refugee status.
128 Including 250,000 refugees from Armenia, 660,000 fugitives from so-called occupied lands,
100,000 refugees from the border areas between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the front line;
data of the State Committee for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons.
129 Status as for the end of 2005; data from UNHCR 2005 Global Refugee Trends.
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5.2. Migration policy
Migration management system in Azerbaijan is still in its development phase.
Until recently, the authorities responsible for migration policy have limited
their activity to the issues related to refugees and internally displaced persons.
Labour migration existed outside the awareness of the state. Azerbaijan’s first
concept of migration policy in its independent history was adopted in July
2004. The Azerbaijani migration management system is considered as rela-
tively stable.
5.2.1. Evolution
Similarly to the other states established after the collapse of the USSR, Azer-
baijan had no former experience in the area of migration policy. The issues
of migration flows management or attitude towards immigrants took the
attention of the state authorities only a few years ago.
The main influence on the shape of the migration policy of Azerbaijan had
the Karabakh conflict. A mass influx of refugees from Armenia and Nagorno-
Karabakh forced the country to establish legislation and mechanisms for pro-
tecting refugees and IDPs. Azerbaijan joined the Geneva Convention on the
status of refugees in February 1993. It also adopted relevant legal acts on forced
migrants and established a State Committee for Refugees and Internally Dis-
placed Persons in a relatively quick manner. However, actions aiming at im-
proving the refugee situation must be considered as insufficient, on one hand
because of the country’s financial limitations in view of the large immigration
wave130, and using the refugees issue as an campaign’s element for regaining
its lost territories on the other. This forces the displaced persons to vegetate
in temporary places of residence and they still lack many rights.
The subsequent development phase of the Azerbaijan’s migration policy, which
was conducted in the mid-1990s, was the adoption of basic migration legis-
lation. It seemed that this legislation mostly reflected the authorities’ con-
cerns in the influx of unwanted immigrants and the willingness to maintain
the former Soviet control methods over migration flows. This was mostly of
a bureaucratic/administrative nature and related to such issues as principles
130 Which, however, is undoubtedly getting better, in connection to inflow of financial meas-
ures from oil sales.
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of entry, exit and residence. An influx of specialists working in the oil sector
made it necessary to adopt an Immigration Law.
Only in the late 1990s, after the mass departures of economically motivated
migrants, Azerbaijan began its actions to regulate the rights of its citizens
working abroad. In 1999, it joined the UN Convention on Protecting the Rights
of all Migrant Workers and the Members of Their Families. It also adopted
a Law on Labour Migration.
However, due to the weakness of the state authorities and the lack of relevant
international agreements, labour emigrants from Azerbaijan cannot not
count on an efficient support from their state in the event of violating their
rights by the reception country.
Only two years ago, in support of the International Organisation for Migration,
Azerbaijan decided to prepare a comprehensive migration policy. On 14 July
2004, the Council of Ministers approved a concept of state migration policy.
This document identified the following priorities for policy development in
the migration area:
– Introducing an effective control system over migration flows, combating
and counteracting illegal migration;
– increasing state aid for forced immigrants in such areas as accommodation,
access to social services and the labour market;
– granting privileges to the qualified workforce in the influx of labour immi-
grants;
– integrating Azerbaijan with global markets and labour migration mana-
gement,
– decreasing the unemployment level and promoting employment of Azer-
baijan’s own workforce on its internal market.
In order to implement this concept, it was decided to adjust legislation and
devise detailed action plans in the field of migration, and to conclude relevant
international agreements on readmission and protecting the rights of Azer-
baijani citizens employed abroad, among other measures. Labour market
protection and limiting the illegal employment of foreigners were also con-
sidered important.
In July 2006, the president adopted a decree approving the State Migration
Program for the period 2006–2008.
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In practice, applying the approved legislation looks worse than the legisla-
tion as such. Corruption among officials and the lack of an effective system
to control migration flows have resulted in the creation of an extensive mi-
gration ‘grey zone’ in Azerbaijan. Moreover, the system of legal employment
of foreigners currently in force, which is regulated on the basis of obligatory
licenses obtained by the employers, is inflexible and vulnerable to abuses.
On the other hand, the Azerbaijani system of migration management is con-
sidered to be highly stable, which results from the early establishment of in-
stitutions responsible for migration issues and development of bases of a sys-
tem for recording migration flows. Azerbaijan is the only state in the region
which has the National Automatic Passport System (NAPS), which is also a data-
base on external migration flows.
5.2.2. Structures
There is no single structure responsible for migration issues in Azerbaijan.
A large number of institutions dedicated to them reflect the general bureau-
cracy and centralisation which are prevalent in the country. An important
role is played by the administrative support of the Council of Ministers. Since
1998, the Special Governmental Commission for Migration Management has
operated as part of the Council of Ministers. It is responsible for preparing
legislative and executive acts related to migration issues.
The population registration system, fighting illegal migration, issuing set-
tlement permits for foreigners and monitoring foreigners’ observance of resi-
dence principles on Azerbaijan’s territory are managed by the migration ser-
vices of the Ministry of Interior. This service is also in charge of the centres
for illegal migrants. The State Border Guard and Illegal Migration Department
of the Ministry of National Security are responsible for combating illegal mi-
gration.
The issues of labour migration, the regulation of the principles of residence
for foreign employees and working out international agreements on employ-
ing workers are the responsibilities of the Labour Migration Division of the
Labour Department in the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Po-
pulation. The Human Rights, Democratisation and Humanitarian Issues De-
partment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of supervising inter-
national migration policy. All issues related to the status and protection of
refugees are the responsibilities of the State Committee for Refugees and In-
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ternally Displaced Persons. From a short period of time, it has also been res-
ponsible for conducting the procedure for granting refugee status.
5.2.3. International cooperation
Baku’s foreign policy aims to maintain the balance between the influences
of both Russia and the West with a willingness to obtain an external support
to improve borders protection system and to regulate migration flow. This
policy seems also to define Azerbaijan’s external relationships in the field of
migration. The activity of certain international organisations also influences
Baku’s policy. The popularity of individual countries among migrant workers
plays a significant role. However, the Azerbaijani authorities do not seem to
be truly interested in regulating the status of their citizens staying abroad.
In this context, Russia seems to be the main labour market for migrant work-
ers from Azerbaijan. Moscow maintains a non-visa agreement with Baku,
which allows for a free influx of labour immigrants. Aiming at maintaining
the former principles of movement of people and easing restrictions for fo-
reigners seems to be the leitmotiv of Azerbaijan’s participation in coopera-
tion within the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Including Azerbaijan into the European Neighbourhood Policy in June 2004
allowed for the extension of cooperation in the areas of interior and migra-
tion. As of this point, it has mainly been limited to financing migration flow-
related research projects from EU funds. A process is underway to prepare
Action Plans for the Caucasus countries, which will extend cooperation in the
field of JHA, including visa policy and readmission. In 2006, the European
Commission launched a two-year regional programme, entitled “An Inte-
grated Approach to Promoting Legal Migration by Creating National Deve-
lopment Capabilities and Regional Dialogue between the Southern Caucasus
and the European Union”. The TACIS Action Plan for 2004–2005 for Azerbaijan
for the first time includes a separate support program for migration.
Azerbaijan also cooperates with the UNHCR, the IOM and the ILO. It partici-
pates in the Budapest Process and the so-called Cluster Process, which in-
cludes the Caucasus states as countries of origin of migrants and several Eu-
ropean states as countries of their residence, and is aimed at limiting illegal
migration. Azerbaijan is in the course of negotiations on signing of agree-
ments on readmission with Russia, Turkey, the Benelux countries, Denmark
and Switzerland, among others. Regarding cooperation in the area of labour
migration, Azerbaijan has concluded an agreement with Saudi Arabia on send-
ing out doctors to work in this country.
5.3. Conclusions
Azerbaijan is a country of intensive albeit decreasing migration flows. The
highest migration movements were at the turn of the 1990s, when as the re-
sult of the outbreak of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, almost the entire
Armenian population left the country and a broad wave of Azerbaijani mi-
grants from Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh arrived. Since the mid-1990s,
the basic trend, which has been maintained until today, has been labour mi-
gration. The main target country for this kind of migration remains Russia.
Azerbaijan is gradually becoming a transit country, and also a target coun-
try for immigrants and refugees from the Middle East, South Asia and Africa.
The problem of a large number of internally displaced persons (fugitives from
the Karabakh conflict) which has remained unsolved for many years, must
also be considered.
Mass migration in connection with the weakness of state machinery and the
ineffective system of border protection has resulted in uncontrollable migra-
tion flows on the territory of Azerbaijan. Currently, when the largest streams
have finished, the authorities are attempting to develop a comprehensive mi-
gration management system. Despite some progress, including the launch
of a fight against illegal migration and attempts to supervise migration flows,
it cannot be assumed that the Azerbaijani system will be able to handle pos-
sible migration pressure from the Middle East.
6. GEORGIA
Present Georgia is struggling with the depopulation problem which was caus-
ed, inter alia, by the wave of emigration from this country that took place
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is estimated that since the begin-
ning of the 1990s, as much as 20% of Georgia’s population may have left the
country. Moreover, several thousand persons have suffered from internal dis-
placements as a result of the outbreak of military conflicts in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia.
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After the ‘Rose Revolution’ of November 2003, Georgia began to develop
a comprehensive system for migration management, which hitherto had most-
ly fallen outside the state’s control. One of the important elements of this
process were the attempts to ‘civilise’ the labour emigration and to develop
the new system of population registration. However, insufficient protection
of the borders, and in particular a lack of supervision on the border with
Russia (which is controlled by the regimes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
not recognising the authority of Tbilisi), remain the key problems.
6.1. Migration movements
As in neighbouring Azerbaijan, the largest migration wave arose in Georgia
in the first years after gaining independence. The internal crisis connected
with the central government’s loss of control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
the civil war, economic collapse, and subsequent political chaos in Georgia
in the early 1990s resulted in the beginning of mass labour emigration, which
took place almost in parallel to ethnic migration. These emigration trends,
albeit less intensive, are still present. On the other hand, according to official
statistics, since 2004 Georgia has recorded a positive migration balance; this
amounted to 5,500 persons in 2004, and reached 76,300 in 2005 (Table 25).
It is hard to define the causes of such a sudden increase in the migration ba-
lance, since the Georgian Statistics Department only publish data on net
migration, and does not provide data on the number of entries and exits131.
According to the estimations made by local experts, a total of 1.2 million citi-
zens emigrated from Georgia after the collapse of the USSR. Pursuant to the
results of the national census of 2002, 1,114,000 persons left Georgia in the
period 1989–2001. Following the data from the State Statistics Department,
calculated indirectly on the basis of the number of entries and exits, the nega-
tive migration balance in the period 1990–2005 was 886,000 persons (Table 25).
Officially, the annual data on external migration recorded by Visas and Re-
gistration Divisions are lower, and result from the incompleteness of the exit
registration system, as is confirmed by government officials.
131 www.statistics.ge/_files/english/population/Vital%20Statistics.doc
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Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Total
Migration balance
-13.2
-22.6
-139.3
-140.9
-142.6
-127.2
-123.1
-59.9
-39.2
-36.3
-35.2
-31.2
-29.1
-28.6
5.5
76.3
-886.6
Table 25. Migration balance in Georgia in the period 1990–2005 (in thousands of persons)132
Source: State Statistics Department of Georgia
132 These data do not include migration movements on the territories of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.
With regard to its difficult socio-economic situation, Georgia is not considered
an attractive country for immigrants. However, some incidents where Geor-
gia’s territory has been used to conduct illegal transit migration were record-
ed, although they were not of a mass nature.
6.1.1. Ethnic migration
Ethnic migration in Georgia was of a quite different nature than in the other
countries of the Southern Caucasus. Firstly, during the Soviet period, Georgia
was the most multi-ethnical country among Caucasus republics. Secondly, the
conflicts which erupted on Georgian territory at the beginning of the 1990s,
were of an internal nature and developed within specific ethnic/cultural zo-
nes. The result of these conflicts was an increase in the ethnic homogeneity
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of Abkhazia (except for the Gali region), from which around 260,000 Georgians
escaped to Georgia in 1992–1992, and in some areas of South Ossetia, which
about 11,000 persons left. Analogous trends emerged in the case of the Osse-
tians and Abkhazians living in ‘Georgia proper’.
Forced migration from and to Georgia took on a regional aspect as well. The
Ossetians moved to the Russian-controlled North Ossetia, among other places.
Apart from that, some Armenians and Azeris moved to their homelands.
The outbreak of ethnic conflicts and the nationalistic policy conducted by the
first Georgia government against ethnic minorities resulted in an increase in
the number of departures outside Georgia and the Caucasus. This type of emi-
gration particularly affected the population of Russians (the number of which
decreased by around 80% in the period 1989–2002)133, Belarusians, Ukrainians,
Armenians, Jews and Greeks. The main target country for migrants in this
case was Russia. The migration of ethnic Azeris, who were living in the Kvemo
Kartlia region, has proceeded more slowly.
In accordance with its approved international obligations, Georgia obliged
itself to provide residence on its territory for the Meskhetian Turks, who had
lived in south-western Georgia until 1944. Resettled to Central Asia under
Stalin’s orders, they left the Ferghana Valley because of ethnic persecutions
at the end of the 1980s. At present, they live in the southern districts of Russia
(from where their repatriation process to the USA is under way) as well as in
Azerbaijan and in Ukrainian Crimea. According to estimates, there are between
200,000 and 300,000 Meskhetian Turks on CIS territory. Despite the Georgian
government prepared a repatriation program for this group still in years
2002–2003, it has not yet been accepted. Their possible settlement is com-
plicated by the fact that the former living areas of this ethnic group are cur-
rently occupied by Armenians.
6.1.2. Labour migration
During the national census conducted in Georgia in 2002, 113,000 families de-
clared that someone from their closest family members was abroad in order
to work. In the opinion of some researchers, these figures have been reduced
133 According to the data from 1989 census, there were 341,200 Russians living in Georgia,
whereas in 2002 only 67,700.
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because the census was unable to record those families of whom all the mem-
bers had migrated.
The average migrant workers from Georgia are aged not more than 49, and
come from urban areas; about 60% of them are men. Russia accounts for app.
65% of a total number of leaves. However, a slight decrease in this trend has
been observed, resulting from Russia’s introduction of visas for citizens of
Georgia. The inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (formally belonging
to Georgia) who are not included in these statistics, usually have Russian citi-
zenship and have no problems migrating there. Such western countries as
Greece, Turkey, the USA, and Germany are the most frequently chosen target
countries. Migrants from rural areas usually choose Russia, whereas the inha-
bitants of Tbilisi prefer western countries. Women migrate most often to Greece.
Turkey, which in February 2006 abolished mandatory visas for the citizens of
Georgia, is a popular transit country on the route to Western Europe134.
After the results of the research conducted by the International Organisation
for Migration in 2003, concerning the range of remittances sent by the mi-
grants to Georgia, it is estimated that around US$480 million is transferred
to Georgia annually.
6.1.3. Georgia as a route for illegal migration
Illegal immigrants from outside the region (Iranians, Kurds, and Iraqis) mostly
migrate to Georgia via the border with Azerbaijan. They then migrate to West-
ern Europe (either by air, or land and sea via the border with Russia). Until Geor-
gia regained its plenary power over Ajaria, the area bordering with Turkey,
controlled by the leader of the time Aswan Abashidze, was a common place
for illegal border-crossings, often in return for a bribe. This route remains po-
pular among illegal migrants. There are also cases of human smuggling via
Abkhazia135. Research conducted by the International Organisation for Migra-
tion showed that the main target countries for illegal migrants are Turkey,
Russia and Greece136.
Illegal migration seems to be of organised nature. In the opinion of some ex-
perts, the persons organising illegal migration on the territory of Georgia are
134 See IOM, Abroad or Hunger at Home: A Study of Irregular migration from Georgia, Tbilisi 2001.
135 See A. Kukhianidze, A. Kupatadze, R. Gotsiridze, Smuggling through Abkhazia and Tskhin-
vali Region of Georgia, Tbilisi 2004, page 36.
136 IOM, Hardship Abroad or Hunger at Home – A Study of Irregular Migration from Georgia,
2001.
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connected with Russian and Georgian organised crime syndicates and Geor-
gian junior officials.
As in Azerbaijan, Georgia is both a transit country and a country of origin for
victims of human trafficking. In the opinions of American experts, human
trafficking in Georgia has reached a high, but not yet alarming level137. The
victims of this business are usually women (who are exploited as prostitutes
or as the workforce) and children. Women coming from Georgia, as well as
these smuggled via Georgia from Eastern European countries, are often sent
to Turkey or the United Arab Emirates.
6.1.4. Refugees and internally displaced persons
According to data from the State Verification Commission established to de-
fine the number of refugees from Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia, living on
Georgia’s territory, there were 208,000 such persons in this country in 2005.
This number might however be lower, since many refugees were afraid to re-
gister because they might have lost their rights to their property in their for-
mer places of accommodation, or gain a compensation138. According to the
UNHCR information, there were 234,000 IDPs in Georgia at the end of 2005139.
Within the last few years, around 35–40,000 refugees returned to the Gali
region in Abkhazia. Moreover, there are a few thousand refugees from Georgia
itself on the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are not controlled
by the Georgian central government.
There are app. 3,000 Chechen refugees in Georgia (mostly in the Pankisi Gor-
ge)140. Around 2,500 refugees are registered in the Ministry of Refugees and
Settlement. The presence of Chechen refugees has caused serious problems
in Russian-Georgian relationships in the past. Georgia has allowed represen-
tatives of the Russian migration service to enter the territory of the ravine
several times, and has conducted a campaign for the voluntary repatriation of
Chechens, all with the aim of reducing tensions in its relations with Moscow.
A majority of the refugees refused to come back. The representatives of the
137 Ann Graham et al., Governance & trafficking in persons – Georgia: assessment, inventory
and proposed activities, report produced for USAID/Georgia and USAID Bureau for Democracy,
Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, May 2004.
138 Despite the fact that the state verification program did not mention such possibility.
139 However according to data of the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation, there were
about 260,000 internally displaced persons at the end of 2004.
140 At the beginning of the second Chechen war their number amounted to 7,000–9,000.
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refugees accuse the Georgian authorities that, the so called anti-criminal
operations among the Chechen population forced by Russia, constitute the
pretext to conduct illegal arrestment procedures and deportations.
6.2. Migration policy
The state reforms being conducted by the present government are both of re-
volutionary and simultaneously quite chaotic nature, a fact which also influ-
enced the underdeveloped migration management system. New legal acts are
being adopted and new structures established. It also seems that the Geor-
gian government has no clear vision for the final form of this system, nor
a concept of a migration policy. According to official statements, the currently
deployed system will be based on solutions approved by the EU states.
6.2.1. Evolution
Because of the outbreak of ethnic conflicts and civil war and the further crisis
of state institutions, Georgia undertook the development of a migration poli-
cy later than the other post-Soviet countries. Furthermore, a crisis in the sta-
tistics services of the country emerged, which resulted in a practical absence
of registration of the first and largest migration wave out of this country.
The first element of a process to develop the migration management system
was the approval of basic acts and laws, including Law on Citizenship (1993),
on Immigration (1993), on the Legal Status of Foreigners (1993), on Emigration
(1993), and on the Registration and Identification of Citizens and Foreigners
Living on the Territory of Georgia (2000). The adopted legislature is of a rela-
tively restrictive nature, and makes it difficult for the foreigners to settle in
Georgia and obtain citizenship unless they are of Georgian origin. On the other
hand, abolishing the permissive nature of registration and the relevantly libe-
ral visa law encourages those foreigners who do not intend to settle to come
and visit. The Georgian authorities tried to regulate the issues related to con-
trol over migration flows, and in 1998 adopted a provision on introducing so-
called migration cards, which however did not work in practice.
The subsequent phase of developing the migration management system was
the establishment of structures and legislature for the purposes of regulating
residence and protection of internally displaced persons and the refugees. In
1996, a Law on Internally Displaced Persons was adopted. The Ministry for Re-
fugees and Settlement was established. Although the situation of the inter-
nal fugitives in Georgia seems better than that of displaced persons in Azer-
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baijan, they also face difficulties in integration in their new place of residence.
This situation improved slightly after the year 2000; among other measures,
provisions enabling the displaced persons ‘temporary integration’ were
adopted, and actions to improve their residential conditions were taken. In Au-
gust 1999, Georgia ratified the Geneva Convention on the refugees’ status.
The next stage of development of a migration policy is connected with the
‘Rose Revolution’ and a radical reorganization of the state, which was its direct
result. A process of radical reconstruction of the previous legislation in the
area of migration policy was launched. Work on new laws on immigration,
the status of foreigners, labour migration and the concept of a migration po-
licy are under way or have already been completed. As government represen-
tatives emphasise, Georgia’s priorities in the area of migration are to moder-
nise the legislature, complete the reform of migration institutions and to
widen the scope of international cooperation. Georgia has also prepared a de-
tailed action plan in the area of counteracting human trafficking.
At present, the key priority for Georgia is the preparation of up-to-date legis-
lature in the area of labour migration. This is partially regulated by a Law on
Temporary Entry, Residence and Exit of Foreigners from Georgia, and a docu-
ment regulating the principles for registering citizens and foreigners staying
on the territory of Georgia. Works on a Law on Labour Migration, the first such
since gaining the independence, which would regulate such issues as: ensur-
ing the legal protection of Georgian workers abroad, legalising remittances
from emigrants, creating new workplaces for qualified workforce, and develop-
ing a migration-related database, are under way. In order to encourage Geor-
gian emigrants to return to the country, the possibility of introducing dual citi-
zenship is also being considered.
6.2.2. Structures
In the course of the process of reorganising the state administration, it is
hard to define the actual functions, which particular institutions and depart-
ments perform. It also seems that the Georgian authorities do not have any
clear vision for the final form of a migration management system. Institutions
responsible for migration-related issues include: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Labour, Health Protection and Social Care,
the Ministry of Refugees and Settlement and the Ministry of the Interior.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in particular its Consular Department) plays
an important role in preparing legal acts on migration. Moreover, this Minis-
try is responsible for conducting international cooperation in the area of mi-
gration and protecting Georgian citizen’s rights abroad.
The scope of the Ministry of Justice’s duties is as follows: conducting a popu-
lation registration system, issuing residence permits to foreigners, issuing emi-
gration permits, preparation of legislative projects in the area of migration,
and conducting deportation procedures.
The Ministry of Labour, Health Protection and Social Care is responsible for
issues of labour migration and the social protection of immigrants. It is also,
together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in charge of negotiations and
preparation of international agreements on readmission, workforce protection
and defining quotas for foreign employees.
The Ministry of Refugees and Settlement is responsible for issues related to
granting refugee status, registration and providing support to the refugees
and internally displaced persons, as well as accepting plans in the area of mi-
gration and developing a migration development system. It is also in charge
of the control and registration of migration flow. This office was established
in 1994, and is one of the longest-existing institutions handling migration-re-
lated issues.
The problems of combating illegal migration come within the competences
of the Ministry of Interior and the Border Protection Department which is
subject to it.
6.2.3. International cooperation
After the ‘Rose Revolution’, the newly-elected Georgian government activated
its cooperation with worldwide international organisations, the European
Union and Western countries. In June 2005 in its desire to demonstrate the
country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, the Georgian parliament adopted an act
on the unilateral abolition of visas for citizens of the EU and other Western
countries. As part of the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy programme,
work is under way on preparing an Action Plan for Georgia, which will in-
clude a visa and readmission policy. A special European Union’s mission
(EUJUST THEMIS), which was responsible for reform of the justice system,
operated in Georgia for a year (from June 2004), whereas since 2005 EU bor-
der experts have been working in Georgia and supporting the process of mo-
nitoring the Russian/Georgian border. The EU has also prepared training for
officers of the Georgian border guard and police.
Georgia is a member of the IOM and ILO, and cooperates actively with the
UNHCR. Georgia also cooperates with other Western countries in the so-called
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Cluster Process, which supervises the process of the return of illegal immi-
grants. Georgia has signed readmission agreements with Italy, Ukraine, Switzer-
land and Bulgaria, among others, and is negotiating the conclusion of similar
agreements with the Benelux countries, the Czech Republic and Germany. It
also undertakes to conclude as many agreements as possible which will enable
its citizens to be legally employed abroad.
In regard to the generally poor relations between Georgia and Russia, the co-
operation of those states in the area of migration is not proceeding well. Visa
regime has been introduced for the movement of people across the borders,
which makes it difficult for the Georgians to work in Russia. In 2004, Georgia
introduced visa facilitations for the Russian citizens, which enabled them to
obtain visas at border crossings. It has also made a proposal to Russia to launch
negotiations to mutually abolish visas. However, the visa-related issues have
become a kind of ‘hostage’ to the current conflicts between these two coun-
tries, and so a quick liberalisation of movement of people is not yet expected.
During the fall of 2006 a serious crisis in Russo-Georgian relations ensued,
which led not only to Russia halting the issuance of visas to Georgian citi-
zens but also to massive deportations of Georgians and to breaking off of the
transport with Georgia. Georgia participates in migration-related cooperation,
which is conducted within the frameworks of the CIS, in a highly limited
manner.
6.3. Conclusions
Georgia is an country of emigration. The main wave of migration movements
was in the 1990s. At present the migration flows are stabilising, however,
there is still labour migration from this country. A significant decrease in the
current rate of those departing abroad is not to be expected in the short-term
perspective. The main target country for emigrants is Russia, but consider-
ing both the visas in this country and the development of an anti-immigrant
climate of opinion in Russia, countries such as Turkey and the Western Euro-
pean states are becoming ever more popular.
There is a large number of internal refugees from South Ossetia and Abkhazia
in Georgia. During the last few years the authorities have undertaken certain
steps in order to improve their living conditions. Moreover, there are Chechen
refugees living in the Pankisi Gorge, who in the past were a source of serious
conflicts in Russian-Georgian relations.
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Compared to its neighbours, Georgia has the poorest-developed migration po-
licy, which in connection with serious insufficiencies in the area of border con-
trol, makes it difficult to control cross-border movement in an effective manner.
The lack of many regulations and the government’s aim of a total restructur-
ing of the migration management system may, in the long-time perspective,
help to create an up-to-date and well-considered migration strategy.
The main focus of Georgia’s international cooperation in the area of migra-
tion is Europe. At the same time, another target of Georgian policy which is of
a great significance from the viewpoint of social needs, is to improve relations
with Russia, including mitigating the visa regime. Moreover, Georgia coope-
rates with such organisations and agendas as the IOM, the IOL, the UNHCR
and the OSCE in an active manner.
7. ARMENIA
The history of the Armenian nation is abounding in examples of mass emi-
gration, displacements and repatriation. Above all it is necessary to mention
the mass exodus from the Ottoman Empire connected with the Armenians’
genocide in 1915 and the repatriation of Armenians to the USSR from Turkey
and Middle Eastern countries, which took place after the Second World War.
Many centuries of emigration have resulted in development of a scattered
around the world diaspora, which is of a greater number than the current
population of Armenia itself. In 1988, Armenia suffered from an earthquake,
as a result of which around 200,000 people left the country141. It is thus no
surprise that the response of Armenians to an outbreak of ethnic conflicts in
the South Caucasus as well as the socio-economic collapse was permanent
emigration. It is estimated that after the collapse of the USSR, more than
a quarter of the Armenian population left the country.
7.1. Migration movements
The course of migration movements in independent Armenia may be divided
into two basic phases. The first one was connected with the Armenia-Azer-
baijan conflict, which erupted in the final years of the USSR, as well the pro-
141 See Gevork Pogosyan, Migration processes in Armenia, September 1998.
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cesses of ethnic homogenisation, which led to an outflow of representatives
of the national minorities and initiating the migration process of the ethnic
Armenians. The departure of the Armenians was the fundamental feature of
the second migration wave, which was based on socio-economic reasons.
This kind of emigration is currently at a lower level, although it still persists.
In the opinion of local experts around 800,000 to 900,000 people left Armenia,
whose population had amounted to over three million after the collapse of the
USSR. However, some estimations even show as much as 1.1 million people.
According to calculations from the Armenian Air Agency in the period 1989–
–2001 the negative migration balance amounted to more than 600,000 per-
sons (Table 26). This number does not include those persons who left coun-
try by land. According to the national census of 2001, 800,000 persons emi-
grated from Armenia during the period between the censuses (years 1989–
–2001). These persons included both emigrants leaving the country for eth-
nic reasons, and those leaving for economic reasons.
142 Calculated on the basis of data on entries and exits to Armenia, which were taking place on
the border-crossings in the airports. Data from vehicles and trains’ border crossings have been
collected since 2000.
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Incoming
639.9
689.9
470.0
469.5
469.9
473.6
415.5
311.4
292.7
380.2
Outgoing
865.5
831.0
597.8
507.0
517.4
504.9
439.7
318.6
318.4
403.9
Migration balance
-225.6
-141.1
-127.8
-37.5
-47.5
-31.3
-24.2
-7.2
-25.7
-23.7
Table 26. External people movements in Armenia in the period 1992–2001 (in thousands of persons)142
Data provided by the aviation authorities of the Republic of Armenia
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According to estimates from independent experts, around 50,000 – to 60,000
people leave Armenia each year. According to official data, the migration bal-
ance in 2005 calculated on the basis of the number of exits and entries at the
borders was positive, and amounted to 12,500144. However, the balance calcu-
lated on the basis of data provided by the Regional Visa and Registrations Di-
visions (OVIRs) showed a 6,000 advantage of emigration over immigration.
During the first nine months of 2006 the migration balance was negative and
amounted to 37 thousand persons. During the last few years, Armenia has re-
corded some cases of immigration by representatives of the Armenian dias-
pora, as well as by citizens of Armenia who had left the country during the
wave of emigration in the 1990s.
Years
1999 total
1999 CIS countries
1999 other countries
2000 total
2000 CIS countries
2000 other countries
2001 total
2001 CIS countries
2001 other countries
2002 total
2002 CIS countries
2002 other countries
2003 total
2003 CIS countries
2003 other countries
2004 total
2004 CIS countries
2004 other countries
Immigrants
1.7
1.4
0.3
1.6
1.2
0.4
1.6
1.5
0.1
1.7
1.1
0.6
1.9
1.4
0.5
1.5
1.2
0.3
Emigrants
8.6
6.9
1.7
12.0
11.1
0.9
11.9
10.7
1.2
10.9
8.5
2.4
9.5
7.7
1.8
9.2
7.6
1.6
Migration balance
-6.9
-5.5
-1.4
-10.4
-9.9
-0.5
-10.3
-9.2
-1.1
-9.2
-7.4
-1.8
-7.6
-6.3
-1.3
-7.7
-6.4
-1.3
Table 27. Migration balance in Armenia in the period 1999–2004 (in thousands of people)143
Data provided by the Armenian National Statistical Service
143 Calculated on the basis of information provided by the Visas and Registration Divisions
(OWIR’s).
144 Migration Agency data.
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7.1.1. Ethnic migration
The reason for ethnic immigration by the Armenians to Armenia and the emi-
gration of Azeris from this country was an increase in clashes between Ar-
menians and Azeris, and the outbreak of the Karabakh conflict. In the period
1988–1992, the Armenian population left the territories of Azerbaijan en masse,
mostly Baku, Sumgait, Kirovabad (presently Ganca), and the areas adjoining
the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. Moreover, in the course of the military con-
flict, part of the Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh escaped to Armenia.
A few thousand Armenians also left war-torn Abkhazia. Towards the end of
1993 there were 330,000 refugees from Azerbaijan and 78,000 internally dis-
placed persons registered in Armenia145. Also, the Armenian refugees from
Abkhazia and later from Chechnya came to Armenia.
Armenia, which is the most mono-ethnic of all the Soviet Caucasus republics
(Armenians made up around 93% of the total population of Armenia in 1989),
was also a place of repatriation of Russians and other Slavs. This country has
also been abandoned by Jews, Kurds, Greeks and others. Except for the Azeris,
there were relatively small flows, compared to migration flows by national
minorities from the other countries in the region. It is estimated that around
44,000 Russians left Armenia, and around 14,000 of them stayed, including
representatives of religious sects, who had been exiled to the Caucasus in the
nineteenth century146. Large number of Kurds and Yasidis also left the country.
7.1.2. Labour migration
Because of the undocumented nature of labour migration from Armenia, there
is no data on detailed number of temporary migrant workers abroad. Based
on the estimations by S. V. Ryazancev, there are probably around 700,000 Ar-
menian citizens working abroad. In the opinion of the experts, who compiled
the report “Work migration from Armenia in the period 2002–2005”, there
were between 116,000 and 147,000 persons migrating in the given period.
Moreover, between 12% and 15% of the total number of households were
connected with work migration (in the case of around 80% of these house-
holds, one family member was resident abroad, and more than one in the rest
of these cases). The study reveals that around 90% of migrants had gone to
145 The UNHCR data.
146 Data of the national census.
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work in Russia147. Therefore, to estimate the total number of Armenian citi-
zens working abroad, Russian sources should be consulted. When compar-
ing the number of Armenians living in Russia in 1989 to that in 2002, it ap-
pears that this number has increased twofold in this period (from 532,000 to
1,130,000)148. According to the estimates by V. Mukomel of 2005 which were
cited above, there are around 280,000 Armenians working illegally in Russia149.
Migrant workers also leave for Western European countries and the United
States; they frequently choose Poland. In contrast to citizens of the other
Southern Caucasian countries, they do not consider Poland as only a transit
country, but also as a target country for their migration. From January 2003
to January 2006, Armenian citizens submitted 6601 applications in Poland
for residential permits, settlement permits and refugee status150. In the late
1990s, citizens of Armenia were one of the most numerous groups applying
for refugee status in Poland. Currently, most applications are for settlement
permits. In order to legalise their stay in Poland, citizens of Armenia often
decide to marry a Polish citizen or extend their residence visas. Moreover,
groups of Armenian immigrants stay in Poland illegally. In the opinion of Ar-
menian experts, there are around 50,000 Armenians in Poland.
As in Moldova, the financial resources sent by migrants to their families are
significant, and sometimes the most important, source of revenues for Arme-
nian society. Based on calculations conducted at USAID’s request, these trans-
fers amounted to around US$900 million in 2003, whereas the official sources
state a figure of around US$300 million (around 10% GDP)151. Calculations of
the International Monetary Fund are two times lower.
7.1.3. Illegal transit migration
Because of its peripheral geographic location and the current blockage of the
majority of its borders, Armenia is situated outside most routes of illegal
migration from the Middle East and South Asia to Europe. In the period
147 A. Minasyan, B. Hancilova, Economic migration form Armenia In 2002-2005: A Sociological
Survey of Households, OSCE and Advanced Social Technologies NGO, 2005.
148 Data of national census.
149 V. Mukomel, ‘How many immigrants...’, op. cit.
150 Data of the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners.
151 Remittances in Armenia: Size, Impacts, and Measures to Enhance their Contribution to De-
velopment, report submitted to USAID/Armenia, October 2004.
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2001–2003 65 Armenians and foreigners were arrested on charges of organi-
sing illegal transit for immigrants. According to the representatives of the
Armenian Interior Ministry, some of the arrested were connected with crime
structures operating in Russia. In addition, employment agencies are known
to participate in the transit of illegal immigrants.
Illegal migration from Armenia to Europe is conducted mostly by air. In 2004,
Russian border services protecting the borders between Armenia, Turkey
and Iran arrested 199 persons, who had attempted to cross the border illegal-
ly, and 647 persons who had used forged documents when crossing the bor-
der. Within the first three months of 2005, the Russians had arrested 50 people
for violating the provisions of Armenia’s border-crossing, including 49 persons
with forged documents. These included citizens of India, Turkey, Afghani-
stan, Pakistan and China.
Despite a certain increase in illegal crossings, Armenia’s borders do not seem
to be particularly exposed to this phenomenon This situation may rapidly
change in the case of outbreak of any possible crisis in Iran.
7.1.4. Refugees and internally displaced persons
According to UNHCR data, the number of Armenian refugees staying in Arme-
nia at the end of 2005 was 219,000. However, it seems that the actual num-
ber of refugees staying in Armenia is lower when considering the high indi-
cators of emigration to Russia of this part of the population. In connection
with the government’s policy of integration, around 70,000 refugees from
Azerbaijan were granted Armenian citizenship. Referring to the calculations
of the Norwegian Council for Refugees and the Armenian Migration Depart-
ment, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development estimated
that there are around 8,000 internally displaced persons in Armenia, who
were resettled as a result of the Karabakh conflict152.
Armenia is not a popular country for settlement for the refugees from outside
the region. In 2004, 60 Iraqi citizens obtained a right of temporary residence
in Armenia because of military actions conducted in their country. In the pe-
riod 2000–2004, 150 foreigners applied to the Department for Migration and
Refugees for refugee status on the basis of the Geneva Convention, of which
11 applications were approved.
152 ICMPD, Overview... , op. cit., page 36.
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7.2. Migration policy
Compared to other countries in the region, Armenia has a relatively well-de-
veloped migration policy. It governs pursuant to basic legal acts, although
these are partially different from the legislative model in force in the Euro-
pean countries. Armenia has not implemented many assumptions of its migra-
tion policy because of both financial difficulties and ineffective administration.
7.2.1. Evolution
As in the other states which were established after the collapse of the USSR,
the first stage in the development of Armenia’s migration policy was the
adoption of basic legal acts, such as the Law on the Legal Status of Foreign-
ers (1994), on Citizenship (1995), and on Refugees (1999). In November 2000,
Armenia was the first country in the Southern Caucasus to approve a plan
for a state regulation of population migration. This concept established: the
structures responsible for migration-related issues, rules for regulating migra-
tion flows and specific tasks in the area of migration policy and their dead-
lines. The document defines the following tasks for Armenia’s migration poli-
cy: to develop the system of immigration control, to integrate refugees and
forced immigrants who cannot return to their places of residence, to develop
a system for forecasting the influx of forced migrants, to provide support to
the IDPs in their return to permanent places of residence, and to reduce per-
manent emigration.
A subsequent stage in the development of a migration policy was the regu-
lation of the rules of residence and protection of refugees & internally dis-
placed persons. Acts which enabled refugees from Azerbaijan to obtain a citi-
zenship were then adopted. A program for assigning accommodation and
social welfares and issuing identity documents was launched as well.
Pursuant to the provisions of the governmental decree of June 2004 on migra-
tion policy, in the current stage of the migration policy development Arme-
nia will aim to achieve the following goals: developing an effective system
of migration flow management, separating the competences of particular
institutions and agendas responsible for border protection153, integrating Ar-
menia with the international labour market and supervising the phenome-
153 Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran are protected by the Russian border troops.
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non of work migration, supporting the repatriation of highly qualified Arme-
nian citizens who live abroad, combating illegal migration and human traf-
ficking, and improving living conditions of the refugees.
In 2004, Armenia launched the development of a computer database of migra-
tion flows, in which passport data from travellers at all existing border con-
trol points will be collected. It also adopted a draft law on external labour mi-
gration. The new act will focus on regulating: the principles of concluding
agreements with foreign employers, compliant with the law on dealing with
migrant workers outside Armenia, and the methods of legalisation of finan-
cial remittances sent by migrants to their families in the country. Armenia is
also working on introducing dual citizenship to attract the rich Armenian
diaspora to return.
7.2.2. Structures
There is a single institution in Armenia which is responsible for most of the
migration policy. The State Department for Migration and Refugees (at pre-
sent called the Migration Agency), which was established in 1999 as a result
of extending the competences of the office for refugee-related issues, is res-
ponsible for the migration policy of Armenia in its broadest sense. Tasks re-
lated to the social protection of immigrants, defining the employment prin-
ciples, etc. are also conducted by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.
This Ministry is also in charge of devising a strategy in the area of work mi-
gration.
The Migration Agency (the former Department for Migration and Refugees)
is a governmental structure, which since May 2005 has been subject to the
Ministry of Territorial Administration. It is responsible for developing pro-
jects of legal standards for migration, negotiating international agreements,
registering refugees and internally displaced persons and their social pro-
tection, granting them refugee status and temporary ‘protected person’ sta-
tus, and devising a system of migration flows control. It seems that part of the
competences of the Agency and the rights of the Ministry of Labour and So-
cial Welfare are overlapping.
Furthermore, the power structures have competence in the area of migra-
tion: the Police (the former Interior Ministry) and border guard, operating
within the Ministry of National Security. The Police are responsible for a popu-
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lation registry system. Also, a department for combating organised crime
operates within this institution, as does a division for combating illegal mi-
gration.
7.2.3. International cooperation
Armenia cooperates closely with Russia. Its status as a loyal Russian ally means
that citizens of Armenia suffer less from restrictions in the Russian migration
policy compared to citizens of other CIS countries. Thanks to agreements in
force: concerning the legal status of Armenian citizens who permanently
live on the territory of the Russian Federation and the citizens of the RF living
permanently on Armenian territory, on the regulation of voluntary re-settle-
ment processes, on the work of immigrants and the social protection of mi-
grant workers, the citizens of Armenia are provided with relatively good
social and legal protection on the territory of Russia.
Armenia actively participates in a number of plans and actions undertaken
by the CIS in the area of migration, and is also a signatory of agreements on
combating terrorism and border crime, adopted within the framework of the
Collective Security System Organisation.
Armenia was the first member of the IOM in the territory of the CIS. Since
1993, it has been a signatory of the Geneva Convention. It also benefits from
the OSCE advisory in the area of preparing legal acts. It participates in the
European Neighbourhood Policy. The European Union has financed in Arme-
nia a research programme aimed at improving methods of collecting data on
migration flows.
Armenia’s bilateral cooperation with other countries is developing actively.
This country has signed readmission agreements with Denmark, Switzerland
and Lithuania, completed negotiations concerning these issues with the Czech
Republic, Germany, Sweden, Ukraine and the Benelux countries, and is in the
course of negotiating agreements with Russia, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and
Norway. In cooperation with Switzerland, Armenia is implementing a pro-
gramme on supporting the reintegration of Armenian emigrants coming back
from this country. It has also concluded an agreement with Qatar on the
legal employment of Armenian nurses there.
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7.3. Conclusions
Economic collapse, political instability and above all the outbreak of the bloody
military conflict with Azerbaijan caused the basic demographic trend of in-
dependent Armenia to be the mass emigration of its inhabitants. The main
target country remains Russia; Poland is also chosen relatively often. Arme-
nian-Azerbaijani antagonism has caused mass departures by the inhabitants
of Azeri nationality and an influx of Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan.
Armenia’s migration policy is relatively well-developed and operates on basic
documents and structures. However, a part of the assumptions of this policy
has never entered into force, which results from both financial difficulties
and ineffective administration.
Armenia is conducting an active external policy in the area of migration. It co-
operates closely with Russian and international organisations operating on
CIS territory, which means that the citizens of Armenia in Russia are provided
with relatively good social and legal protection. Armenia also cooperates with
the IOM, the ILO, the OSCE and the European Union, and has signed read-
mission agreements with some European countries.
